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On Feb. 6, U.S. President Trump declared<\/a> through yet another executive order that the United States would abide by a new \u201cAmerica First\u201d arms export strategy. The goal of the strategy is to \u201censure that future arms sales prioritize American interests by using foreign purchases and capital to build American production and capacity.\u201d Importantly, the Trump administration established a prioritization rubric for judging whether an ally or partner is eligible for receiving U.S.-made weapons. It states that the \u201cUnited States will prioritize arms sales and transfers to partners that have invested in their own self-defense and capabilities, have a critical role or geography in United States plans and operations, or contribute to our economic security.\u201d<\/p>\n Based on the above criteria, most Southeast Asian countries are likely to face greater difficulties in securing U.S. weaponry. To be sure, not every state in the region seeks Washington\u2019s assistance\u2014nor can every state afford it. However, those that are interested may be in for a rude awakening as they encounter a new U.S. paradigm in which they receive little to nothing from Washington.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n On Feb. 6, U.S. President Trump declared<\/a><\/u><\/span> through yet another executive order that the United States would abide by a new \u201cAmerica First\u201d arms export strategy. The goal of the strategy is to \u201censure that future arms sales prioritize American interests by using foreign purchases and capital to build American production and capacity.\u201d Importantly, the Trump administration established a prioritization rubric for judging whether an ally or partner is eligible for receiving U.S.-made weapons. It states that the \u201cUnited States will prioritize arms sales and transfers to partners that have invested in their own self-defense and capabilities, have a critical role or geography in United States plans and operations, or contribute to our economic security.\u201d<\/p>\n Based on the above criteria, most Southeast Asian countries are likely to face greater difficulties in securing U.S. weaponry. To be sure, not every state in the region seeks Washington\u2019s assistance\u2014nor can every state afford it. However, those that are interested may be in for a rude awakening as they encounter a new U.S. paradigm in which they receive little to nothing from Washington.<\/p>\n This will prompt them to seek weapons deliveries from others, be they U.S. friends or adversaries. In the end, Trump\u2019s new arms export policy will further weaken the U.S. network of alliances and partnerships in a particularly crucial region in the Indo-Pacific at a time when Washington should be shoring up its network to more effectively counter Beijing.<\/p>\n Although there are no clear winners of Trump\u2019s new arms sales strategy, some nations may fare better than others. One of the beneficiaries could be the Philippines, which features long coastlines facing the South China Sea and has clashed with China over the latter\u2019s maritime territorial expansion<\/a><\/u><\/span>. In the recently released U.S. National Security Strategy<\/a><\/u><\/span>, the Trump administration argues<\/a><\/u><\/span> that control over the South China Sea has \u201cmajor implications for the U.S. economy,\u201d since about one-third of global shipping passes through its waters. The document further asserts that the United States must deter China from attacking or invading Taiwan. Considering the Philippines\u2019 location less than 100 miles from the southern tip of Taiwan, it is reasonable to assess that continuing to arm Manila will be a priority.<\/p>\n Another country that already seems to be benefiting from Trump\u2019s arms transfer policy is Cambodia. Last week, the Trump administration officially lifted<\/a><\/u><\/span> an arms embargo against Phnom Penh, paving the way for Cambodia to diversify away from its heavy dependence on Chinese-built systems. Although the administration\u2019s rationale for ending the arms embargo remains opaque, the new strategy provides some clarity.<\/p>\n In October, while Trump attended the annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Malaysia, he inked<\/a><\/u><\/span> a new agreement with Cambodia to access its critical minerals deposits. (It\u2019s unclear why he seeks this, since the critical minerals bottleneck is extraction and refining<\/a><\/u><\/span>, not access to plentiful deposits.) It appears that Phnom Penh\u2019s reciprocal benefit for supporting Trump\u2019s economic security agenda is renewed access to U.S. arms supplies. The same may be possible for both Malaysia and Thailand, which also signed critical minerals deals with Trump on the sidelines of the summit, but so far, it\u2019s unclear whether tangible benefits are forthcoming. Regardless, most U.S. arms are probably too expensive for Cambodia and Malaysia to afford.<\/p>\n One Southeast Asian country that can certainly afford U.S. arms and benefit from the new strategy is Singapore. To be sure, Singapore spends just 2.7 percent of its GDP on defense\u2014well below the 3.5 percent that the Trump administration generally desires<\/a><\/u><\/span> from close friends.<\/p>\n The city-state, however, does check two other interrelated boxes. Strategically located at the narrow mouth of the Strait of Malacca, the main sea lane connecting the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, U.S. military planners could certainly consider Singapore vital to blockading Chinese shipping in a potential future war\u2014even if Singapore\u2019s own capabilities are relatively modest and may not lend well toward such a high-stakes operation.<\/p>\n And secondly, as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and the Pacific Affairs Michael DeSombre made clear during his visit to Singapore this week, the administration has keyed<\/a><\/u><\/span> in on the need to \u201cdeepen partnerships that protect freedom of navigation and the trade routes critical to American and Singaporean prosperity.\u201d This explicitly draws a connection between the strait and U.S. economic security.<\/p>\n Other emerging strategic partners in the region, such as Indonesia<\/a><\/u><\/span> and Vietnam<\/a><\/u><\/span>, may lose favor under Trump\u2019s new arms transfer strategy. Although DeSombre\u2019s recent visits<\/span> to Jakarta and Hanoi were<\/span> productive and struck all the right notes, particularly on the need to collaborate on maritime security, the reality is that neither country is as geographically critical as the Philippines and Singapore to sustaining Washington\u2019s strategy to counter China.<\/p>\n Moreover, neither is sufficiently capable militarily or even willing to provide substantial contributions to such a fight, given their strict foreign-policy emphasis on nonalignment. Neither country has thus far inked critical minerals pacts, currently the easiest way to elevate their standing in Washington. Vietnam further relies mainly on Russia for arms; so does Indonesia, even as it hunts bargains from other suppliers, including China. All of this suggests that arms assistance to them will be deprioritized over the next three years.<\/p>\n Perhaps unexpectedly, Laos and Myanmar could see a boost in their profile. They, too, control substantial critical mineral reserves that could be bartered for arms. In the case of Myanmar, the Trump administration reportedly considered<\/a><\/u><\/span> several months ago whether to support the ruling military junta in exchange for securing these resources\u2014or possibly an opposition group if it could make a similar deal when in power.<\/p>\n Finally, for Brunei and ASEAN\u2019s newest member, Timor-Leste, Trump\u2019s new arms transfer strategy is unlikely to support their defense. It\u2019s hard to see what these two countries could offer, either strategically or in terms of resources, to support an America First policy.<\/p>\n As always under Trump, it is fair to wonder whether the administration will stick to its own guidance. After the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy were released, many experts believed that these authoritative documents mattered far less than under previous administrations simply because Trump changes his mind quickly and often, especially when he is confronted with the actions of other powers.<\/p>\n But given the importance of the latest executive order to renewing the United States\u2019 industrial base\u2014which appears to be a constant in Trump\u2019s thinking<\/a><\/u><\/span>\u2014it is more likely than not that he will abide by this guidance for the remainder of his term.<\/p>\n There are also fair questions about uneven implementation of the arms transfer strategy\u2019s criteria. Outside of Southeast Asia, the new U.S. ambassador to Bangladesh, Brent Christensen, stated on Feb. 10 that Washington planned<\/a><\/u><\/span> to sell Dhaka unspecified weapons. Bangladesh, however, does not check any of the criteria above, though a recently concluded<\/a><\/u><\/span> trade deal might have had something to do with it.<\/p>\n Either way, the broader pattern is unmistakable. Under Trump\u2019s new arms transfer strategy, security cooperation is no longer primarily about reinforcing alliances, shared values, or long-term strategic positioning. It is about immediate reciprocity\u2014economic returns, industrial capacity, and tangible contributions to U.S. objectives.<\/p>\n This shift carries consequences. Southeast Asian states that cannot meet Washington\u2019s new criteria will not simply accept marginalization; they will diversify, looking toward Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, European nations, and other partners. They may also look to Russia and China. Over time, this risks fragmenting the very security architecture that the United States has painstakingly built in the Indo-Pacific.<\/p>\n In prioritizing short-term industrial gains and transactional leverage, Washington may secure more favorable deals. But it could also erode the trust, predictability, and political goodwill that make alliances durable over the longer term. Indeed, weakening this strategic network at a moment of escalating great-power competition against China is yet another of the Trump administration\u2019s foolish and self-inflicted wounds.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n