On Dec. 28, Myanmar’s military regime held the first phase of fraudulent and tightly controlled elections in 102 of the country’s 330 townships. Even though the largest opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), is barred from participating in elections and the military is continuing deadly airstrikes around the country, there are worrying signs that governments around the world, including the United States, may be prepared to reengage the military. Now is not the time for the Trump administration to overhaul U.S. Myanmar policy.
The military has arrested more than 200 citizens for criticizing the election under a restrictive “election protection law.” Even liking Facebook posts critical of the military’s rigged polling exercise has proved sufficient grounds for arrest. With the military in control of less than half of the country’s total territory, granting the regime the political recognition it craves would not serve Washington’s long-term interests or those of the people of Myanmar.
On Dec. 28, Myanmar’s military regime held the first phase of fraudulent and tightly controlled elections in 102 of the country’s 330 townships. Even though the largest opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), is barred from participating in elections and the military is continuing deadly airstrikes around the country, there are worrying signs that governments around the world, including the United States, may be prepared to reengage the military. Now is not the time for the Trump administration to overhaul U.S. Myanmar policy.
The military has arrested more than 200 citizens for criticizing the election under a restrictive “election protection law.” Even liking Facebook posts critical of the military’s rigged polling exercise has proved sufficient grounds for arrest. With the military in control of less than half of the country’s total territory, granting the regime the political recognition it craves would not serve Washington’s long-term interests or those of the people of Myanmar.
Since the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, which ousted the democratically elected NLD and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, U.S. policy has focused on diplomatic isolation of the junta and targeted economic sanctions. The United States has coordinated its sanctions policy and diplomatic messaging with allies such as the United Kingdom, European Union, and Canada to maximize the efficacy of its pressure campaign. However, the Trump administration has signaled it is considering a major overhaul of U.S. policy.
Last November, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem announced that the administration was terminating Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for thousands of Burmese refugees living in the United States. In a statement shockingly at odds with the state of events inside Myanmar, Noem declared, “The situation in Burma has improved enough that it is safe for Burmese citizens to return home. … Burma has made notable progress in governance and stability, including the end of its state of emergency, plans for free and fair elections, successful cease-fire agreements, and improved local governance contributing to enhanced public service delivery and national reconciliation.”
Department of Homeland Security officials have also turned down requests for meetings with human rights advocates in Washington, insisting that current policy is “under review” and shirking further discussion of the administration’s policy. Those affected by Homeland Security’s termination of TPS are not waiting around for solutions to their urgent circumstances. Two groups, the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF) and the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), have filed a lawsuit asking a judge in northern Illinois to consider the legality of the Trump administration’s decision to revoke TPS.
The United States recently refrained from issuing a statement calling on the Myanmar military junta to end violence against civilians and release political prisoners alongside other Western governments such as Canada, Norway, and the United Kingdom on International Human Rights Day.
The Trump administration has also been noticeably quiet on Myanmar’s ongoing election process, which is being held in three phases, with the second two phases taking place on Jan. 11 and Jan. 25. According to a policy directive from Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the United States will not comment on or criticize elections in other countries (except those in Latin America and Europe, where U.S. President Donald Trump takes a direct interest).
Myanmar observers are struggling to make sense of the administration’s unfolding policy. Is it part of a wider shift in U.S. efforts to court the country’s generals, or are individual decisions merely that—rather than reflecting a coherent strategy?
The administration reportedly heard proposals for the United States to consider investing in Myanmar’s rare-earth mining industry last summer. While those proposals have not gone anywhere (China dominates Myanmar’s rare-earth mining industry, reportedly deriving 57 percent of its rare-earth imports from Myanmar alone), analysts worry that Trump’s team may engage the generals when they sense an opportunity.
In July, Trump sent a letter to the head of Myanmar’s military junta, “His Excellency Min Aung Hlaing,” announcing that Washington was imposing a 40 percent tariff on Myanmar’s exports to the United States. U.S. tariffs on Myanmar are among the highest in the world (Brazil and India face 50 percent tariffs) and are tied with Laos for the highest in Southeast Asia.
Rather than raise a stink about the tariffs, however, Min Aung Hlaing responded with an enthusiastic letter of his own, expressing his gratitude for the president’s letter and requesting that Trump consider relieving sanctions pressure in light of Myanmar’s status as a least developed economy.
Two weeks later, the U.S. Treasury Department quietly lifted sanctions on several businesses and cronies close to Min Aung Hlaing and the Myanmar military. While analysts familiar with the decision have downplayed its significance, insisting that it is “technical, not political,” the junta celebrated the decision as an important step toward its reacceptance by the international community and stepped up its propaganda efforts to portray the resistance as losing.
In late 2025, the U.S. Justice Department established a new Scam Center Strike Force, and Congress passed new legislation to dismantle the sprawling cyberscam industry that has flourished in Myanmar and along its shared borders with Cambodia and Thailand since the coup.
The move demonstrated how the U.S. government can still move quickly and forcefully when it perceives a threat to its national security and the welfare of its citizens. According to the Treasury Department, cyberscams cost Americans more than $10 billion in 2024 alone.
The Myanmar military has denied any connection to the scam centers that have proliferated within its borders over the past decade and even launched symbolic crackdowns on major sites such as KK Park near the Thai border in eastern Kayin state. But critics point out that the military is not a reliable partner in global efforts to root out the illegal economies as long as corrupt officers and high-level government officials in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Thailand continue to benefit from the scam industry.
The recently published National Security Strategy makes clear that the Trump administration is prepared to work with undemocratic or authoritarian countries as long as it serves U.S. national interests: “We recognize and affirm that there is nothing inconsistent or hypocritical in … maintaining good relations with countries whose governing systems and societies differ from ours even as we push like-minded friends to uphold our shared norms, furthering our interests as we do so.”
Yet there is no clear upside to seeking good relations with Myanmar’s junta. Simply stated, the rewards are not worth the risks. It is virtually impossible for Washington to supplant Beijing’s stranglehold on Myanmar’s rare-earths supply chain, and the United States has no conceivable shared interests with the Tatmadaw, as the military is known in Myanmar. China, India, and Thailand, which share borders with Myanmar, have all reconciled themselves to maintaining working relations with the Tatmadaw for various reasons.
Beijing has a number of interests in Myanmar, from a stable border region to the security of its energy and infrastructure investments. India cooperates with Myanmar’s military to eradicate insurgencies on their shared border. And Thailand continues to invest in Myanmar’s oil and gas industry while working with the junta to ensure the security of its citizens living along the Thai-Myanmar border.
Cynics and opportunists may argue that Washington is losing the game of influence to Beijing and therefore the time has come to reengage the junta. But this is shortsighted. The United States would be better served by supporting Myanmar’s democratic resistance so that when military rule inevitably ends, Washington retains the goodwill and support of the people, who continue to distrust China.
In the long run, a peaceful and democratic Myanmar is a far more sustainable partner for the United States to work with than a corrupt and embattled military regime. Rather than upend U.S. policy by engaging the generals in Naypyidaw, Washington should increase its support for Myanmar’s opposition and civil society leaders, who will build the next generation of the country’s democracy.
The Trump administration should also expand coordination with allies and partners who share U.S. concerns about the effects of Myanmar’s instability on regional—as well as global—security. Like-minded partners such as Australia, Canada, the EU, and the United Kingdom have an abiding interest in alleviating the suffering of Myanmar’s people and strengthening the next generation of democratic leaders that will come to power there.
The military’s proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party, is guaranteed to dominate the largely predetermined faux election, which will not resolve the country’s deeper political divisions. In fact, the election has exacerbated conflict across the country, as the armed forces seek to extend their hold over territories ahead of the final phase of the election and resistance groups challenge the military’s control over politics. Washington should focus on the long game by laying the groundwork for a future in which Myanmar can be a meaningful U.S. partner in the Indo-Pacific.
