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Welcome to Foreign Policy<\/em>\u2019s Southeast Asia Brief.<\/p>\n It\u2019s been a very busy week in the region. We\u2019re covering the highlights from the Shangri-La Dialogue<\/strong>, Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing\u2019s first overseas trip<\/strong>, and the arrest of a Philippines senator<\/strong> (not the one you\u2019re thinking of).<\/p>\n Hegseth\u2019s Praise of Asia Falls Flat<\/p>\n<\/div>\n It\u2019s always interesting when a compliment misses the mark. At last week\u2019s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth\u2019s attempted flattery of Asia prompted<\/a> snorts in sections of the audience, the Straits Times<\/em> reported.<\/p>\n \u201cOur partners in Asia have long understood that the bedrock of a durable partnership is not based on idealistic values, but on the concrete alignment of national interests,\u201d Hegseth declared<\/a> at the massive international security establishment gathering. \u201cWhen our interests align, we act together with focused resolve. When our interests diverge, we adjust pragmatically without the drama or the moralizing. I think Western Europe might take note.\u201d<\/p>\n Alongside the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a bastion of believers in endless multilateral summitry and international law.<\/p>\n Hegseth saying, \u201cWe don\u2019t need more conferences. We need more combat power,\u201d is not reassuring for the region\u2019s many small- and medium-sized states.<\/p>\n Shangri-La\u2019s keynote speech<\/a> by Vietnamese President To Lam (see next section) stood in near-direct contradiction to Hegseth\u2019s. The latter\u2019s contention was also dubious.<\/p>\n The U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, which Hegseth boasted about at the start of his speech, prompted near-universal condemnation<\/a> and invocations of international law across Southeast Asia. The U.S. strikes on Iran also sparked public consternation<\/a>, which has only grown as the war takes a cruel toll on local economies.<\/p>\n Meanwhile, key European NATO allies<\/a> were often much more<\/a> equivocal<\/a> about U.S. actions in Venezuela and Iran<\/a>.<\/p>\n Hegseth singling out various countries as good allies and partners (the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam) also likely discomfited, rather than reassured, many.<\/p>\n His definition of a good partner entails moving toward spending 3.5 percent of GDP on defense and\/or doing more on regional security. Spending 3.5 percent is a high bar that few will want to meet, except maybe Singapore<\/a>. And in a region where great-power interference is viewed warily, few will be keen on a deeper entanglement with U.S. security. (Note the trepidation<\/a> that greeted Indonesia\u2019s proposed concessions to the United States on airspace overflight access.)<\/p>\n The Philippines has spent<\/a> under 2 percent of GDP on defense for nearly 30 years. In 2024, its spending was 1.3% percent. This is consistently less than France and, until recently, about on par with Germany\u2014until the latter committed to massive new defense spending. Most other Southeast Asian nations have similar track records.<\/p>\n Some now worry<\/a> that failing to meet these benchmarks could mean worse treatment from the United States on the trade front.<\/p>\n And as Hunter Marston pointed<\/a> out, Hegseth\u2019s softer line on China at the summit stands in tension with his call on countries in the region to step up on security: \u201cWashington is fuelling an arms race at a time when doubts about its commitment to the region continue to grow.\u201d<\/p>\n One final note: It was odd to see Thailand, a treaty ally like the Philippines, bracketed into the \u201cpartners\u201d section of the speech.<\/p>\n What We\u2019re Watching: Shangri-La Edition<\/p>\n<\/div>\n China\u2019s Japan warning. <\/strong>Turns out the United States isn\u2019t the only superpower failing to convince others at Shangri-La. China had its own its own solipsistic message at the dialogue: Beware of \u201cmilitarism\u201d from Japan.<\/p>\n \u201cCan it earn the trust of the international community, especially the Asian countries that once suffered under its aggression? I have serious doubts,\u201d Gen. Meng Xiangqing, head of China\u2019s delegation, said<\/a> about Japan.<\/p>\n As Japan ups its security role<\/a> in the region, China hopes invoking the shared suffering of occupation by Japan during World War II will deter Southeast Asia. Reporting on Chinese President Xi Jinping\u2019s outburst<\/a> on the matter when he met with U.S. President Donald Trump in May suggests China really means it.<\/p>\n Yet official historical memories, which are important as those who actually lived through the war die, are different in China and Southeast Asia. For China, the struggle against Japanese invasion has been promoted<\/a> as the birth of the modern nation. In Southeast Asia, the significance of the Japanese invasion is often much more ambiguous<\/a>: especially cruel for overseas Chinese communities but also heralding independence.<\/p>\n Key nationalist figures like Sukarno in Indonesia and Aung San in Myanmar collaborated<\/a>, looking to snatch independence as European colonial empires fell. The state-defining struggles were often postwar\u2014against the Netherlands in Indonesia, France and then the United States in Vietnam, and Chinese communists in Malaysia.<\/p>\n Two countries\u2014the Philippines<\/a> and Singapore<\/a>\u2014focus heavily on the occupation as a period of nation-creating suffering. But both now have strong relationships with Japan, with the former embracing Japan as a key security partner<\/a>.<\/p>\n Resentment of Japan did linger in some quarters in the 20th century, but Japan has worked hard to smooth them over. Polls in Southeast Asia show that Japan is now the region\u2019s most trusted<\/a> partner.<\/p>\n So, when Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi pushed<\/a> back, he had a strong hand. He offered Japan as a security partner for the region, an important development that I will discuss in later iterations of Southeast Asia Brief. While few will probably go as far as the Philippines in embracing Japan, not many will be alarmed by China\u2019s warning.<\/p>\n To Lam\u2019s diplomatic push. <\/strong>Vietnam\u2019s president gave the keynote address<\/a> at the Shangri-La Dialogue. This was a highlight of two weeks of diplomatic travel that took him to Bangkok, Manila, and Singapore.<\/p>\n The speech, in which To Lam diagnosed three crises, stood in sharp contrast to Hegseth\u2019s vision where power, not values, matter.<\/p>\n Lam first identified \u201cthe crisis of the international order,\u201d where \u201cfundamental principles of international law are interpreted selectively, applied inconsistently, or subordinated to the logic where might makes right.\u201d His second, \u201cthe crisis of development models,\u201d was also interesting for anyone curious about his economic plans for Vietnam.<\/p>\n The third was \u201cthe crisis of strategic trust.\u201d The solution he identified was \u201cmanaging differences within a rules-based framework.\u201d Lam said that disruptive new technologies like artificial intelligence risk intensifying the crisis.<\/p>\n To Lam\u2019s visit to Singapore was also accompanied by the announcement<\/a> of further cooperation on manufacturing and technology. His visits to Bangkok and Manila saw upgrades to diplomatic relationships and agreements on various issues, including tech and security.<\/p>\n