speech<\/a> yesterday, which is, \u201cLet\u2019s get down to business.\u201d<\/p>\nThe main thing that we want to do looking forward with this NATO 3.0 approach is to come to a much more equitable and thus sustainable model that\u2019s focused on an effective, rational defense of NATO, with Europe taking primary responsibility for its conventional defense, backed up by meeting those spending pledges led by President Trump with Secretary-General Rutte and the European leaders. That will enable that. And if you look over time, that is a really promising vista where we\u2019re going to have a Europe that is strong, that is populous, that is wealthy, that is able to field really serious military force. I see friends of ours from the Indo-Pacific, and we\u2019re asking the same thing. I was in South Korea, the first non-NATO ally to commit to 3.5 percent, the new global standard, as the National Security Strategy has said. That\u2019s where we see not a retreat of the United States from its alliances, but a kind of moderate approach that puts it on a much more sustainable path.<\/p>\n
RA:<\/strong> That was a great answer, but it was a yes-no question. Even if everyone buys that this is where NATO 3.0 is headed, the reason why the question is, as you call it, \u201ctheological,\u201d is because it could be real. For example, take the Russian-speaking town of Narva in Estonia. Russia could attack and say, \u201cWe take this territory.\u201d Estonia then could invoke Article 5, which, as you know, only the United States has ever done. You can\u2019t give a NATO 3.0 answer to that. It has to be a yes-or-no answer.<\/p>\nEC:<\/strong> No, I think the NATO 3.0 answer is the answer to that. I\u2019m a government official; we don\u2019t engage in speculation. When I was in a think tank, I might have given you a different answer. The president has shown in places like Venezuela and in Operation Midnight Hammer that he is prepared to use military force decisively to back up his pledges to work with our allies, like our model ally Israel. We train, we ready our forces, we think intimately, and we have discussions about these practicalities. This is the spirit at the Department of War, but I would say throughout our administration: We are more in the delivering-results-and-readiness business than in the cheap-talk business. That distinguishes us from our predecessors. I will say that directly because you challenged me on this point. President Trump and his administration under his historic leadership are doing more, and we are going to be ready. But we\u2019re putting things on a more sustainable basis. I think that\u2019s the best answer I can give. That\u2019s an answer that Europeans should\u2014actually, that\u2019s a credible, honest, candid, realistic answer. You can have all the shibboleths, the recitation of the shibboleths, you can have all the promises, but if you can\u2019t practically and realistically back it up and make it worthwhile to the American people, that\u2019s an empty promise.<\/p>\nRA:<\/strong> I don\u2019t defend the Biden administration here, but words do matter, signals matter. As far as that goes, there is a sense of fear in Europe that Article 5 doesn\u2019t matter as much anymore.<\/p>\nEC:<\/strong> Can I just say one thing on that? I think words do matter. What we\u2019re saying is we are going to make sure that we and our allies are making commitments and we\u2019re following through on it. We\u2019re about delivering results, and I think the last administration was a lot of overpromising and underdelivering. We\u2019re in the opposite camp: being strong and clear but quiet, not looking to peacock, if you will, but really focusing on building up strength. President Trump has committed to pursuing a $1.5 trillion military budget. We have a historic attempt to overhaul our laggardly and in some cases moribund defense industrial base to get it fit for purpose. National mobilization of our defense industrial base\u2014that\u2019s what our allies should actually want. That\u2019s results.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n
RA:<\/strong> Fair enough. Again, Mark Rutte, when he was asked this question at Davos, said very clearly, \u201cMr. President, we will come to your defense.\u201d But let\u2019s move from Europe to the Indo-Pacific because you\u2019ve been arguing for a while, and now the administration does as well, that shifting burden sharing in NATO allows the United States to have more of a focus on Asia. Talk to us about what that has meant in the last 14-odd months of this administration.<\/p>\nEC:<\/strong> What we say in both the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy is that we\u2019re going back to a commonsense, pragmatic focus on Americans\u2019 interests and mapping our overall strategy onto where our interests are most impinged upon and most threatened and where our contributions make the most difference, but also, critically, where we think our allies\u2019 interests lie realistically and also where they can make the most material and relevant contribution. So this is a very different model from the last administration\u2019s one-theater approach, which was a non-military, non-realistic, much more normative, rules-based-international-order approach. Ours is saying that we\u2019re going to meet our allies where they are.<\/p>\nWe\u2019re saying that we\u2019re going to work with the warp and weft. We\u2019re going to work with the current of those interests, and that\u2019s where countries will be willing to put up. Then we\u2019ll take where our contribution is going to make the greatest difference and where our interests are most engaged, relatively speaking, and that\u2019s where we\u2019re going to focus. It doesn\u2019t mean we\u2019re going to do nothing in those other areas. But if you look at our strategy, it says homeland and hemisphere. We need to refocus the military as a critical part of that. Secondly, the first island chain and stability there; deterring China through strength, not confrontation. We have a very similar approach to our allies and partners there. In other theaters, we\u2019re looking at Europe and NATO vis-\u00e0-vis Russia, looking to our wealthy allies. Chancellor Merz made this point eloquently yesterday, saying that Germany alone is a larger economy than Russia. This is a viable, tractable problem. Similarly, South Korea is saying, \u201cNorth Korea is our primary threat,\u201d and they\u2019re willing to take the lead for conventional defense on the peninsula. That\u2019s what we\u2019re seeing.<\/p>\n
We\u2019re going to get the force back to a focus on lethality and readiness. Secretary Hegseth has made a historic approach to get back to the basics there. On the industrial side\u2014we see this tragically in Ukraine\u2014these modern conflicts are going to be wars of production, so we need to have a defense industry that can produce for ourselves and for our allies. We\u2019re also very supportive of our allies growing their defense industrial base. We\u2019re confident that this will be the recipe for stability but also deterrence and defense.<\/p>\n
RA:<\/strong> Let\u2019s talk about China now. There\u2019s a sense that between, say, 2016, the start of the first Trump administration, and, say, 2024, there was a real ascendance of China hawks in D.C. writ large, but also in the White House and in two administrations. There\u2019s a sense now that that trend has reversed a little bit, and I\u2019ll just cite a couple of things that suggest so. One is pulling back from some of the tariff policies from early last year after China imposed export controls on rare earths and critical minerals. There\u2019s also the United States pulling back on chip restrictions for the highest-end chips. There\u2019s a growing sense that when you add all of this up, the United States has actually changed its posture on China. It\u2019s much less hawkish. Would you agree with that?<\/p>\nEC:<\/strong> I\u2019m not sure I could characterize the overall trajectory. I think the United States wants a stable and respectful relationship with China. Obviously, we want to avoid conflict. We also want to be able to engage in mutually beneficial commerce, but we recognize from the president on down that we need to do that from a position of strength. That\u2019s commercial and economic strength. On the military side, we\u2019re very clear about that. We\u2019re strong and clear but quiet, focused on the first island chain. And we need to work with our allies, particularly our allies in the Indo-Pacific, to build collective strength. I think we\u2019ve actually been quite clear. I wouldn\u2019t presume to characterize it, but it\u2019s a coherent approach that\u2019s very akin to this commonsense, \u201cAmerica First\u201d approach. Under the president\u2019s visionary leadership\u2014<\/p>\nRA:<\/strong> Can you define America First, just so we have a dictionary definition?<\/p>\nEC:<\/strong> A little bit of the hack for America First is the commonsense approach. The president talks about common sense\u2014<\/p>\nRA:<\/strong> But my common sense is different from your common sense.<\/p>\nEC:<\/strong> OK, it\u2019s not a scientific theorem, but it\u2019s basically saying: \u201cAre things working out for regular Americans?\u201d People are going to contest what that means, and that\u2019s actually good.<\/p>\nRA:<\/strong> That also sounds like [former President Joe] Biden\u2019s \u201cforeign policy for the middle class.\u201d<\/p>\nEC:<\/strong> Our conceit is that we\u2019re doing a lot better job. That\u2019s the president\u2019s contribution, taking the international trade regime and saying, \u201cWait a minute. This is not working for Americans,\u201d and saying that the orthodoxy of the economist class is not actually working. OK, we\u2019re going to relook at that. NATO\u2014like when you come to a place like the Munich Security Conference, and I say this with respect, but for many, many years it was the same recitations. The president\u2019s saying, \u201cWait a minute. How does it make sense for very wealthy, prosperous, developed countries to be spending close to 1 percent and we\u2019re spending 4 to 5 percent of GDP?\u201d Again, a lot of the blame goes on Americans for those decisions. But that\u2019s a commonsense reassessment.<\/p>\nWith China, we understand and we respect China\u2019s tremendous achievements in the development of its economy, its very significant military buildup. And we\u2019re acting accordingly, but we treat it respectfully and look at it in a clear-eyed way with the goal of a favorable balance of power and stability. In our engagements with the Chinese, it resonates with them. Obviously, both sides are looking for advantage and negotiating, and that\u2019s a very direct matter, but we\u2019re not trying to strangle China. You\u2019ve probably heard this over the years, the Chinese belief that we were trying to strangle their growth or hold them down. That\u2019s not what we\u2019re trying to do, but we\u2019re going to make sure that we and our allies and partners are operating from a position of strength. That to me is common sense.<\/p>\n
RA:<\/strong> I will say, though, that this morning Wang Yi, the Chinese foreign minister, did say that, for example, the U.N. works just fine, which was a direct refutation of what Secretary of State Marco Rubio said, and then he did point a finger at \u201ccertain countries.\u201d Inasmuch as there\u2019s a change in policy, I\u2019m not sure I\u2019m seeing a great change in the Chinese tone.<\/p>\nEC:<\/strong> We\u2019re not naive. This is a tough, clear-eyed relationship. Fortunately, our presidents have an excellent relationship. But we\u2019re going to agglomerate our strength and position. We\u2019re going to be engaging. We\u2019re going to be direct. We\u2019re going to be realistic. We\u2019re going to be respectful. But we\u2019re also going to look after the American people and also our allies and partners.<\/p>\nRA:<\/strong> You were very influential in the writing of the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. The word \u201cTaiwan\u201d doesn\u2019t show up in either of those. Is there a reason why? Tell us how you\u2019re thinking about deterrence for Taiwan.<\/p>\nEC:<\/strong> I have nothing to say in terms of any policy change or position or emphasis even on the issue of Taiwan. Our president is actually quite consistent with our traditional position. We understand that people look at these public documents very carefully. We measure our words carefully, as I said earlier, and obviously the president is our spokesman on anything, but certainly on matters of great sensitivity. We have hewed closely to our position, and we\u2019re focused on our position in the Western Pacific, but we\u2019re seeking stability. But stability involves both a willingness to engage, but also clarity and strength, and we\u2019re all about building up a position of strength. If you look at the budget, if you look at what we\u2019re doing with our defense industry, if you look at how we\u2019re enlisting our allies\u2014I wouldn\u2019t even say enlisting\u2014encouraging our allies to do it for their own reasons. That\u2019s the right mix under President Trump\u2019s leadership.<\/p>\nRA:<\/strong> There\u2019s an element of cognitive dissonance for me sometimes when I look at utterances from the White House and documents and then conversations like this. One of them, of course, was Greenland. It genuinely befuddled many of us why the United States would threaten either war or coercive economic tactics to take territory from a NATO ally. The second one, which is more related to what we were just talking about, is the idea of a \u201cDonroe Doctrine,\u201d this idea that there are spheres of influence. In that kind of thinking, the United States focuses more on its hemisphere. What happens to the other hemisphere? The implication then is that China and Russia should have their way.<\/p>\nEC:<\/strong> I see zero evidence from the United States government in any sort of authoritative statement that we are conceding hemispheric spheres of influence to anybody else. The authoritative statements of the U.S. government, whether the National Security Strategy or the National Defense Strategy, literally say the contrary. I see that as a projection. It\u2019s sort of this normative frame that people say, \u201cThey\u2019re thinking that way, so maybe they have to give it to the others.\u201d That logic is certainly not how I think, and I don\u2019t think that\u2019s how people in the administration think. We\u2019re looking for a favorable balance of power with our allies and partners in a kind of hard-nosed, credible way.<\/p>\nAt the same time, we are also engaging. We have negotiations with Moscow designed to try to end the tragic war in Ukraine. We\u2019re engaging with China on a variety of fronts, trade and otherwise, in military channels. The president\u2019s team is negotiating with Iran.<\/p>\n
RA:<\/strong> I like that you use the word \u201cnormative.\u201d In terms of the critiques, they are normative, in large part because some norms are being challenged, and I think that\u2019s where that critique gains weight.<\/p>\nEC:<\/strong> I think that\u2019s true, and Secretary Rubio owned that. I said the other day that I was very encouraged: I only heard the \u201crules-based international order\u201d mentioned once while I was in Brussels, and that was real progress.<\/p>\nRA:<\/strong> Why don\u2019t you like the term?<\/p>\nEC:<\/strong> I think it\u2019s a misconception. Whether it exists or not, it actually gets people, especially in this kind of context, and misleads them in terms of the frame in which they approach alliances. So it becomes more about a sort of catechism and how much you hew to this purported catechism, rather than a practical discussion\u2014almost like a businesslike discussion\u2014about how we make sure that this operation is sustainable over the long term, that everybody\u2019s pulling their weight. I don\u2019t want to harangue the point too much, but there\u2019s sort of a mark-to-market element here, which is like, \u201cThis has been way out of whack. Let\u2019s get down, let\u2019s get down to basics.\u201d<\/p>\nObviously, I disagree with a number of things Chancellor Merz said yesterday, and I say that with respect. We in the administration have a different view. But overall, the frame was him very much leaning in and saying, \u201cLet\u2019s get down to business. Let\u2019s be practical. We\u2019re going to have differences.\u201d<\/p>\n
RA:<\/strong> I will just say, though, that when Chancellor Merz said the international order doesn\u2019t work anymore, I think he meant that as a criticism, and the point was\u2014<\/p>\nEC:<\/strong> He\u2019s free to say that, but he\u2019s not indexing on that and languishing there. Honestly, the German government, including Federal Minister of Defense Boris Pistorius, who\u2019s had a historic role in raising German defense spending and changing the constitution, deserves enormous credit. That\u2019s the greatest evidence. There are people in this orbit who are still indexed on that, and I think they\u2019re going to be left behind. They\u2019re not helping Americans, but more importantly, they\u2019re not helping Europeans.<\/p>\nRA:<\/strong> I take all of those points. Just one last thing on that: The rules matter because, for example, if territorial integrity in Europe doesn\u2019t matter, then China could use that as a rationale for Taiwan later.<\/p>\nOne last question for you, Bridge. As you and others have gotten Europe to carry more of the burden when it comes to defense spending, what does that do over time\u2014five years, 10 years from now\u2014to the nuclear umbrella question?<\/p>\n
EC:<\/strong> There are a lot of important questions, and if I may say so without presumption, I hope future iterations of this conference are focused more on thinking through these tough issues. As Europe rearms, what does that mean for integration of forces? What does that mean for command and control? What does that mean for stability? What does that mean for defense industrial cooperation that\u2019s more practical and bottom line-oriented? That\u2019s what this conference was discussing in NATO 1.0, and that\u2019s the kind of brass-tacks conversations that are sometimes out of the klieg lights.<\/p>\nThe nuclear deterrent is an important one. As I stressed in our department and as the administration has made clear, the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent continues to apply here and to our allies. That is clear. There are discussions I\u2019m hearing about different potential formulations or adaptations. I\u2019m not here to give an official administration position; our view in general is receptive to a greater European coloration to the NATO deterrent. Of course, we already know that the independent nuclear deterrence of the United Kingdom and France\u2014this is NATO policy going back to the 1970s\u2014contributes to the security of the alliance. We want to be very sober, deliberate, given that you mentioned norms, about nuclear nonproliferation treaty obligations, the stability considerations, etc. But those are conversations that we should be having among partners in that businesslike way.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n
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