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Ukraine\u2019s newly appointed defense minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, has a new, grim strategy for winning against Russia\u2019s onslaught: Kill more Russian troops than the Kremlin can send.<\/p>\n
It\u2019s a goal that could strain Russia at a moment when it is seeking major gains<\/a>. It could also give leverage to Ukraine in peace negotiations with Russia, which the United States is currently brokering.<\/p>\n However, analysts and European officials cautioned that a plan of attrition comes with major caveats, including that Russia is also becoming more efficient at targeting Ukrainians on the battlefield.<\/p>\n In January, Fedorov said one of his two major strategic objectives was<\/a> \u201cto kill 50,000 Russians a month.\u201d That figure exceeds the roughly 30,000 to 35,000 new troops that Russia recruits every month, according to<\/a> Janis Kluge, a researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.<\/p>\n Ukraine appears to have already made some progress toward that goal: Russian fatalities per month climbed in 2025, according to a BBC study of obituaries<\/a> published in Russian newspapers.<\/p>\n The higher death rate may be tied to Russia using fewer armored vehicles, which are valuable but easily detectable by drone, and instead attacking with only infantry, said Kateryna Stepanenko, a fellow at the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank.<\/p>\n The increase may also be tied to the Kremlin pressuring its forces to make gains as a way of influencing the United States to stop supporting Ukraine, Stepanenko added. \u201cThe intensity of Russian assaults has remained high because the Kremlin needs to create that perception [that it\u2019s winning],\u201d she said.<\/p>\n Russian losses in Ukraine now number nearly 1.2 million killed, wounded, or missing soldiers, according<\/a> to a report from the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank. That\u2019s more soldiers lost by any major power since World War II. For all this blood, Russia has made relatively little territorial gain: Its current offensives are moving at a rate slower than 100 meters a day, according to CSIS, which is slower than some World War I battles.<\/p>\n Amid these losses, Russia is having to work harder to staff its forces.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s military consists of<\/a> a mix of professional soldiers who volunteer, and draftees, who serve a 12-month term and are legally barred from serving abroad, including in Ukraine.<\/p>\n After many of its professional soldiers were wiped out<\/a> in the early days of Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine, Russia announced a partial mobilization of former soldiers in September 2022. Hundreds of thousands of Russians left the country<\/a>, including as many as 261,000 men, according to Russian outlet Novaya Gazeta<\/em>.<\/p>\n In response, the Kremlin ended the mobilization and instead turned to recruiting criminals<\/a>, foreigners<\/a>, and, most of all, paying increasingly large sign-up bonuses to those willing to join as volunteers. Such bonuses<\/a> can reach tens of thousands of dollars, more than many Russian workers make in a year<\/a>.<\/p>\n The price of recruiting such soldiers is rising, with costs increasing by 60 percent to 70 percent in some regions last year, Kluge said. Even with these bonuses, the Kremlin is relying more and more on older recruits: The average age of Russian soldiers who died in 2025 was between 46 and 52, according<\/a> to data from Russian outlet Mediazona.<\/p>\n Meanwhile, Ukraine has its territory on its side, with around 100 miles between Russia\u2019s recent advance near Pokrovsk and Ukraine\u2019s next biggest city in the east, Dnipro. \u201cIf you\u2019re trading that for a very high rate of Russian casualties, you can trade a lot of ground for a long time,\u201d said Jack Watling, a senior research fellow at the British think tank Royal United Services Institute.<\/p>\n A higher rate of Russian casualties, in combination with economic and other forms of pressure, could encourage the Kremlin to seek negotiations, Watling said. \u201cIt\u2019s about shifting the trend lines in a way that alters thinking in the Kremlin about their prospects.\u201d<\/p>\n A large Russian effort to increase recruitment numbers to 50,000 or higher, meanwhile, would strain Russian society and economy, Kluge said. Most of Russia\u2019s volunteer soldiers are poor men with limited financial prospects, a demographic that is limited in size. The cost of recruiting these additional soldiers would also pressure the economy, as it would require a \u201csignificant\u201d increase in spending to radically increase the monthly recruitment rate, Kluge added.<\/p>\n In order to get a major rise in recruitment, Russian officials might seek to informally pressure civilians who otherwise might not serve, generating discontent across Russian society, Kluge said.<\/p>\n Ultimately, Russia might even be forced to consider mobilization, said one Western official, who like others interviewed, was not authorized to speak publicly to the press on sensitive military issues. That could prove disastrous for Russia\u2019s political leadership, given the mass flight of Russians in 2022 in response to the partial mobilization.<\/p>\n Still, the Ukrainian plan faces a number of obstacles.<\/p>\n For one, Ukraine has limited ability to strike Russian troop concentrations far behind the line of contact due to a lack of suitable long-range munitions, including decreasing numbers of U.S.-provided HIMARS-launched rockets, said a European security official. Ukraine had previously<\/a> used such missiles to kill Russian troops clustering in barracks and other locations.<\/p>\n While Ukraine does have more ample reserves of lethal long-range drones, their operators have been pushed back from the front line following Russia targeting them, Watling said. That means that Ukraine\u2019s goal of killing 50,000 Russians per month depends on Russia sending 50,000 troops charging across the front lines. \u201cThe Russians dictate the rate of casualties,\u201d Watling said.<\/p>\n If they instead commit to their current volume of 30,000 troops, Russia can likely \u201cmaintain and sustain\u201d its current casualties, said a second European security official.<\/p>\n Russia, meanwhile, is also getting more efficient at killing Ukrainians, in part due to Russian forces\u2019 increased use of drones. Russian advances near Pokrovsk last fall were enabled<\/a> by drone operators that targeted Ukrainian drone operators and army logistics, thereby choking off Ukraine\u2019s reconnaissance, attack, and resupply capabilities.<\/p>\n Moscow is now working to significantly expand its use of drones. In November, the Kremlin established<\/a> drone operations as a separate military branch. Russia currently has 80,000 soldiers in drone units and plans to double that number this year, according to<\/a> Ukraine\u2019s top general.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s increasing lethality comes at a bad time for Ukraine, which is struggling to retain and recruit the foot soldiers who hold the front line. Ukraine reported<\/a> over 100,000 cases of desertion in the first seven months of 2025, more than the previous three years combined. Ukrainian troop shortages on the front helped<\/a> Russia advance on Pokrovsk in the fall, and they are contributing<\/a> to Russia\u2019s current advance around the Ukrainian town of Huliaipole.<\/p>\n With more Russians sitting behind the lines controlling drones, Ukraine may also have less and less opportunity of reaching its goal of killing 50,000 troops per month, said the first European security official. There \u201cwill not be such a strain on the Russian side,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n