In recent weeks, President Donald Trump has once again put U.S. credibility under assault. His erratic aggression in Iran, unilateral decision-making, and rhetorical attacks on allies have made clear—if it wasn’t already abundantly so—that Washington is becoming a more reckless, less predictable partner.
Just how much damage has been done to U.S. credibility—and how easily can it be repaired?
In recent weeks, President Donald Trump has once again put U.S. credibility under assault. His erratic aggression in Iran, unilateral decision-making, and rhetorical attacks on allies have made clear—if it wasn’t already abundantly so—that Washington is becoming a more reckless, less predictable partner.
Just how much damage has been done to U.S. credibility—and how easily can it be repaired?
Americans have slowly come to realize that rebuilding the world’s trust will be a long and arduous process. But many still hope that, after Trump, steadier leadership and more consistent foreign policy can begin to undo the damage.
But this hope does not reckon with the full extent of the challenge. As new research shows, foreign audiences respond to structural features of U.S. politics—especially polarization—and not just the characteristics of individual leaders. In short, they recognize that even if the next U.S. president proves to be more credible, this doesn’t matter so long as the system itself remains broken.
Along with my colleague Helen Webley-Brown, I study how Americans—as well as their allies and partners—assess the United States’ international reputation. In our research, we have asked more than 7,500 individuals in the United States, Australia, India, Israel, and the United Kingdom to consider various configurations of future U.S. governments and assess how trustworthy they might be.
The work shows a significant, international lack of trust in Washington—one that might stem from, but now goes far beyond, concerns about Trump himself. Indeed, it is the persistent features of the U.S. government, ones that will exist far past 2028, that seem to matter most when it comes to the U.S. reputation.
For example, our study participants were asked to consider either a highly partisan president or a moderate one. Consistently, they viewed a more ideological extreme president—regardless of their party—less favorably. This poses an enduring challenge for U.S. credibility. As gerrymandering, campaign financing, and turnout challenges in U.S. elections have grown, the electoral system itself has become skewed toward less moderate candidates, who struggle to win over foreign audiences.
Indeed, polarization itself consistently swayed attitudes against Washington. When study participants were asked to consider a highly polarized U.S. public, favorability toward the U.S. government dropped by 18 percentage points. Confidence in U.S. extended deterrence dropped by 5 percentage points.
The problem is concerning and persistent. Polarization has plagued U.S. politics for years; the Trump administration is both a product of and an exacerbator of it. And the changing composition of U.S. political demographics, electoral politics, and the media environment mean that polarization is here to stay.
As a result, which party controls the presidency or holds the majority in Congress matters far less to the U.S. reputation than how politics operate, according to our data. Instead, the evident frustration with Washington around the globe is responding to something deeper: the perception that U.S. politics have become fractured and unstable. Yes, Trump is an unprecedentedly untrustworthy president, the view goes, but whomever the American public elects next (or after that) might be as well.
Why, exactly, does polarization matter so much? The answer lies in what it portends. In the words of one study participant: Polarization means “gridlock … disarray, and infighting.” Another wrote, “With a highly polarized divide in the U.S., all they would do is argue amongst themselves and with other nations.”
After all, a highly polarized United States is less capable of sustaining coherent policies over time. Commitments made by one administration may be reversed by the next. Even the Biden administration—for all its various efforts to smooth over relations with allies—did little, in the end, to paper over the shock that the first Trump administration wrought.
The effects of polarization go further. Domestic divisions may slow decision-making or affect political messaging in moments of crisis. Political conflict may force politicians to turn inward, and it could weaken the political will needed to solve the most pressing international challenges.
This has important implications for how we ought to interpret recent events in the Middle East. The Trump administration’s actions toward Iran raise concerns about escalation and point to the persistent erosion of U.S. alliances. Even some of the closest U.S. allies have denied base access and failed to comply with Trump’s demands for support. Decoupling behavior—from new military acquisitions to a focus on artificial intelligence sovereignty—has already begun, not just in response to Trump but also in anticipation that things won’t get better, at least not soon.
While Trump, in many ways, represents a sharp departure from previous administrations, allies and partners increasingly fear that what we see today is the new “business as usual.”
This helps explain why U.S. allies and partners are increasingly hedging. In Europe, debates about “strategic autonomy” and even European nuclear capabilities have gained traction as policymakers question whether reliance on the United States remains prudent. In Asia, concerns about U.S. staying power have also sparked nuclear debates, prompted renewed emphasis on burden-sharing, and contributed to a proliferation of both intra- and interregional security arrangements. These developments are not solely reactions to any single administration. They reflect a deeper—and more long-standing—uncertainty about the United States’ place in the world.
This does not mean that Washington’s credibility is irreparably broken. But it does mean that recovery will be more difficult than many assume. Rebuilding trust will require more than a change in leadership. As long as U.S. politics remain deeply polarized, allies and partners will continue to question whether American commitments can endure. Those attempting to rebuild trust will need to grapple not only with how to make better and more consistent foreign-policy choices, but also with how to repair a deeply fractured domestic political landscape.
