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Welcome to Foreign Policy<\/em>\u2019s Southeast Asia Brief.<\/p>\n The highlights this week: Indonesia\u2019s president visits Moscow<\/strong> even as he signs a U.S. defense agreement, Vietnam\u2019s To Lam consolidates power<\/strong>, and a survey shows Southeast Asian leaders would pick China<\/strong> over the United States, if forced to choose.<\/p>\n Prabowo Is Rowing Between Two Reefs<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on Monday. According to readouts, the two presidents agreed to increase cooperation on energy and economic issues.<\/p>\n Few details beyond this have been forthcoming. However, Indonesian Cabinet Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya said discussions included \u201clong-term cooperation\u201d in the oil and gas industries.<\/p>\n Indonesia is also looking at purchasing Russian oil to make up for disrupted supplies from the Middle East, according to a statement from Russia\u2019s energy minister.<\/p>\n In a short speech, Prabowo said that he \u201ccame to consult because the global geopolitical situation is experiencing very rapid development and changes. We view Russia as having played a very positive role in navigating this uncertain geopolitical climate.\u201d<\/p>\n The very same day, Indonesia and the United States announced a new defense cooperation agreement.<\/p>\n The agreement focuses on military modernization and capacity-building, military training and education, and exercises.<\/p>\n The two countries are discussing<\/a> an agreement that would let U.S. military aircraft freely access Indonesian airspace.<\/p>\n In some ways this is classic Indonesia. Since independence, its foreign-policy philosophy has been \u201crowing between two reefs,\u201d or avoiding aligning with any one power.<\/p>\n However, this mix of summitry and security diplomacy is also distinctly Prabowo. Since his election in 2024, the Indonesian president has been on a mission to increase Indonesia\u2019s international profile.<\/p>\n To this end he has made frequent trips abroad to meet with other national leaders, often calling for diplomacy and peace.<\/p>\n Prabowo has also overseen Indonesia joining both BRICS<\/a> and U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s Board of Peace, as well as volunteering<\/a> Indonesian peacekeepers for Gaza. These are the sorts of decisions that other presidents might have steered clear of.<\/p>\n Security issues have been the other major feature of his diplomatic push. In February, Prabowo oversaw the striking of a new security pact<\/a> with Australia. This followed the establishment<\/a> of a new Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue with China in 2025.<\/p>\n Concrete results so far are unclear. In particular, the decisions to get close with the United States and involve Indonesia in the Middle East have proved controversial domestically.<\/p>\n Some see Prabowo as weak-kneed on the issue of Palestine. The recent deaths of three Indonesian peacekeepers stationed as part of a preexisting deployment\u2014one killed by Israel and two likely by Hezbollah, according to U.N. investigations\u2014has amped up the controversy<\/a>.<\/p>\n Talk of overflight rights, a privilege usually granted to allies, has also raised eyebrows. The foreign ministry has privately warned<\/a> the defense ministry that it risks entangling Indonesia in potential South China Sea conflicts.<\/p>\n In this context, a visit to Russia with a clear domestic benefit of securing fuel may go down better.<\/p>\n Vietnam\u2019s To Lam becomes president. <\/strong>To Lam was unanimously elected<\/a> president of Vietnam by the country\u2019s National Assembly last Tuesday. Earlier this year, he was also reappointed<\/a> to the more powerful position of general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam.<\/p>\n Lam has succeeded in his push to centralize power in his own hands, moving away from the more collective leadership system Vietnam previously practiced.<\/p>\n Chosen as prime minister<\/a> was Le Minh Hung, formerly the governor of Vietnam\u2019s central bank. Le\u2019s technocratic credentials fit with Lam\u2019s aggressive push to raise growth. He is also seen as close to Lam personally. Le\u2019s father used to be Lam\u2019s boss.<\/p>\n Lam has followed his election with a visit<\/a> to China this week.<\/p>\n Vietnam has been strengthening relations with China in areas including trade, tech, and security. But Lam has also moved to cultivate<\/a> close ties with the U.S., joining Trump\u2019s Board of Peace.<\/p>\n Singapore holds firm on Hormuz.<\/strong> Singapore has no plans to negotiate with Iran to let its ships pass through the Strait of Hormuz, Minister for Foreign Affairs Vivian Balakrishnan said<\/a> in response to a question in Parliament.<\/p>\n Balakrishnan went on to say the right to transit is established in international law. \u201cThe Strait of Hormuz, just like the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, are examples of Straits Used for International Navigation. No ifs, no buts, no questions, as far as we are concerned,\u201d Balakrishnan said. \u201cThere is a\u00a0right<\/em>\u00a0of transit passage. It is not a privilege to be granted by the bordering state, it is not a license to be supplicated for, it is not a toll be paid. It is a right of ships to traverse. This right is enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.\u201d<\/p>\n Why is Singapore so hung up on this?<\/p>\n \u201cYou may be wondering why I am taking such a legal and strict definition. It is not because I am particularly obsessed with law, but because the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is in fact another critical choke point,\u201d Balakrishnan explained. He noted the Strait of Malacca was not only narrower than Hormuz, but it also saw greater flows of maritime oil and far more container trade pass through it.<\/p>\n The analogy is not perfect. As the Economist<\/em> noted<\/a>, if the Strait of Malacca closed, a lot of the trade could be redirected to other passages. But Singapore\u2019s economy is built on its status as a trade hub. Other Southeast Asian countries\u2014including Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam\u2014have struck deals<\/a> with Iran for safe passage.<\/p>\n