\n
<\/p>\n
U.S. President Donald Trump has two basic options regarding Iran right now. He can either push through an imperfect deal and sell it to the American people as a victory; or he can bet that Washington can sustain more economic and political pain than Tehran and continue to play a geopolitical game of chicken.<\/p>\n
Which will it be? The stakes get higher with each passing day. This week, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a club of industrialized economies, projected that global growth could slow to 2.1 percent\u2014a sharp drop from last year\u2019s 3.4 percent\u2014if a deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz isn\u2019t reached this year.<\/p>\n
On the latest episode of FP Live, I spoke with Robert Malley, a lead negotiator in the Obama administration\u2019s 2015 Iran nuclear deal, and also a special envoy for Iran under President Joe Biden. Malley now runs the Middle East program at the International Crisis Group and teaches at Yale University\u2019s Jackson School of Global Affairs. Subscribers can watch the full discussion in the video box atop this page, or download the free FP Live podcast. What follows here is a condensed and lightly edited transcript, exclusive to FP Insiders.<\/p>\n
Ravi Agrawal:<\/strong> So, every week now, there are new reports that we are close to a deal, and then nothing happens. What do you make of the ongoing talks between Washington and Tehran?<\/p>\n Robert Malley:<\/strong> Every day is Groundhog Day<\/a>, but the groundhog is very sick. Every day is the same craziness. You just mentioned it: Within a 24-hour span, the president can say, \u201cwe\u2019re on the verge of a deal,\u201d that he \u201cdoesn\u2019t need a deal,\u201d he \u201cdoesn\u2019t want to talk to the Iranians,\u201d he\u2019s \u201ctalking to the Iranians,\u201d he\u2019s \u201cgoing to escalate,\u201d he\u2019s \u201cgoing to end the war,\u201d or he\u2019s just going to \u201cwalk away.\u201d So to measure where we are today, we\u2019d have to measure the president\u2019s mood minute by minute. That wouldn\u2019t be very productive, so I think we should take a step back.<\/p>\n Big picture, both sides\u2014you would think\u2014have an objective interest in ending at least the Strait of Hormuz portion of this war. For the United States, it\u2019s pretty self-evident what the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is costing economically and politically for the president and his party. Just today, oil executives are saying that if this goes on for a few more weeks, we could see a spike in the price of oil at levels that would make today look like a very easy phase of the economic hardship. So from Trump\u2019s point of view, it would seem to make perfect sense: Let\u2019s just open the Strait of Hormuz.<\/p>\n From the Iranian point of view, they could always close it in the future, but opening it now means that they could try to get some more revenue, which they have been forgoing so far. They would still have the deterrence of being able to close it, but at least they would start putting some oxygen back into their economy, particularly if it were wedded with some form of economic relief, which would be their demand. And then they could deal with the nuclear issues, and other issues, further down the road.<\/p>\n So we always seem to come to the edge of that deal, and then something pulls it back. I don\u2019t want to put all of the blame on the U.S. side, because God knows the Iranians can be very hard to negotiate with, but in this case, it seems that the president is torn between this desire to end this phase, which is really costing him, but he hates appearing weak. People are whispering in his ear all the time, \u201cA little more pressure, you\u2019re gonna get them to buckle, you\u2019re going to get them to surrender.\u201d He\u2019s always had an affinity for the language of force. So to give up now, when he thinks he may be close to a bigger achievement\u2014he doesn\u2019t seem to be prepared to do it, and the amount of mistrust just makes everything that much harder. So I think we are close, but \u201cclose\u201d in this instance could be very far away.<\/p>\n RA:<\/strong> You know this so well, but negotiations, I think, always begin with maximalist goals. And I\u2019m curious what you see as the minimal goals both sides must have in order to reach a deal.<\/p>\n RM:<\/strong> The minimalist goal is what I just mentioned, more or less, which is that the United States needs to know that the Strait of Hormuz is open to regular traffic, so that oil and energy prices start declining again.<\/p>\n RA:<\/strong> But Rob, that is the status quo prewar, basically.<\/p>\n RM:<\/strong> Yes. Not only is this war illegal and unjustified both domestically and internationally, but completely counterproductive for the reason you just put your finger on, which is that the main goal of the war today is to undo the impact of the war, to open the strait that was not closed before the war began. So it is obviously absurd, and that may be one of the reasons why the president hesitates, because he knows what critics will say. We went through all of this to get back to a situation that didn\u2019t exist before the war, and is in some ways worse, because now Iran has used\u2014and knows that it could use again, and the rest of the world knows they could use again\u2014this ability to close down the Strait of Hormuz. But at the minimum, that\u2019s what the president needs. If he doesn\u2019t get that, he has nothing.<\/p>\n At the minimum, what the Iranians need is the end of the blockade\u2014and some kind of end to the war. I don\u2019t even know what that means, but they keep insisting on it. End of the war in Iran, end of the Israeli war on Lebanon, and some measure of economic relief. They probably know they\u2019re not going to get that much simply in exchange for opening the Strait of Hormuz, but whether it\u2019s some economic toll system in which ships that cross through the Strait of Hormuz have to pay a fee for environmental reasons, or sanctions relief with access to some of their assets that have been frozen and cut, they\u2019re going to need some economic benefit, because otherwise they will face a calamitous economic situation. No matter how this war ends, it\u2019s going to be very hard for them to make up for all of the economic loss that they\u2019ve incurred. So they need to have something up front to justify them going back to a situation where the Strait of Hormuz is not closed.<\/p>\n RA:<\/strong> You mentioned Israel and Lebanon there. How important a piece of the puzzle is it? It\u2019s telling that Iran has been trying to tie a cease-fire with Hezbollah into a larger U.S.-Iran deal. But then as a result, there have also been all these growing tensions between Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, which are emerging now into the public sphere.<\/p>\n RM:<\/strong> It is very important, it appears, for the Iranian regime to have a linkage to Lebanon, at least for the first phase\u2014in other words, at least in order to get a memorandum of understanding of some sort with the United States. There are many reasons for that; obviously, Hezbollah has been a core partner of Iran, and it\u2019s important for Iran to show that it is not fighting the struggle only for itself, but for the broader axis of resistance, or what remains of it. It could score some points in that way, in saying, \u201cWe\u2019re fighting for a broader Arab cause, not just for our own interests.\u201d But yes, they want to preserve Hezbollah as much as possible as an asset. Just as it served them in the past, they want it to serve them in future. So I think you have to take them at their word when they say that without some cessation of hostilities in Lebanon, they\u2019re not prepared to agree to a deal with the U.S.<\/p>\n Now, you could define what a \u201ccessation of hostility\u201d means. Does it mean no attack on Beirut? Does it mean no further expansion of Israel\u2019s occupation? There could be some wiggle room there, but certainly you can\u2019t see the intensity of Israel\u2019s current fighting in Lebanon if Iran is going to enter a deal with the United States.<\/p>\n But right now, in order to get into this deal, Iran has made its position very clear\u2014I must admit, clearer than I would have expected. That is one of the reasons why Trump had that difficult conversation with Prime Minister Netanyahu, in which he told him, you\u2019re \u201cfucking crazy<\/a>\u201d if you think you\u2019re going to strike Beirut. And it appears to have had some effect, although one of the most perceptive things that Trump said recently is that cease-fires in the Middle East mean that the fire is a little more moderate<\/a> than it was before. That\u2019s what we\u2019re seeing, including today in Lebanon. It\u2019s not as if Israel has stopped firing in Lebanon any more than it has stopped firing in Gaza.<\/p>\n RA:<\/strong> So true. We haven\u2019t talked about the nuclear angle much so far, and I wonder how important you think that is in current talks, or whether both sides realize this is way too complicated to get into right now, and we need some sort of a first-phase deal before we can get to that point.<\/p>\n RM:<\/strong> One of the ironies is that right now, all the focus is on the Strait of Hormuz, not so much on the nuclear file, which purportedly was why the war was launched in the first place\u2014although there, too, there\u2019s an irony, because Trump claimed that he had obliterated Iran\u2019s nuclear program last June. So irony, or paradox, and illogical point after illogical point. But it is interesting that the focus doesn\u2019t seem to be so much on the nuclear file. It\u2019s going to be a very complicated deal to negotiate, and it\u2019s not the most immediate threat.<\/p>\n But Trump\u2014and again, it\u2019s one of the reasons why that memorandum of understanding, which always seems to be just an inch away, becomes elusive\u2014hears the critics. He knows what people are saying, which is that if he gets this deal and it doesn\u2019t touch the nuclear file, then he may never get there. Whereas with the blockade, he has some leverage. So he keeps saying, \u201cOf course we\u2019re going to have to deal with the nuclear file,\u201d and he wants something up front. Now, if all he wants up front is an Iranian declaration that they\u2019ll never seek to pursue a nuclear weapon, that existed in the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], he could get that again. If what he wants is some commitment by Iran that they will negotiate the disposition of the highly enriched uranium that is somewhere under the rubble\u2014the 60 percent enriched uranium, of which they have about 450 kilograms\u2014he probably could get that, if it\u2019s vague; if Iran promises that it will negotiate a way to dispose of it, and promises that it\u2019ll negotiate constraints on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. That is in the realm of the possible.<\/p>\n If he wants something more specific, I doubt he\u2019ll get it, because then Iran is going to ask for up-front sanctions relief. You don\u2019t have to be in Iran\u2019s shoes to understand that they can\u2019t trust anything that comes out of the president\u2019s mouth anymore. He\u2019s the one who withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, even though Iran was complying with it. And twice in the last year or so, he struck Iran in the middle of negotiations. So they won\u2019t make any tangible concessions on the nuclear file until they have tangible, up-front concessions on the economic sanctions file, and the president doesn\u2019t seem prepared to give it. That\u2019s why I\u2019m very doubtful that as a first phase, you\u2019re going to get anything detailed on the nuclear front.<\/p>\n Former National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice wrote a piece<\/a>, and I don\u2019t agree with much in the piece, but she says the focus should be on the Strait of Hormuz, and that on the nuclear issue, the military strikes have done enough damage, so if Iran starts trying to dig out this highly enriched uranium, or reconstitute its nuclear program, American and Israeli eyes and ears will probably be able to detect it. So even though Iran\u2014and again, it is one of the outcomes of this misguided, misbegotten war\u2014is probably more eager to get a nuclear weapon than at any time in its history, it also knows that it\u2019s under greater surveillance than at any time in history from Israel and the United States, so it might be very difficult for them to reconstitute their program. So that\u2019s not the most immediate issue, and I could imagine you get a deal and then postpone the nuclear negotiations. Whether you ever get to a deal, who knows, but the United States and Israel could make clear that if Iran is about to reconstitute their program and they detect it, they will bomb again.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n