Dozens of miles behind Russian lines, a Ukrainian drone feed<\/a> shows an unsuspecting Russian military truck idling. Then the feed cuts out as the drone slams into the vehicle. It\u2019s a scene repeated over and over again on Ukrainian social media<\/a> in recent weeks as the country leans into a new phase of its war against Russia.<\/p>\n The strikes, which have seen Ukrainian drones range almost 100 miles behind Russian lines, are part of a major campaign to starve Russian troops of supplies. And they\u2019re an important factor in spurring optimism<\/a> that Ukraine finally is gaining the upper hand.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n Dozens of miles behind Russian lines, a Ukrainian drone feed<\/a> shows an unsuspecting Russian military truck idling. Then the feed cuts out as the drone slams into the vehicle. It\u2019s a scene repeated over and over again on Ukrainian social media<\/a> in recent weeks as the country leans into a new phase of its war against Russia.<\/p>\n The strikes, which have seen Ukrainian drones range almost 100 miles behind Russian lines, are part of a major campaign to starve Russian troops of supplies. And they\u2019re an important factor in spurring optimism<\/a> that Ukraine finally is gaining the upper hand.<\/p>\n \u201cThe situation is better now than it was a year ago\u2014this is one of the clear differences,\u201d said Rob Lee, a Eurasia expert at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) who regularly visits the front line<\/a>.<\/p>\n Last year, Ukraine\u2019s military was struggling to fend off Russian attacks<\/a>, a task made all the harder by frequent Russian strikes on Ukrainian logistics and a deep manpower shortage in the Ukrainian army.<\/p>\n Now, thanks in part to the strike campaign\u2014along with high Russian casualties<\/a>, domestic discontent<\/a> in Russia, and other factors\u2014Ukraine appears more confident that it can end the war on favorable terms. On Monday, Kyrylo Budanov, a former top military commander and current chief of staff to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, said peace might be achievable<\/a> by winter.<\/p>\n Ukraine\u2019s mid-range attack drones force Russia to either take expensive or time-wasting security precautions in how it delivers troops, food, munitions, and fuel, or else risk further losses. \u201cIt\u2019s going to make it more difficult for Russia to advance, because it\u2019s going to increase the cost for them,\u201d Lee said.<\/p>\n Ukraine is doubling down on the tactic. Strikes targeting Russians 12 miles or more from the front line have quadrupled since February, Zelensky said in May<\/a>, calling it a \u201cpriority.\u201d<\/p>\n Last week, Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said the ministry would boost strikes<\/a> by offering cash to units that use them effectively in order for them to buy more drones, in an expansion of the military\u2019s \u201ce-points<\/a>\u201d system, which rewards the highest-performing units with more resources.<\/p>\n \u201cWe are launching a \u2018logistics lockdown\u2019 for the Russian army,\u201d Fedorov wrote<\/a>. Russian channels on the social media app Telegram have warned<\/a> of attacks across highways in occupied portions of Ukraine.<\/p>\n Fedorov\u2019s move to incentivize strikes holds promise, said Kateryna Bondar, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. Still, she cautioned that it could end up with units pursuing points to the detriment of military goals. \u201cThe strategic value of middle strike lies in [the] systemic degradation of a logistics network, not in individual platform kills \u2014 yet a points-per-confirmed-destruction logic rewards the easily-reachable, easily-filmed target over the higher-value but harder-to-verify node,\u201d she wrote in an email.<\/p>\n <\/a><\/p>\n \n \tThe two nations, seemingly frustrated by the United States as a mediator, are sizing up alternatives. \t <\/a><\/p>\n \n \tA year ago, the Ukrainian government decided to take the fight directly to Russia. It hasn\u2019t looked back since. \t <\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n <\/a><\/p>\n \n \tThe war with Ukraine has slowed growth, but Moscow remains stable. \t <\/p>\n Ukraine has had weapons<\/span> with similar effects in the past\u2014chiefly rocket systems such as the U.S. Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, which has a range<\/a> of around 40 miles and a payload of 200 pounds<\/a>. Such systems were key in turning back a Russian advance in 2022, again by forcing Russian logistics<\/a> to disperse.<\/p>\n However, the system had disadvantages: Each missile cost $168,000 and suffered from production constraints<\/a>. The missiles are also jammable<\/a> by Russia, and, because they\u2019re U.S.-made products, they are more vulnerable to U.S. restrictions on military aid.<\/p>\n Among the most prominent mid-range strike drones is the Hornet<\/a>, produced by Perennial Autonomy, a company founded by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt, an early investor in Ukrainian defense companies.<\/p>\n The drone\u2019s payload, at 10 pounds, is small but sufficient to destroy valuable trucks carrying supplies and boasts a range of over<\/a> 62 miles. To beat Russian jamming, it uses a combination<\/a> of Starlink satellite systems and some artificial intelligence in targeting.<\/p>\n While it\u2019s unclear how many Ukraine can produce, in 2025 Perennial Autonomy, under its previous corporate name of Swift Beat<\/a>, signed<\/a> a deal to produce \u201chundreds of thousands of drones,\u201d a figure that also includes other drone types produced by the company. The drone costs as little as $6,000, making it a cost-efficient weapon for cash-strapped Ukraine.<\/p>\n For larger targets\u2014like command posts or warehouses\u2014Ukraine also has drones like the FP-2<\/a>, which can crash a payload of 440 pounds of explosives into a target over 200 miles away. Ukraine can produce<\/a> FP-2 and its original, longer-range variant, the FP-1, at a collective rate of 200 per day, with the FP-2 costing $50,000 per drone.<\/p>\n Still, Russia has some options for neutralizing the impact of Ukraine\u2019s mid-range strike drones.<\/p>\n For one, Ukraine\u2019s use of the drones relies in part on sophisticated intelligence collection to help identify targets, with U.S. contributions playing a major role, said Kateryna Stepanenko, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, a think tank.<\/p>\n However, that also poses a vulnerability that Russia could seek to exploit. \u201cWe will likely see some sort of cognitive warfare effort where the Kremlin will claim \u2018we\u2019re ready to negotiate if you cut [intelligence support],\u2019\u201d Stepanenko said. The United States briefly cut off intelligence support for Ukraine in March 2025, seemingly as a way to pressure Ukraine over negotiations with Russia, before quickly resuming<\/a> it.<\/p>\n Russia can also work to boost its defense against such drones, which it currently lacks.<\/p>\n Ukraine\u2019s system for shooting down similar Russian drones points toward the complexity of the task. Ukraine reliably shoots down most<\/a> Russian Shahed drones, one of the most common types of Russian drones used for striking behind Ukrainian lines.<\/p>\n To do so, however, Ukraine has had to build up both a complex system<\/a> for tracking the drones, as well as invent new, semi-autonomous interceptor<\/a> drones, in addition to dedicated drone-hunter teams<\/a> using machine guns in order to cover the over<\/a> 700 miles of front line.<\/p>\n \u201cIt will likely take [Russia] at least a year to figure out how to protect against Ukrainian mid-range strike capabilities,\u201d Stepanenko said.<\/p>\n \u201cI\u2019m not prepared to say that Russians will never find some sort of a countermeasure,\u201d she said. \u201cBut I do think that it\u2019s going to take them time.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\nRead More<\/span><\/h2>\n
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