Every year since 2017, we have given our predictions for the greatest threats facing the world. If some of the top risks this year seem to echo those we\u202fanticipated\u202ffor\u202f2025, it is not that they are static, but that the peril continues, without reaching a denouement. The risks of a Trump presidency we\u202ffeared have\u202fcome\u202ffaster and thicker than we\u00a0envisioned\u00a0of\u202fGaza, Ukraine, and climate.\u202fChina and Taiwan are not among\u202fthe top\u202fgeopolitical\u202frisks, as we judge 2026 is unlikely to see tensions\u202frise to that level in the aftermath of the summit<\/a> between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n<\/div>\n The world\u202fremains\u202fin a protracted interregnum,\u202fstill unsettled,\u202ffragmenting, but\u202fno less contested. The National\u00a0Security Strategy\u00a0makes<\/a> the U.S. retreat from primacy official: \u201cThe days of the\u202fUnited States\u202fpropping\u202fup\u202fthe entire\u202fworld\u202forder\u202flike Atlas are\u202fover.\u201d\u00a0The old neoliberal\u202frules-based\u202farchitecture\u202fis\u202fdecomposing, power diffusing,\u202fand much of the world is\u202fsearching for new\u202fmultilateral\u202farrangements to act as a buffer against three predatory, revisionist\u202fmajor powers.<\/p>\n Their efforts raise the\u202fquestion of whether it is possible to have a stable multilateral system without a hegemon.\u202fThe world is approaching an inflection\u202fpoint, where\u202fdiscontinuity\u2014war,\u202ffinancial crisis, or natural disaster\u2014buries\u202fthe\u202fpost-Cold War era\u00a0and\u00a0ushers\u00a0in a new, unknowable order.<\/p>\n With three years\u202fyet in his\u202fterm, Trump\u202fis already the\u202fmost\u202fconsequential and transformative president since FDR, what some would call a world-historical figure\u2014one who alters the course of history, and likely not for the better.\u202fThe United States\u202fappears to many\u202fa\u202fpredatory\u202frogue actor,\u202fa major destabilizing force with Trump diminishing the value of alliances\u00a0and multilateralism that have been the hallmarks of U.S. foreign policy since 1945.<\/p>\n The militarization of U.S. cities; dissolution of U.S. soft power (e.g.,\u202fthe U.S. Agency for International Development, Voice of America);\u202fthe slashing of research and development budgets, the secret sauce of U.S. innovation;\u202fand\u00a0abandonment of\u202fU.S.-led multilateral institutions\u202f(of\u202flate, the\u202fCOP30 climate summit and G-20)\u202fand\u202freordering of global trade have\u202ffostered\u202fworries of a rogue America out to destroy itself and the system it created.\u00a0Trends are not pointing toward\u202fothers picking up the pieces,\u00a0able to renew a rules-based\u202fliberal, multilateralist\u202forder.<\/p>\n This\u202fninth\u202fedition of our annual foresight exercise,\u00a0\u201cTop 10 Global Risks<\/a>,\u201d is drawn from our forecasting experience at the National Intelligence Council. In the language of intelligence, we have medium to high confidence in all the probabilities we have assigned to each of\u202fthe risks, given the\u00a0\u201ccredible\u201d\u00a0to\u00a0\u201chigh-quality\u201d\u00a0level of information that is available.\u202fAs it is for intelligence estimates<\/a> a \u201chigh or medium\u202fconfidence\u201d judgment\u202fstill carries the possibility of it being wrong.<\/p>\n A banner displayed by the organization MoveOn in Los Angeles on Dec. 12, 2025, protests U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s tariffs on imports.Patrick T. Fallon \/ AFP via Getty Images<\/span> <\/p>\n<\/div>\n Many\u202feconomists<\/a>\u202fhave already sounded the alarm that all the preconditions are present for economic meltdown.\u202fFinancial assets are massively overvalued with unbounded\u00a0artificial intelligence fueling<\/a>\u00a040 percent of\u00a0U.S. GDP growth and 80 percent of\u00a0stock market growth even\u202fthough\u202fproductivity\u202fgains by companies experimenting with AI are so far elusive.<\/p>\n Some\u00a0experts are beginning to doubt whether AI can really go beyond machine learning to the artificial general intelligence of Silicon Valley dreams, charging that current AI models can handle simple problems but\u00a0\u201cfundamentally break down<\/a> on complex tasks,\u201d\u00a0thinking less, not more, as the difficulty\u202frises.\u202fA stock market crash\u202fcould wipe out\u202f$35 trillion in consumer wealth, according<\/a> to former International Monetary Fund Deputy Director Gita Gopinath. Institutionalizing, yet lightly regulating, cryptocurrency\u202fadds\u202frisk uncertainty<\/a>.<\/p>\n Adding\u202fto these risks\u202fis\u202fthe growing\u202frole played by unregulated non-bank financial institutions or shadow banks in corporate finance, and in state finance<\/a> in China, making it difficult to know how\u202fmuch\u202fcompanies are\u202fleveraged.\u202fAn internal probe<\/a> of First Brands, an auto parts maker that filed for bankruptcy in\u202f2025, examined how it used money that was due from customers to borrow from lenders several times over.\u00a0First Brands\u2019s\u00a0collapse was also spurred by\u202fthe growing\u202fweakness of middle-class consumers no longer able to\u202fmaintain\u202for purchase new vehicles.<\/p>\n The situation is frighteningly reminiscent of what happened in 2007-08, when the holders of cheap mortgages could not keep up their payments.\u202fThe\u00a0K-shaped economy<\/a>, with just the wealthiest 20 percent of U.S. households fueling consumption, is not sustainable.\u202fTariffs are beginning to increase\u202finflation,\u202fand low hiring levels have led to an affordability crisis. Trump has few solutions beyond\u202feliminating his own\u202ftariffs on food items such as coffee, negotiating with Big\u202fPharma to lower drug costs, and\u202fpromising $2,000 checks for most Americans that would boost U.S. debt already equaling around<\/a> 125 percent\u202fof GDP, a level unprecedented for peacetime.<\/p>\n A financial crisis\u202fthis time\u202faround\u202fcould\u202fbe far more lethal for U.S. power in the world than in 2008. China and the G-20 are unlikely to help\u202fa second\u202ftime.\u202fThe U.S. dollar, already weakened, would not be the shield it has been without the U.S. taking drastic action to\u202fcut spending and\u202fraise taxes.<\/p>\n Probability of crisis:<\/em> Brazilian President Luiz In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva (lower middle) poses with world leaders during the BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro on July 7, 2025.Mauro Pimentel\/AFP via Getty Images<\/span> <\/p>\n<\/div>\n Italian\u00a0Marxist\u00a0philosopher\u202fAntonio Gramsci\u00a0summed\u202fup<\/a> the\u202f1930s with his famous phrase,\u00a0\u201cThe old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born:\u00a0now\u202fis the time of monsters.\u201d It\u2019s\u00a0a\u00a0description\u00a0apt for the\u202finterregnum between today\u2019s dying liberal order and whatever is to come.\u202fIt\u2019s\u202fnot just Trump\u00a0trashing\u00a0the\u202fancien\u202fr\u00e9gime: Most of the other great powers are out to kill it.<\/p>\n Russian President Vladimir Putin was first out of the gate, waging war on Ukraine to reassert Russia\u2019s interests against NATO.\u202fClaiming regional\u202fdominance, Xi wants to avenge China\u2019s past century of humiliation, while the global south seeks a\u202fgreater decision-making role for itself in global affairs.\u00a0Europe appears paralyzed by its nostalgia for the liberal\u202forder,\u202fbut Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine and Trump\u2019s weakening of U.S. security guarantees\u00a0as\u00a0stated\u202fin his recent\u00a0National Security Strategy<\/a>\u00a0are forcing\u00a0Europe\u00a0to arm itself for a realpolitik world.<\/p>\n Yet for many states, multipolarity is the\u202fanswer. Even\u00a0U.S. Secretary\u00a0of State\u00a0Marco Rubio\u00a0has admitted<\/a> that it is inevitable, but there is no plan to ensure the global\u202fcommons\u202fis\u202fprotected\u202fat a time of rising extreme poverty and conflict along with growing climate change\u202fimpacts.<\/p>\n Just like the global economy, multilateralism is fracturing, with the Trump administration exiting the United States from U.N. organizations such as\u00a0the World\u00a0Health Organization and defunding others like the World Food Program by its foreign\u202fassistance\u202fcuts.<\/p>\n Russia and China are expanding alternative<\/a> organizations such as BRICS to de-dollarize and create alternative currency\u00a0systems\u00a0to the\u00a0U.S.\u00a0dollar. The mix of diminished institutions and great-power competition points to a deficit of needed cooperation when the next global pandemic, climate, or financial crisis erupts. Domestically, the discontent is even greater, with\u00a0inequality\u00a0growing\u00a0and\u00a0Western\u00a0publics\u00a0irate that globalization\u00a0appeared to benefit\u00a0everyone else.<\/p>\n Young people everywhere are seeing the ladders to the good life being kicked away, with populists seeking simple answers in a complicated, fast-changing world. However powerful they are, both states and individuals see themselves as victims. Xi has publicly complained<\/a> about U.S. suppression and encirclement in an attempt to thwart China\u2019s rise. Putin blames<\/a> the U.S. and West for starting the war in Ukraine with NATO enlargement, coupled with U.S. efforts to fuel color revolutions in post-Soviet states and never-ending sanctions. Trump<\/a> and other U.S. leaders have blamed China<\/a> for cheating on trade, stealing U.S. intellectual property, and foisting COVID on the rest of the word. Gramsci\u2019s interregnum ended with one of the deadliest wars ever. Such an eventuality\u202fcan\u2019t\u202fbe ruled out, but for the moment, Trump and other leaders\u202fremain\u202ffearful of\u00a0a\u00a0slide into major state-on-state war.<\/p>\n Probability of crisis:<\/em> A Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard speedboat patrols with the USS Gravely<\/em> warship near the capital of Port of Spain on Oct. 26. Martin Bernetti\/AFP via Getty Images<\/span> <\/p>\n<\/div>\n Trump asserted his own corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in his National Security Strategy, pairing it with his threats against cartels in Mexico and regime change in Venezuela\u2014and steep tariffs and sanctions against\u202fColombia\u202fand\u202fCuba<\/a>\u202fmay be next.<\/p>\n Seeking\u202fto\u202festablish\u202fa\u202fdominant\u202fsphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, while\u00a0sidelining the\u00a0United States\u2019 other regional commitments,\u00a0has\u00a0most Washington strategists scratching their heads.\u202fCertainly,\u202fthe U.S. has ignored its neighbors for too long, but a mix of\u202ftariffs,\u202fthreats, handouts to friendly leaders, and gunboat diplomacy can\u2019t turn the clock back to the 19th century, when the United States was unrivaled in its hemisphere.<\/p>\n China understands better what Latin America wants: economic development.\u202fDespite worries about Chinese goods displacing\u202flocal industries, trade<\/a> between China, Latin America, and the Caribbean has\u00a0\u201csoared from\u202f$12 billion\u202fin 2000 to\u202f$315 billion\u202fin 2020, with projections<\/a> indicating it could surpass\u202f$700 billion\u202fby 2035.\u201d\u00a0Brazil\u2019s trade with China exceeds\u00a0\u201cits trade with the U.S. by more than two to\u202fone.\u201d<\/p>\n It might have been a different story if President Bill Clinton\u2019s Free Trade Area of the Americas<\/a> had come to\u202ffruition. Instead, Trump has pursued\u00a0\u201cAmerica First\u201d\u00a0measures that often backfire, such as cuts to foreign assistance in his first term to Central America<\/a>\u202fthat fueled more migration.\u00a0With the recent food aid cuts,\u202fVenezuela and Colombia<\/a>\u2014two of the biggest Trump targets\u2014\u201cnow face even more severe crises\u2014with ripple effects on U.S. farmers, trade, and counternarcotics\u202fefforts.\u201d<\/p>\n The risk is that in four years, most Latin American states will have distanced themselves from Washington and moved even closer to China. In focusing too much on Latin America, the U.S. will ignore its other interests and allies. Should Trump put troops on the ground in Venezuela to topple President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, the U.S. could get trapped in an escalating military engagement that would be unpopular at home. Blocking Venezuela\u2019s oil exports\u2014the lifeblood of its economy\u2014will likely lead to Maduro\u2019s downfall and to rampant inflation and shortages of food and other essentials, devastating the poor and middle classes. Trump appears to have no plan to help Venezuelans cope with the political instability should Maduro be ousted.<\/p>\n Probability of crisis:<\/em> Two Iran-made ballistic missiles are displayed at Azadi Square in western Tehran on Feb. 10, 2025. Morteza Nikoubazl\/NurPhoto via Getty Images<\/span> <\/p>\n<\/div>\n 2026 begins with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists\u2019 Doomsday Clock<\/a> moved to just 89 seconds to\u00a0midnight. Great-power competition is driving new nuclear risks, as existing powers such as the United States, Russia, and China seek to increase their stockpiles or carry out new tests, while at the same time, proliferation\u202fthreats, from Iran to Japan, are unfolding in a third nuclear era.<\/p>\n AI, offensive cyber, and anti-satellite weapons are creating new vulnerabilities for nuclear powers. Gone is the Cold War-era balance of\u00a0terror,\u202fas is the\u00a0post-Cold War\u202fstasis,\u202fand\u202fits aftermath,\u202fwhen the U.S. and Russia pledged<\/a> to\u202freduce\u202ftheir nuclear weapons stockpiles by more than 80 percent.\u202fThe\u202farchitecture of\u202farms control accords\u202fhas\u202funraveled.\u202fIts last vestige, the New START Treaty, which\u202flimits\u202fthe United States and Russia to 1,550 deployed warheads, expires in February, its fate uncertain.<\/p>\n In a nascent triangular arms race,\u202fU.S. military\u202fstrategists\u202fare thinking the unthinkable:\u202fto fight two nuclear wars simultaneously. The U.S. is modernizing<\/a> all three legs (land, sea, air) of its nuclear\u202ftriad at an estimated cost of\u202f$1.7 trillion.\u202fRussia\u202fis also modernizing<\/a> its nuclear forces,\u202fdeploying new short-range \u201cnon-strategic\u201d nukes,\u202fas is\u202fChina. The\u202fPentagon says<\/a>\u202fBeijing will have 1,000 nuclear warheads\u202fby 2030. In response to Russian and Chinese tactical nukes, the U.S. has developed its own short-range nuclear\u202fcruise missiles<\/a>.<\/p>\n Though the major nuclear powers have not tested nuclear weapons since 1996, Trump has ordered<\/a> new nuclear tests if\u202fothers such as Russia\u00a0and China\u202ftest. China is expanding<\/a> its test site at Lop Nur. Moscow\u2019s threats<\/a> of tactical nuclear use in Ukraine,\u202fa\u202flowering\u202fof\u202fthe nuclear threshold, suggested\u202fthe feasibility of\u202flimited nuclear war<\/a>.\u202fThis risk\u202fextends to\u202flesser nuclear\u202fstates\u2014North Korea, which has massively\u202fbuilt up<\/a>\u202fits missile and nuclear\u202fforce\u00a0capabilities, and India and Pakistan,\u202fwhose\u202fnuclear\u202frivalry<\/a>\u202fcontinues.<\/p>\n Faced with volatile\u202fsecurity\u202fpredicaments\u202fin the Middle East and East Asia and doubts about U.S. reliability, recent U.S. deals\u2014nuclear submarines<\/a> for South Korea, a\u202fU.S.-Saudi<\/a> civil nuclear program\u2014raise concerns. Both may involve reprocessing nuclear fuel\u202fwith which they could join Japan as virtual nuclear powers.\u202fSouth\u202fKorea js debating<\/a>\u202fthe virtues of nuclear weapons, and Japan is\u202falso rethinking<\/a>\u202fits\u202fnuclear allergy.\u202fWhat could go wrong?<\/p>\n Probability of crisis:<\/em> Security forces intervene against Generation Z protesters in Antananarivo, Madagascar, on Oct. 9.Rafalia Henitsoa\/Anadolu via Getty Images<\/span> <\/p>\n<\/div>\n Generation Z, a demographic cohort born between 1997 and 2012 that constitutes 20 percent<\/a> of humanity, faces\u202fa future challenged by an unraveling global system. Gen Z is concentrated in the Global South. In South<\/a> and Southeast Asia<\/a>, one-third or more of the population is less than 25 years old; in\u202fAfrica, almost 60 percent of the population (some 890 million people) was less than 25 years old in 2024. The continent\u2019s median age<\/a> was 19.3 years in 2025.<\/p>\n Disillusioned by internet censors, government corruption, and a jobs deficit, Gen Z is already wreaking havoc<\/a> on governments in Africa and South and Southeast Asia. Since 2024, a tsunami of youth-led protests has brought down governments in Bangladesh, Madagascar, and Nepal; caused other states such as Indonesia, Kenya, and Morocco to dismantle unpopular policies; and spurred brutal repression<\/a>, as in Tanzania. Across the Middle East, the political impact of \u201cyouth bulge<\/a>\u201d\u2014under-25-year-olds constituted 60 percent<\/a> of the region\u2019s population in 2025\u2014grows, although it has not yet triggered a new Arab Spring or another burst of protests in Iran. Gen Z protests in Bulgaria<\/a> in December that unseated its government suggest the West may not be immune.<\/p>\n Africa\u2019s predicament is even worse. The region contains 20 of 39 states the World Bank dubbed<\/a> fragile or conflict affected in fiscal year 2026. These countries are replete with internal clashes<\/a>, ranging from civil wars to terrorist attacks. All have large unskilled youth bulges with few employment opportunities. On a more basic level, almost 600 million sub-Saharan Africans lack access to electricity<\/a>.<\/p>\n African states are also heavily burdened by foreign debt\u2014$746 billion cumulatively<\/a>. And government debt in sub-Saharan Africa averages around 60 percent<\/a> of countries\u2019 gross domestic product. Approximately 57 percent<\/a> of Africans live in countries that spend more on external debt servicing than education or health care.<\/p>\n These youthful nations must find\u202fa path to development amid what some have dubbed a global polycrisis<\/a>\u2014a cascading set of intersecting problems. Those challenges include a growing North-South economic and technological divide; declining\u202faid<\/a>; and navigating global financial negotiation to manage deepening debt issues, climate change, food insecurity, disease, and (not least) the\u202frisks to jobs from artificial intelligence.<\/p>\n As the Gen Z drama unfolds, its impact\u202fwill\u202fripple across the world\u2014whether resulting in prosperity, where governments find the means to educate and employ this cohort; or, where they do not, poverty, terrorism, disease, civil wars, and mass migration.<\/p>\n Probability of crisis:<\/em> Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with Trump at the end of a news conference in Anchorage, Alaska, on Aug. 15, 2025. Andrew Harnik\/Getty Images<\/span> <\/p>\n<\/div>\n Conventional conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine\u202fWar, if not resolved in the first year, on average tend to last more than a decade<\/a> unless they transform into a frozen conflict or reach a cease-fire. But after three years of war, Russia increasingly has the upper hand and appears unlikely to settle without forcibly taking the Donbas or being given the region in a peace agreement.<\/p>\n The Europeans alone are not capable<\/a>, nor is the United States under President Donald Trump willing, to provide Ukraine with the arms that could give it a fighting chance. Peace negotiations have been a never-ending merry-go-round, with Trump agreeing to Russian President Vladimir Putin\u2019s terms before pushing them on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who musters European support for refusing them.<\/p>\n The recent U.S. National Security Strategy targets<\/a> Europe, forecasting<\/a> \u201ccivilizational erasure\u201d for the continent and blaming it for Ukraine\u2019s resistance to a cease-fire. So far, Putin has not moved an inch to water down his terms. In the worst case, Trump will tire and dump the Ukraine problem on the Europeans, who won\u2019t be able to turn the tide and don\u2019t have much influence with the Kremlin.<\/p>\n With Russian forces advancing into Ukraine, Putin could become\u202feven greedier and less interested in settling. Russia is reportedly stockpiling<\/a> long-range missiles that could devastate Ukraine. At best, Kyiv would impede a complete victory for Moscow, but it can\u2019t achieve a just peace without strong support from a united NATO. A peace settlement that endures and averts another conflict needs strong support from the United States. And although Trump says he wants a cease-fire, his real goal appears to be bilateral trade and investment deals with Russia. With U.S. and European leaders at loggerheads, Russia appears to have achieved its long-term goal of splitting the West and emasculating NATO.<\/p>\n Probability of crisis:<\/em> Morning smog clouds the view at Kartavya Path in New Delhi on Dec. 14, 2025.Vipin Kumar\/Hindustan Times via Getty Images<\/span> <\/p>\n<\/div>\n As climate change worsens, there is a serious risk of weakening countermeasures\u2014and poorer countries, already hurt the most, will bear the brunt of the impact. U.S. opposition to climate efforts is also ceding leadership to China.<\/p>\n Trump called<\/a> climate change \u201cthe\u202fgreatest con job ever perpetrated on the world\u201d in his address to the U.N. General Assembly in September. Not only did he withdraw the United States from the 2015 Paris Agreement for the second time, Trump has pressed other countries to drop their climate efforts and concentrate on exploiting more fossil fuels.<\/p>\n To some extent, this has worked. Inside the United States, many companies are scaling back<\/a> their earlier promises to fight climate change, and Microsoft founder Bill Gates wrote a remarkable memo<\/a> that downgraded climate change\u2019s place in his philanthropic foundation\u2019s objectives list. There was no mention<\/a> in the 2025 U.N. Climate Change Conference final statement of fossils fuels, much less a roadmap thanks to Russia, Saudi Arabia, and other oil producers blocking one. And with China staying silent, the European Union showed itself ineffective in countering these anti-climate efforts.<\/p>\n The EU\u2019s silence \u201cpartly reflects the\u202fpower shift in the real world,\u201d one analyst told<\/a> the BBC, linking the emerging power of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa coalition to the decline of the EU. Even within the EU, there are concerns that meeting its aggressive 2040 emissions reduction target will aggravate the group\u2019s weakening economic competitiveness<\/a>.<\/p>\n At the U.N. climate conference, the goal of $120 billion a year in climate financing for poor countries was pushed back five years<\/a>, from the\u202finitial\u202fsuggested date of 2030 to 2035. This increases the climate risks for poorer countries already highly vulnerable to droughts, floods, and higher temperatures inhibiting agricultural production and spreading disease. Meanwhile, the\u202fWorld Meteorological Organization forecast<\/a> a 70 percent chance that five-year average warming for 2025-29 will be more than 1.5 degrees Celsius (up\u202ffrom a 47 chance for 2024-28 in last year\u2019s report).<\/p>\n China\u2019s transformation into a renewables giant<\/a> is the only positive note on climate this year. The country accounts for 74 percent of all large-scale solar and wind capacity under construction, compared to 5.9 percent for the United States. Not missing an opportunity, China has capitalized on wind, solar, and battery technologies, which constituted more than a quarter of its economic growth in 2024.<\/p>\n Probability of crisis:<\/em> Israeli soldiers stand near military vehicles close to the border with the Gaza Strip in southern Israel on Sept. 17, 2025.Amir Levy\/Getty Images<\/span> <\/p>\n<\/div>\n Despite hopes yet again for a \u201cnew Middle East<\/a>,\u201d the region\u2019s most enduring problems\u2014Gaza and Iran\u2014may move closer to renewed conflict than\u202fpeace\u202fin\u202f2026. The United States,\u202fmired in both conflicts, and with new security commitments to Saudi Arabia<\/a> and Qatar<\/a>, is deepening its entrenchment in the region despite vowing in the new National Security Strategy to narrow its interests.<\/p>\n The first phase of the Trump-designed cease-fire plan for Gaza is already getting mugged by reality. Gaza is de facto partitioned<\/a>, with Israel controlling more than half of the territory and most Palestinians living\u202fin ruins in the other half.\u202fMeanwhile, Hamas is refusing<\/a> to disarm and has reasserted its\u202fmilitary and political presence. Fighting continues to flare up from both sides<\/a>.<\/p>\n There are indications the United States\u202fis considering redeveloping the Israeli-controlled half of Gaza. These realities impede further implementation of the peace plan, elements of which include an international stabilization force<\/a> and a\u202ftransitional, technocrat-run Palestinian administration.<\/p>\n In the West Bank, Israeli settler violence and military operations continue to fuel tensions. Getting to the second phase of the\u202fGaza peace\u202fplan and charting<\/a> a \u201ccredible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood\u201d appears distant.<\/p>\n Other destabilizing factors in the region are Israeli attacks on\u202fLebanon, meant to prevent a resurgence of Hezbollah, and Syria, threatening the country\u2019s political transition. And Iran, facing chaos and potential renewed war, may be\u202fan even more explosive risk. The country\u2019s economy is cratering<\/a> due to intensified sanctions<\/a> over its nuclear program. Tehran is also facing a water crisis<\/a> after five years of drought and mismanaged agricultural and economic policies. Iran\u2019s president warned<\/a> in November that Tehran might need to be evacuated if the drought continued.\u202fThese predicaments are compounded by an ailing, often absent, 86-year-old supreme leader, Ali Khameini, whose power is waning<\/a>. The line of succession is uncertain\u2014and could spur unrest or a\u202fcoup by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.<\/p>\n Against this backdrop, the International Atomic Energy Agency says Iran still has enriched uranium<\/a>, despite U.S. and Israeli bombings, and there are signs<\/a> Tehran is continuing its nuclear program. It reneged<\/a> on an agreement with the agency to resume external monitoring\u202fof its nuclear activities, and it has rejected<\/a> U.S. offers of renewed nuclear talks (though it hints new talks are possible). Renewed Israeli and\/or U.S. bombing of Iran is a looming prospect.<\/p>\n Probability of crisis:<\/em> A technician works at an Amazon Web Services AI data center in New Carlisle, Indiana, on Oct. 2, 2025.Noah Berger\/Getty Images via Amazon Web Services<\/span> <\/p>\n<\/div>\n The transformational power of artificial intelligence cuts in different directions. On one hand, for example, AI could help detect<\/a>, treat<\/a>, and maybe even cure diseases such as cancer, Alzheimer\u2019s, and Parkinson\u2019s in the coming decade; on the other, it could be a new source of social disorder and contribute to democratic demise.<\/p>\n Multiple AI risks are mounting. Most immediately, AI could soon render obsolete many jobs and is already contributing<\/a> to job losses and hiring freezes. Some CEOs warn<\/a> that AI could replace half of U.S. white-collar workers. In January 2024, an International Monetary Fund analysis concluded<\/a> 60 percent of jobs in nations with advanced economies would be\u202fimpacted by AI, yet there appears little urgency to rethink skills training and education.<\/p>\n But the real problem may be that AI turns out to be much less that promised\u2014or threatened. Even if the technology is transformative in the long run, the short term race for AI dominance poses financial risks that may\u202fbite\u202fin 2026. The investing boom in the technology is fueling fears<\/a> of a bubble that will soon burst while much of the rest of the U.S. economy sputters. In 2024, global Big Tech invested more than $400 billion in data centers (of which there are now more than 5,000<\/a> in the United States). And that investment is projected increase massively by 2029, to $1.1 trillion (and one prediction expects $2.8 trillion<\/a> on AI-related infrastructure as a whole). Increasingly, though, this investment is through debt. OpenAI doesn\u2019t expect profits<\/a> until 2030; Anthropic hopes to break even by 2028.<\/p>\n Nor are many AI pilots reporting return on their initiatives<\/a>. The gap between massive\u202finvestment and a dearth of revenues is sparking fears of a crash reminiscent of, if not worse than, the 2000 implosion of the dot-com bubble. There is also a gap<\/a> between AI energy needs and available electricity, despite newly built power plants, leaving some data centers idle and driving up electricity prices<\/a>.<\/p>\n Risks don\u2019t end there. Some Americans, including<\/a> Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, think that China is winning the AI innovation race. China\u2019s open-source AI approach, as its popular DeepSeek chatbot demonstrated, results in models cheaper and just as effective<\/a>, though less technologically advanced, than U.S. products. While U.S. AI models seeks superintelligence, China focuses on practical apps. These products may appeal to much of the Global South, which already uses<\/a> China\u2019s digital infrastructure.<\/p>\n On top of these risks is the concern, as\u202fAI founders have voiced, that AI\u202fwill render humans extinct<\/a>.<\/p>\n Probability of crisis:<\/em> An Indian paramilitary service member keeps watch in Pahalgam, Kashmir, on April 23, 2025. Tauseef Mustafa\/AFP via Getty Images<\/span> <\/p>\n<\/div>\n There are multiple risks in Asia now. But some of the usual suspects (e.g., North Korea) are more conspicuous by their absence in the new U.S. National Security Strategy. While geopolitical uncertainty in East Asia\u202fhas not diminished, U.S.-China ties are likely to be steady at least through 2026. Beijing\u2019s military coercion\u202fof Taipei and in the South and East China seas is unlikely to escalate beyond the threshold of gray zone activities.<\/p>\n Trump\u2019s tariffs and Chinese manufacturing overcapacity pose dual threats<\/a> to the Asian economy, undermining regional production networks in South and Southeast Asia that are based on a \u201cChina +1\u201d<\/a> strategy\u2014a diversification scheme in which investors move factories out of China but use Chinese components. Though it encouraged such moves during the first Trump administration, the\u202fUnited States is now seeking<\/a> to cut China out of these supply chains altogether.<\/p>\n Trump has signed trade deals<\/a> with four member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but the\u202fUnited States has yet to clarify final tariff levels. They will depend on how Trump decides the rules of origin<\/a>\u2014guidelines that determine, for instance, whether goods using Chinese components that were processed into final products in Vietnam (or other nations) and exported added enough local value to be tariffed at Vietnamese rates, or if they are designated as transshipped goods facing higher Chinese level tariffs.<\/p>\n Current tariffs are already taking a toll on Asia, but if the United States requires a high level (say, 50 percent or more) of value added\u00a0to avoid transshipment tariffs, Southeast Asia\u2019s economy could be hit hard particularly if a flood of Chinese surplus goods shuts down ASEAN factories.<\/p>\n The locus of security conflict risks is South Asia. India-Pakistan tensions after recent terrorist attacks<\/a> highlight a combustible situation. Both sides claimed victory<\/a> after skirmishes this spring. Meanwhile<\/a>, Pakistan\u2019s military (and personnel such as Defense Forces Chief Asim Munir) has been emboldened by constitutional changes<\/a> that enhanced its power.<\/p>\n Munir was bolstered by\u202fhis diplomatic success in persuading<\/a> Trump to tilt toward Pakistan and rebuke India, and by Pakistan\u2019s defense pact with Saudi Arabia. In contrast, India\u2019s Prime Minister Narendra Modi appears weakened by a Trump<\/a> snubbing. Both leaders have something to prove. The mix of a simmering dispute in the Kashmir region, terrorism concerns, problems with Afghanistan, and water disagreements could relight the fuse.<\/p>\n Pakistan also has to worry about a second front\u2014terrorism, its ongoing clash with Baluchi separatists and the resurgent Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan militant organization. Confrontations with the latter group have spilled over<\/a> into military clashes with Kabul, and Islamabad is deporting<\/a> one-third of the 3 million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan across a porous, disputed border.<\/p>\n In short, tensions in the region remain high, with on-off cease-fires, and unresolved issues including simmering India-China border disputes<\/a> suggest more conflict ahead<\/a>. \n <\/p>\n
\n1. Trump\u2019s\u202fEconomic\u202fMorass<\/h3>\n
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\n2. The Dissolution\u202fof\u202fOrder<\/h3>\n
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\n3. U.S. Pivot to Western Hemisphere<\/h3>\n
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\n4. Third\u202fNuclear\u202fEra<\/h3>\n
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\n5. Gen Z Rebellion<\/h3>\n
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\n6. An Empowered Putin After Ukraine<\/h3>\n
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\n7. Climate Decline<\/h3>\n
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\n8. A Persistently Dangerous Middle East<\/h3>\n
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\n9. Artificial Intelligence: the Great Disruptor<\/h3>\n
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\n10. A Shaky Asia-Pacific<\/h3>\n
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