{"id":5039,"date":"2026-06-09T05:49:41","date_gmt":"2026-06-09T05:49:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/firearmupgrades.com\/?p=5039"},"modified":"2026-06-09T05:49:41","modified_gmt":"2026-06-09T05:49:41","slug":"rebuilding-u-s-shipyards-requires-public-investment","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/firearmupgrades.com\/?p=5039","title":{"rendered":"Rebuilding U.S. Shipyards Requires Public Investment"},"content":{"rendered":"


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In the roughly six weeks from Operation Epic Fury\u2019s start until the April 8 cease-fire, more than 20 commercial vessels were hit in or around the Persian Gulf. If U.S. shipyards had to replace the gross tonnage, the process would likely take more than 12 years. China could build that capacity in about eight days. In this way, the war in Iran has put a spotlight on declining U.S. maritime power and the U.S. industry\u2019s inability to produce and repair the ships needed to fight a long-term conflict.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

The war has also exposed that the global economy can no longer take access to open oceans for granted. At the peak of the conflict, more than 700 ships were stranded<\/a> near Iran, effectively leaving some 20,000 mariners hostage<\/a> at sea. Some vessels reflagged under registries more favorable to Iran. Others became \u201czombie ships<\/a>\u201d by claiming the identities of scrapped vessels. Still others falsified locations or went dark<\/a>\u2014tools typically used by sanctions-evading vessels<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Roughly 80 percent of global trade by volume moves by sea, and open maritime exchange has underwritten decades of rising global prosperity. But the Iran conflict has revealed the fragility of that system and raised questions about what role the United States intends to play within it\u2014proponent, defender, or antagonist.<\/p>\n

Whatever Washington intends, its ability to sustain its global maritime ambitions has eroded. For years, U.S. shipyards have delivered well under 1 percent of global commercial tonnage. Singapore, a country smaller than the Atlanta metropolitan area, built more gross tonnage<\/a> in 2024 than the entire United States. Roughly 90 percent of U.S. military equipment moves by sea, but the country\u2019s shipyards can no longer reliably build or repair the vessels required. The government\u2019s fleet of military cargo ships held in reserve for wartime sealift now averages 46 years old<\/a>, more than twice the typical lifespan of a commercial vessel.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s not that the United States cannot build ships; in fact, it had created one of the world\u2019s largest merchant marines by the end of World War I and grew an industry that, at its World War II<\/a> peak, could build the nation\u2019s entire prewar commercial tonnage in three years.<\/p>\n

Reviving that industry will take more than piecemeal grants, scattered foreign investments, or the commissioning of a prestige battleship class. A turnaround will only happen by using tools that have worked in the past: public investment and public support.<\/p>\n

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A modern, angular gray naval ship at a dock. A long line of shipyard workers wearing bright orange safety vests stands along the ship’s deck behind a red, white, and blue banner. In the foreground, a man in a dark suit and red tie stands on a stage decorated with several American and state flags, waving his right hand.<\/figcaption>

U.S. President Donald Trump waves after speaking to guests during a visit to the Fincantieri Marinette Marine shipyard in Marinette, Wisconsin, on June 25, 2020.Scott Olson\/Getty Images<\/span> <\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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A bipartisan consensus has emerged in Washington to reverse the recent maritime decline. President Donald Trump\u2019s \u201cMaritime Action Plan<\/a>\u201d and the congressional support for the proposed SHIPS for America Act<\/a> reflect the sense of urgency. However, neither approach addresses the full scope of the industry\u2019s challenges because neither provides an assured stream of funding or industry confidence that the government will maintain its maritime commitments beyond election cycles. After all, fees on Chinese vessels were originally designed to be a major source of revenue to finance SHIPS Act priorities, but recent tariff negotiations have shown<\/a> that such fees can be easily traded away<\/a> in exchange for other concessions.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

The White House\u2019s recent budget proposes to increase the Navy\u2019s funding by 46 percent and support both combat and noncombat ships. Trump has called for building a new \u201cgolden fleet,\u201d including asking for an estimated $17 billion<\/a> for a new \u201cTrump-class\u201d battleship.<\/p>\n

But the economics of U.S. production suggest that staggering obstacles lie ahead. The United States faces a 45 percent<\/a> shortfall in tankers and less than a quarter of the commercial vessels needed to sustain a wartime economy in the Pacific. A U.S.-built refueling tanker costs five times more<\/a> than Japanese- or South Korean-built counterparts. More than 80 percent<\/a> of U.S. Navy ships under construction are behind schedule, and delays in both commercial and naval yards stem from obsolete equipment, employee turnover as high as 100 percent<\/a>, and supply chain unreliability.<\/p>\n

Decades of underinvestment and industrial decline cannot be reversed with a single executive order or congressional appropriation. A turnaround gets even harder when the individuals tasked with leading it only stay in office for a fraction of the time that it takes to build a destroyer. The second Trump administration\u2019s first secretary of the Navy held the job for 13 months. The office tasked with leading maritime rejuvenation inside the National Security Council was<\/a> gutted<\/a> only a few months after Trump\u2019s April 2025 executive order<\/a> titled \u201cRestoring America\u2019s Maritime Dominance.\u201d And the Maritime Administration, the Transportation Department agency tasked with overseeing maritime interests, has an aging staff and a 12 percent vacancy rate<\/a>.<\/p>\n


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A vintage illustrated poster with a yellow background and the bold text “On The Job For Victory.” The central illustration shows a shipyard worker in brown overalls and a cap, holding a large tool with a hose and gesturing forward with his other hand. In the background, silhouettes of cranes and ship hulls under construction are visible.<\/figcaption>

A poster shows a workman in a shipyard for the U.S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., circa 1917. Buyenlarge\/Getty Images<\/span> <\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Even in its midcentury heyday, U.S. shipbuilding was a boom-and-bust industry. It flourished with World War II infusions but soon contracted in the 1950s as European and Japanese competition increased. A revival around the time of the Nixon administration expanded merchant marine protections and helped bring new business to U.S. yards.<\/p>\n

But in the early 1980s, the Reagan administration terminated key subsidies and loan guarantees that had backstopped the industry for decades. The timing coincided with the end of an offshore-drilling boom, and within five years, the combined pressures caused order books to plummet, the industry\u2019s employment to decrease by a third, and 40 percent of active yards to shutter<\/a>. The collapse was not inevitable but rather a matter of policy choices.<\/p>\n

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