The Iranian regime’s military strategy has always involved an underlying bet that it could control escalation. For the better part of half a century, this gamble mostly paid off. Whether it was taking hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, bombing U.S. Marines barracks in Beirut and Air Force housing in Saudi Arabia, or funding proxies from Afghanistan to Gaza to Iraq, Iran’s actions have, until very recently, never triggered serious blowback.
This month, Iran placed its biggest bet yet on its ability to control escalation. But this time, it appears headed toward calamity.
The Iranian regime’s military strategy has always involved an underlying bet that it could control escalation. For the better part of half a century, this gamble mostly paid off. Whether it was taking hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, bombing U.S. Marines barracks in Beirut and Air Force housing in Saudi Arabia, or funding proxies from Afghanistan to Gaza to Iraq, Iran’s actions have, until very recently, never triggered serious blowback.
This month, Iran placed its biggest bet yet on its ability to control escalation. But this time, it appears headed toward calamity.
In recent bouts with the United States, Iran sought to control escalation spirals and pursued a rather restrained tit-for-tat use of violence. After the United States killed Quds Force leader Qassem Suleimani in 2020, Iran launched a missile strike on two U.S. military bases in Iraq, which notably did not kill any Americans. Similarly, after Operation Midnight Hammer last June, in which the United States struck Iranian nuclear sites, Tehran responded with another missile strike—this time at a U.S. air base in Qatar, again choreographed to make a point but not prompt a wider conflict. During these previous iterations, Iran seemingly cared more about the public statement made by its missiles rather than any actual military effect.
This time is different. Iran has pursued what could charitably called an “escalate to de-escalate” strategy. Tehran has struckstruck not only Israeli and U.S. targets but also other countries across the region, including those that have hitherto been relatively friendly with the regime—such as Oman, Qatar, and Turkey. Moreover, Iran has set its sights beyond military targets to strike oil infrastructure, hotels, and airports, the lifeblood of the region’s economy. Presumably, Iran assumes that by hurting U.S. allies and partners in the region—not to mention every other country that depends on the region’s oil supplies—that will turn up the pressure on the Trump administration to end the war.
“Escalate to de-escalate” strategies, however, rarely work. During the first Gulf War, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein bet that by firing missiles at Israel, he could provoke it into entering the war and thereby shatter—or at least complicate—the U.S.-led coalition with its Arab partners. Instead, the United States made an active effort to hunt down the Iraqi missile launchers in exchange for Israel not entering the conflict. The Scud-hunting campaign was operationally less than successful, but it did work to keep Israel out of the conflict and keep the anti-Iraq coalition united.
More recently, Russia tried similar tactics. The Kremlin’s threats of nuclear war may have influenced the Biden administration’s decisions to send military aid to Ukraine, but it did not stop such support entirely. More recently, Russia flew drones into Poland last September, violating NATO airspace, and ramped up its covert operations in Europe to pressure NATO to cease its support for Ukraine. If anything, those actions have only strengthened European resolve to back Ukraine and oppose Russian aggression.
Iran’s “escalate to de-escalate” strategy will almost certainly backfire as well. The countries that Iran has targeted, including through its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah—Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—are just as likely to join in the fight against Iran as they are to push for a cease-fire. After all, Iran’s missile barrages struck not only U.S. bases but these countries’ civilians and economy. There are initial indications that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others are weighing retaliation.
That would deepen Tehran’s strategic quandary. Gulf states have formidable arsenals of their own. Saudi Arabia’s defense budget alone was $78 billion in 2025, roughly three times that of Iran. Even if these countries choose not to get directly involved in the war, they can assist in other ways: providing intelligence or freezing Iranian assets. The door could be open for European involvement as well, now that NATO has intercepted missiles over Turkey and a drone crashed at a British base in Cyprus.
Iran’s other tactics are bound to alienate countries even farther afield. Much of Asia—including China, India, and Japan—depends on oil coming out of the Persian Gulf, but the economic fallout is being felt as far away as Latin America. While these countries may not necessarily support U.S. and Israeli actions, Iran’s tactics will not ingratiate. If a desperate Iranian regime embarks on a global terrorism campaign, as some experts predict, that will not win any friends either.
Even if these countries did urge the United States and Israel to end the war, would that work? Iran’s strategy still rests on the dubious assertion that these countries have sufficient leverage over U.S. President Donald Trump or Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to shift U.S. or Israeli policy. There is little evidence to suggest that is the case.
Trump has been an Iran hawk since almost the start of the Islamic Republic. In 1980, he called for military intervention against Iran to resolve the hostage crisis. Ever since then, he has advocated for a firm hand—including force—to deal with Iranian transgressions. During his first term, he made exiting the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, more commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, and replacing it with a “maximum pressure” campaign a centerpiece of his Middle East policy. He called killing Suleimani one of the crowning achievements of his first term and last year’s strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities a “spectacular success.”
Netanyahu’s hawkish record on Iran is similarly consistent. He has warned of the dangers of the Iranian regime for more than three decades. Early on, he even compared the threat from a nuclear-armed Iran to that from the Soviet Union. And, like Trump, he was consistently skeptical of diplomatic solutions to Iranian proliferation. Now that Netanyahu sees a chance to end the threat militarily, it will be tough for any regional actor to convince him to back down.
All of this has yet to consider the specific personalities and politics involved. Trump regards backing down as a sign of weakness. As we recently saw with global tariffs, Trump doubles down even when a policy is unpopular, causes economic fallout, or runs into a roadblock. . He and Netanyahu have also shown that they are willing to buck the wishes of allies and partners. Both leaders are also in an election year and have reason to believe that a military victory would be good for their political fortunes. The pleas of other regional actors, should they come, would likely be ignored.
If by some chance Iran’s “escalate to de-escalate” strategy builds diplomatic pressure to end the war—or, more likely, that a combination of waning U.S. public opinion and global economic pressure leads Trump to reverse course—Tehran will still have caused itself long-term damage. Despite its oil resources, Iran’s tattered economy depends on good relations with the rest of the region. An estimated 60 percent of Iran’s trade is with its neighbors. Prior to the current conflict, China was Iran’s biggest trading partner, but Iraq, Turkey, and the UAE were among the top five.
Iran sees itself as the natural hegemon of the Middle East with a large population, vast oil wealth, and a history of empire dating back to ancient Persia. But it is hard for Iran to rule the region if it chooses to bombard friend and foe alike. Memories are long in the Middle East, and Iran’s actions this month could reverberate for generations. Even if the regime survives U.S. and Israeli bombs, it will come out this conflict poorer, weaker, and more isolated than ever before. In other words, even if Iran wins this war in the narrow sense of the term, its victory is bound to be Pyrrhic one.
And that’s the problem with Iran’s compulsive strategic gambling. Roll the dice enough times, and the odds eventually work against you. Iran is about to learn this lesson, and it will have only itself to blame.
