{"id":982,"date":"2025-04-09T02:52:08","date_gmt":"2025-04-09T02:52:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/firearmupgrades.com\/?p=982"},"modified":"2025-04-09T02:52:08","modified_gmt":"2025-04-09T02:52:08","slug":"china-prepares-to-endure-a-trade-war-foreign-policy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/firearmupgrades.com\/?p=982","title":{"rendered":"China Prepares to Endure a Trade War \u2013 Foreign Policy"},"content":{"rendered":"<p> <br \/>\n<br \/><\/p>\n<div>\n<p>Welcome to\u00a0<em>Foreign Policy<\/em>\u2019s China Brief.<\/p>\n<p>The highlights this week: Beijing faces a strategic dilemma amid\u00a0<strong>escalating trade conflict<\/strong>, rumors spread about\u00a0a\u00a0<strong>top-ranked general<\/strong>, and a long-awaited\u00a0<strong>stimulus package<\/strong>\u00a0could soon be a reality.<\/p>\n<div class=\"newsletter-unit-signup--shortcode-fallback\">\n<h2 class=\"dek-heading\">\n                <a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/category\/china-brief\/\">Sign up<\/a>  to receive China Brief in your inbox every Tuesday.            <\/h2>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<div data-shortcode-newsletter=\"china_brief\" class=\"newsletter-unit-signup newsletter-unit-signup--shortcode email-capture--step-1 newsletter-unit-signup--shortcode-china_brief\">\n<div class=\"newsletter-china_brief newsletter-shortcode-china_brief\">\n<div class=\"show-on-email-capture--signed-up hide-from-newsletter-subscriber newsletter-unit-signup--shortcode--container\">\n<div class=\"newsletter-unit newsletters-page newsletter-row\">\n<div class=\"newsletter-china_brief\">\n<h2 class=\"dek-heading\">Sign up to receive China Brief in your inbox every Tuesday.<\/h2>\n<p>\n                        <button class=\"button\">Sign Up<\/button>\n                    <\/p>\n<div class=\"grid--flex newsletter-china_brief newsletter-signup-container\" role=\"group\" aria-label=\"China Brief sign up form\" tabindex=\"0\">\n<div class=\"buttons\">\n<div class=\"hide-from-newsletter-subscriber privacy-policy-container\">\n<div class=\"privacy-policy-acknowledge\">\n<p><small>By submitting your email, you agree to the <a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/privacy\/\" target=\"_blank\">Privacy Policy<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/termsofuse\/\" target=\"_blank\">Terms of Use<\/a> and to receive email correspondence from us. You may opt out at any time.<\/small><\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p>\n    <label for=\"email-china_brief\">Enter your email<\/label><br \/>\n    <input type=\"email\" name=\"email\" class=\"hide-from-reg hide-from-sub\" id=\"email-china_brief\" aria-required=\"true\" required=\"\"\/><\/p>\n<p>    <button class=\"button button--signup \" data-newsletter-id=\"china_brief\" data-sourceid=\"In-article unit\">Sign Up<\/button>\n  <\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<hr\/>\n<h3>Beijing Faces Strategic Dilemma on Trade<\/h3>\n<p>The White House has said that tariffs against China amounting to <a href=\"https:\/\/x.com\/EdwardLawrence\/status\/1909645258729594976\">104 percent<\/a> have taken effect after Beijing refused to lift retaliatory tariffs\u2014introduced after U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s big announcement last week\u2014even after Trump threatened additional 50 percent tariffs in response.<\/p>\n<p>Beijing has promised tough measures in response, calling Trump\u2019s move a \u201cmistake on top of a mistake\u201d and pledging to \u201cfight to the end.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>But the escalating trade conflict has left China with a strategic dilemma, and every potential approach is risky and painful. The Chinese political leadership made the same mistake as many people in U.S. institutions: They thought that Trump\u2019s second term would look like his first, without realizing that guardrails were already broken.<\/p>\n<p>China was preparing for a tense standoff over trade with the United States, like two gunslingers eyeing each other at high noon. But rather shooting his target, Trump began throwing dynamite. That is a problem for Beijing: The United States is doing collateral damage to bystanders or allies\u2014but it might also blow up China in the process.<\/p>\n<p>If the tariffs take full effect, the scenario isn\u2019t good for anyone. China has leaned more <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/04\/07\/business\/china-manufacturing-exports-trump-tariffs.html\">heavily on exports<\/a> following its failure to kickstart domestic consumption in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Those goods have found new markets worldwide, but in the event of a <a href=\"https:\/\/economictimes.indiatimes.com\/news\/international\/global-trends\/there-will-be-blood-jpmorgan-warns-of-60-global-recession-odds-under-trump-tariffs\/articleshow\/119965761.cms?from=mdr\">likely global recession<\/a>, those markets will contract.<\/p>\n<p>However, Chinese supply chains are less dependent on the United States than U.S. supply chains are on China. China can find substitutes for almost everything that it imports from the United States, especially if more suppliers want to diversify their markets to cope with an unreliable Washington.<\/p>\n<p>So, what happens next? The optimistic scenario, in which both sides talk themselves into the status quo ante or something close to it, involves diplomacy and flattery. Something like this prevailed during Trump\u2019s first term, with a trade deal reached in January 2020\u2014albeit largely <a href=\"https:\/\/www.piie.com\/blogs\/realtime-economics\/2022\/china-bought-none-extra-200-billion-us-exports-trumps-trade-deal\">unrealized<\/a> due in part to the pandemic. This version is what China would prefer.<\/p>\n<p>Yet Trump appears unwilling to accept any terms but supplication\u2014and the language coming out of the White House leaves little room for Beijing to back down without suffering domestic political damage. Trump\u2019s suggestion that China \u201cwants to make a deal,\u201d for example, makes it less likely that China will do so.<\/p>\n<p>Chinese officials are used to massaging leaders\u2019 egos\u2014a key part of dealing with Trump. But it is now a contest of strength between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping; it will be difficult for Chinese analysts to suggest a way out that might undermine Xi. One of China\u2019s premier think tanks was just <a href=\"https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/news\/china\/politics\/article\/3305501\/top-china-think-tank-shuts-down-research-centre-after-questions-party-loyalty?module=top_story&amp;pgtype=subsection\">shuttered<\/a>, in part due to a researcher criticizing Beijing\u2019s response to Trump\u2019s initial announcement.<\/p>\n<p>China\u2019s response to Trump\u2019s April 2 declaration was tough, not only imposing a 34 percent retaliatory tariff on the United States but also <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnbc.com\/2025\/04\/07\/chinas-counter-tariffs-raise-the-specter-of-an-intense-trade-war-with-us.html\">unleashing<\/a> a wave of investigations into U.S. firms, placing some U.S. companies on its \u201cunreliable entities\u201d list, and imposing additional export controls on rare earths.<\/p>\n<p>Such threats and punishments are the most likely immediate response. A real trade war is a contest in ability to endure pain. Economically, the United States before Trump\u2019s return was <a href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/special-report\/2024-10-19\">doing considerably better<\/a> than China. But the Chinese public is probably better at enduring the costs of a trade war than a polarized United States, where tariffs are also <a href=\"https:\/\/thehill.com\/homenews\/administration\/5236989-partisan-divisions-tariffs-foreign-alliances-poll\/\">broadly unpopular<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>One serious escalatory possibility would be China <a href=\"https:\/\/tnsr.org\/2021\/11\/caught-between-giants-hostage-diplomacy-and-negotiation-strategy-for-middle-powers\/\">taking hostages<\/a>, as it did most prominently after Canada arrested Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou. This would most likely take place in the form of exit bans on U.S. businesspeople residing in or visiting China rather than arrests. A more aggressive posture\u2014in the South China Sea, or toward Taiwan\u2014that signals defiance to the United States is also possible.<\/p>\n<p>If the crisis continues past this week, China could also encourage nationwide <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2017\/03\/09\/world\/asia\/china-lotte-thaad-south-korea.html\">boycotts of U.S. goods<\/a>, a measure deployed against countries such as South Korea in the past. A worst-case scenario would see public anger turn against U.S. targets in ways that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can\u2019t fully control, as occurred during <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-asia-19312226\">anti-Japanese<\/a> riots in 2012, when mobs attacked schools and smashed up restaurants.<\/p>\n<p>China could also try to punish some of the Southeast Asian countries, such as Vietnam, that are <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/asia-pacific\/vietnam-says-buy-american-defence-security-products-trump-tariffs-loom-2025-04-08\/\">scrambling<\/a> to cut deals with the United States by offering to purchase more U.S. security products. That seems unlikely, though, as Chinese leaders probably see Trump\u2019s tariffs as an opportunity to bring these countries <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/us-news\/2025\/apr\/08\/how-trump-tariffs-could-push-vietnam-into-the-arms-of-china\">closer to Beijing<\/a>, playing off anger and shock.<\/p>\n<p>Even if the trade war escalates further, I expect that China is looking seriously at ways to pay off Trump, his relatives, or people that it thinks can influence his administration. Officials in Beijing have experience dealing with <a href=\"https:\/\/pennsylvaniaindependent.com\/politics\/president-donald-trump-corruption-firings-pardons-government-ethics\/\">corrupt elites<\/a>, even if it is usually on a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ussc.edu.au\/beijing-s-grand-seduction-of-ruling-elites-in-the-pacific-southeast-asia\">smaller scale<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>That approach could take the form of literal payouts or favorable terms for Trump-linked companies, especially since the administration has declared that it will no longer <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/presidential-actions\/2025\/02\/pausing-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-enforcement-to-further-american-economic-and-national-security\/\">attempt to enforce<\/a> U.S. laws on foreign corruption.<\/p>\n<hr\/>\n<h3>What We\u2019re Following<\/h3>\n<p><strong>Political purge watch.<\/strong> There are <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2025\/04\/04\/china\/china-military-general-he-weidong-absence-intl-hnk\/index.html\">persistent rumors<\/a> that one of China\u2019s top-ranked generals, He Weidong, is under investigation. He, 67, is a Xi loyalist who has <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2025\/04\/04\/china\/china-military-general-he-weidong-absence-intl-hnk\/index.html\">supported<\/a> the leader\u2019s anti-corruption crackdown; he also rose through the ranks in a People\u2019s Liberation Army that is rife with corruption at every level, to which He is likely personally exposed.<\/p>\n<p>But there is no official word of an investigation; the speculation is based on He\u2019s failure to appear in public for a few weeks\u2014something that has previously led dissidents astray in generating false stories of purges or defections. The CCP\u2019s opaqueness, especially around leaders\u2019 health, contributes to this trend; there is a chance that He is simply unwell.<\/p>\n<p>One target is more certain: Liu Tianran, a financier and the son of former Vice Premier Liu He, is under investigation and has possibly been detained, according to <em>Financial Times<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/47d8b4b9-226d-4045-8a42-db5f9be89a9f\">reports<\/a> that cite multiple sources. Liu He headed trade talks during Trump\u2019s first term and retired from the office in 2023. But crackdowns have targeted retired politicians before, and going after family members is often a first step.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Chinese soldiers in Ukraine.<\/strong> Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky summoned the Chinese <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2025\/04\/08\/europe\/ukraine-says-captured-chinese-nationals-russia-intl\/index.html\">ambassador<\/a> in Kyiv after two Chinese nationals were captured fighting for Russia, and he said that Ukraine has evidence of many more Chinese soldiers in the Russian ranks.<\/p>\n<p>China supplying manpower to Russia would be a major escalation, but it seems unlikely. It is much more probable that the captured Chinese nationals were mercenaries employed by one of the many private military contractors (PMCs) that Russia uses.<\/p>\n<p>Those PMCs often recruit soldiers from Central Asia, but their existing manpower pools may be drained\u2014or these soldiers might be some of the many Chinese citizens residing in neighboring countries such as Kazakhstan or Mongolia. (Long wars have a way of drawing in unexpected participants, such as the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.piie.com\/blogs\/north-korea-witness-transformation\/antony-beevor-yang-kyoungjong\">Korean soldier<\/a> captured by the United States on D-Day.)<\/p>\n<hr\/>\n<h3>FP\u2019s Most Read This Week<\/h3>\n<hr\/>\n<h3>Tech and Business<\/h3>\n<p><strong>Stimulus at last?<\/strong> Since the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese investors and consumers have waited like farmers for rain for a stimulus package on the scale that China released in response to the 2008 global financial crisis. Though there have been stimulus efforts, Xi\u2019s aversion to \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/opinion\/articles\/2023-08-30\/china-xi-jinping-s-live-to-work-ideology-alienates-youth\">welfare-ism<\/a>\u201d as well as his anxiety about potential <a href=\"https:\/\/www.chicagobooth.edu\/review\/how-china-s-stimulus-plan-inadvertently-boosted-shadow-banking\">side effects<\/a> has kept them <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cepweb.org\/chinas-monetary-stimulus-aggregate-and-structural-implications\/\">relatively small<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>The U.S. tariffs may have finally moved the needle, however, with an <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2025-04-07\/china-discusses-frontloading-stimulus-to-counter-tariff-hit?embedded-checkout=true\">accelerated stimulus<\/a> package now under discussion and Xi saying that he will \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2025-04-07\/xi-vows-to-fully-unleash-consumption-in-face-of-trump-tariffs?srnd=next-china&amp;sref=6ZE6q2XR&amp;embedded-checkout=true\">unleash<\/a>\u201d domestic consumption. The problem is that Chinese households are generally cautious spenders in uncertain times, and after COVID-19 lockdowns, they don\u2019t trust their own government or the U.S. government to keep things stable.<\/p>\n<p><strong>TikTok extension.<\/strong> A proposed deal to sell TikTok\u2019s U.S. business was held up after China said in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/technology\/tiktok-deal-put-hold-after-china-indicated-it-would-reject-deal-over-tariffs-say-2025-04-04\/\">retaliation<\/a> for U.S. tariffs that it wouldn\u2019t approve the deal, prompting Trump to extend another 75-day stay on the U.S. banning the app (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/news\/world\/united-states-canada\/article\/3305587\/senator-mark-warner-says-new-trump-tiktok-extension-may-violate-law\">possibly illegally<\/a>). The holdup was a reminder that TikTok, which is controlled by Chinese giant ByteDance, can\u2019t make a deal without Beijing\u2019s sign-off.<\/p>\n<p>China hawks in the U.S. Republican Party have gone quiet on TikTok since Trump made defending it one of his interests after years of vocal opposition to the app.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n<p><br \/>\n<br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2025\/04\/08\/china-tariffs-trump-trade-war-us-economy\/\">Source link <\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Welcome to\u00a0Foreign Policy\u2019s China Brief. The highlights this week: Beijing faces a strategic dilemma amid\u00a0escalating trade conflict, rumors spread about\u00a0a\u00a0top-ranked general, and a long-awaited\u00a0stimulus package\u00a0could soon be a reality. Sign up to receive China Brief in your inbox every Tuesday. Sign up to receive China Brief in your inbox every Tuesday. Sign Up By submitting [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":983,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-982","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-politcical-news"},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/firearmupgrades.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/982","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/firearmupgrades.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/firearmupgrades.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/firearmupgrades.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/firearmupgrades.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=982"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/firearmupgrades.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/982\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/firearmupgrades.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/983"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/firearmupgrades.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=982"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/firearmupgrades.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=982"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/firearmupgrades.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=982"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}