\n
<\/p>\n
Two recent speeches\u2014one by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference in February and the other by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January\u2014paint two vastly different pictures of the world. Rubio\u2019s challenge to the rules-based international order contrasts with Carney\u2019s effort to salvage it; Rubio\u2019s insular worldview contrasts with Carney\u2019s cosmopolitan one. But from the vantage point of the global south, they paint similar pictures.<\/p>\n
Rubio\u2019s speech in Munich<\/a> sought to reassure European allies after the more confrontational rhetoric of last year\u2019s speech by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance<\/a> at the same conference. However, in painting the West\u2019s golden era as a period when colonialism and imperialism thrived, it was far from reassuring for the global south. Rubio lauded the \u201cfive centuries\u201d before the end of the Second World War as a period when the \u201cWest had been expanding\u201d to \u201cbuild vast empires extending out across the globe\u201d while the period that followed was one of \u201cterminal decline,\u201d accelerated by \u201canti-colonial uprisings.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n Two recent speeches\u2014one by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Munich Security Conference in February and the other by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January\u2014paint two vastly different pictures of the world. Rubio\u2019s challenge to the rules-based international order contrasts with Carney\u2019s effort to salvage it; Rubio\u2019s insular worldview contrasts with Carney\u2019s cosmopolitan one. But from the vantage point of the global south, they paint similar pictures.<\/p>\n Rubio\u2019s speech in Munich<\/a> sought to reassure European allies after the more confrontational rhetoric of last year\u2019s speech by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance<\/a> at the same conference. However, in painting the West\u2019s golden era as a period when colonialism and imperialism thrived, it was far from reassuring for the global south. Rubio lauded the \u201cfive centuries\u201d before the end of the Second World War as a period when the \u201cWest had been expanding\u201d to \u201cbuild vast empires extending out across the globe\u201d while the period that followed was one of \u201cterminal decline,\u201d accelerated by \u201canti-colonial uprisings.\u201d<\/p>\n Meanwhile, Carney\u2019s much-touted speech in Davos<\/a> was welcomed for its forthrightness in acknowledging the \u201cpleasant fiction\u201d of geopolitics while being a call to arms for middle powers to step up and play a more prominent role in the international system.<\/p>\n However, from the vantage of point of the global south, it was an acknowledgement of the hypocrisy of the Western-led global order. Carney noted that the U.S.-led \u201cinternational rules-based order was partially false,\u201d with the strongest exempting themselves \u201cwhen convenient,\u201d trade rules enforced \u201casymmetrically,\u201d and international law \u201capplied with varying rigor depending on the identity of the accused or the victim.\u201d<\/p>\n These two very different speeches by Western leaders reflect something that countries in the global south have often suspected of the collective West. Whether it be through the blatant oppression of colonialism or the more subtle double standards of the postwar rules-based international order (and its post-Cold War variant, the liberal international order) there has been a consistent attempt to keep those countries down.<\/p>\n The question is this: How does the global south respond? Does it respond in kind and embrace the emergence of a more confrontational and bifurcated international system marked by renewed great-power competition and assertiveness? In referring to Europe and the United States as part of one \u201cWestern civilization\u201d bound by their \u201cChristian faith,\u201d Rubio\u2019s speech can be seen as a counterpart to the worldviews of China and Russia, which also see the world through a civilizational lens with their own exclusive spheres of influence.<\/p>\n India\u2019s leadership ambitions<\/span> in the global south are not new. They can be traced to the post-colonial period, when New Delhi sought to promote so-called \u201cthird-world solidarity\u201d through forums such as the Bandung Conference in 1955<\/a> and the Non-Aligned Movement, established in 1961. It was a vocal critic of European efforts to reacquire their colonies after the Second World War, including Dutch \u201cpolice action\u201d in Indonesia and the First Indochina War.<\/p>\n Some of India\u2019s actions are clearly self-serving. It justifies its push for greater status and recognition\u2014from its never-ending quest for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council to its G-20 presidency in 2023 and its bid to host the COP33 climate conference in 2028\u2014on the basis of its credentials in the global south. New Delhi wants to have a seat at key rule-making institutions, and in doing so, it seeks to offer Indian solutions to global problems.<\/p>\n This was evident during the late February AI Impact Summit in New Delhi. It was the first time the summit took place in a developing country\u2014the previous ones were held in the United Kingdom, South Korea, and France\u2014and India used its host status to frame the artificial intelligence debate through the lens of the global south. This included drawing attention to the tangible impact of AI in sectors such as health care, agriculture, education, and energy and climate issues. This echoes the position that India took when it hosted the G-20 summit in 2023, when it promoted digital public infrastructure as a means of strengthening digital inclusion and the democratization of technology.<\/p>\n Interestingly, in calling for the democratization of technology, India is challenging both the West and China. It is calling on the West for a more equitable distribution of power in the international system. However, it is also implicitly challenging China for leadership of the global south<\/a> by offering a more open and democratic model to the one put forward by China\u2019s one-party techno-surveillance state.<\/p>\n India, with an economy roughly one-fifth the size of China, lacks Beijing\u2019s economic heft. However, what it lacks in material capabilities, it can make up for by offering an alternative worldview embedded in values of democracy, the rule of law, and multilateralism. This is the essence of India\u2019s ambitions for the global south: It wants a greater voice for emerging economies, but it also wants to ensure that this voice complements rather than compromises the rules-based international order and works with rather than against advanced industrialized economies. India is a reformist rather than revisionist power.<\/p>\n To be sure, making this case will be easier said than done. Take the example of the BRICS summit, which India is set to host later this year. India will likely use its status as the bloc\u2019s chair to downplay some of the more controversial elements of the BRICS agenda, such as the de-dollarization narrative<\/a>, which has incurred the wrath of the Trump administration. (It will likely reframe this as a push to settle bilateral trade in national currencies.) New Delhi will also seek a degree of alignment between its BRICS chairmanship, the United States\u2019 G-20 chairmanship, and France\u2019s G-7 chairmanship.<\/p>\n However, India\u2019s BRICS agenda could easily be hijacked by broader geopolitical developments. Recent U.S. military action against Venezuela<\/a> and potential action against Iran could fuel a narrative that the global south is under siege from the \u201cmight is right\u201d approach of the United States. The fact that the BRICS membership includes several countries that maintain overtly anti-Western agendas,\u2014including China, Russia, and Iran\u2014will also make it difficult for India to control the narrative.<\/p>\n Even among the<\/span> founding BRICS member states\u2014Brazil, Russia, India, and China\u2014there is a lack of consensus on what the institution stands for. Brazil and India see the forum primarily as an economic initiative, whereas China and Russia use it to promote their broader geopolitical objectives. Beijing in particular is increasingly embedding its worldviews\u2014rooted in its four \u201cglobal\u201d projects, the Global Development\/ Security\/Civilization\/Governance Initiatives\u2014into the DNA of forums representing the global south.<\/p>\n From New Delhi\u2019s perspective, BRICS has been moving in the wrong direction in recent years. As its agenda has been hijacked by geopolitics, the bloc has moved away from its initial focus on development and governance. Its expanding membership<\/a> has encouraged more noise but less action, with more emphasis on what it stands against rather than what it stands for.<\/p>\n India\u2019s ambition for BRICS entails building on the organization\u2019s initial achievements, including the establishment of the BRICS New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement. This would move the forum from shared grievances to shared outcomes. The slogan<\/a> of India\u2019s BRICS chairmanship\u2014\u201cHumanity first\u201d\u2014combined with a theme of \u201cBuilding for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation, and Sustainability\u201d may seem na\u00efve. But it reflects an effort to offer an alternative worldview in which collaboration rather than competition or confrontation are the currency of international relations.<\/p>\n If India is able to seize this moment (and receive support from like-minded countries), then it can offer an alternative direction to the one being offered by the return to great-power politics.<\/p>\n Speaking at the unveiling of the website and logo of India\u2019s BRICS presidency earlier this year, Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar noted<\/a> New Delhi\u2019s ambition to the use the BRICS platform to contribute to \u201cgreater global welfare.\u201d In doing so, it can operationalize its ambition to be a voice of the global south while serving as a bridge between it and the West.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n
\n
\n