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Any potential peace deal to end Russia\u2019s war with Ukraine is likely to feature some form of security guarantee that is designed to ensure foreign assistance for Ukrainians in the event of a renewed Russian attack. But whether any such guarantee would ever be credible is unclear.<\/p>\n
Some in Ukraine are already fearful that the Trump administration\u2019s desire for business deals<\/a>\u00a0with Russia will undermine its resolve to aid Ukraine in a crisis\u2014and that any peace deal could prove to be merely a stop-gap measure before Russia\u2019s next attempted invasion.<\/p>\n Those fears have shaped the negotiation strategies of Ukrainian officials who have recently been traveling between global capitals to secure diplomatic support. Increasingly, Ukrainians and their European allies are realizing that their best hope for a lasting peace may be an explicit reliance on the Ukrainian military.<\/p>\n The United States has categorically refused to deploy troops under any potential scenario. Europeans have likewise made it clear that they are not ready to die for Ukraine either.<\/p>\n Instead, Ukraine\u2019s best bet going forward may be a domestic armed force that is better paid, better trained, better armed, and more motivated than the contract Russian soldiers and convicts that the Kremlin is banking on, as well as a domestic defense industry that not only produces but innovates.<\/p>\n In short, as U.S. President Donald Trump tries to emulate the Gaza model for peace\u2014a quick deal with details to be figured out later Ukraine must turn itself into a militarily strong country like Israel, or a \u201csteel porcupine,\u201d as noted earlier<\/a> by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.<\/p>\n \u201cThat\u2019s a metaphor for Ukraine to become so strong that Russia can\u2019t swallow it,\u201d said Rafael Loss, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.<\/p>\n Trump\u2019s original proposal called for Ukraine to not only give up territory that\u2019s currently under Russian occupation, but also to demilitarize parts of the Donbas region that were painstakingly fortified by Ukrainians. But\u00a0the worry<\/a> is that abandoning that area will just make it easier for Russia to attack and conquer at a later date, under one pretext or another. Moreover, Ukraine felt threatened by the proposal, which also called<\/a> for capping the strength of its armed forces\u2014from around\u00a0a million<\/a>\u00a0to 600,000, while imposing no such condition on Russia.<\/p>\n \u201cOf course, we\u2019ll continue working with partners, especially the United States, and look for compromises that strengthen but not weaken us,\u201d said Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. He seemed to be trying to avoid irking an easily irritable American president while also making his reservations clear.<\/p>\n The original draft of the peace deal placed a permanent veto on Ukraine\u2019s NATO membership on Russia\u2019s behalf, as well as on the deployment of European troops, presumably even as trainers. It even alluded to a rollback of NATO infrastructure, with European fighter jets to be deployed in Poland.<\/p>\n All of that is ostensibly in exchange for a\u00a0vague<\/a> mention of security guarantees that will be decided at a later stage.<\/p>\n Trump\u2019s proposal secures \u201ccompensation\u201d for any guarantees that it may offer, but without answering exactly how it would intervene militarily if Russia violated the agreement. \u201cAnything that limits the size of armed forces, anything that limits what outside guarantors can do inside Ukraine or on behalf of Ukraine, puts limits on Ukraine\u2019s ability to defend itself, especially when no such limits are placed on Russia,\u201d Loss said.<\/p>\n Ukraine is afraid that even if it concedes de facto control of occupied Ukrainian territories to Russia, there is no guarantee that Russian President Vladimir Putin will stop. Despite the 1994 Budapest agreement, in which Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia itself, Moscow reneged on its commitments. It invaded Crimea in 2014 and marched on Ukraine again in 2022, trying to carve out a part of sovereign Ukrainian land each time.<\/p>\n \u201cFrom the Ukrainian perspective, the size of Ukrainian territory and whether Russia controls 100 kilometers more or less, is less important than Ukrainian sovereignty and the security guarantees it can achieve,\u201d Loss said.<\/p>\n In August, Trump indicated that the United States may provide\u00a0air support to Ukraine\u00a0as part of a potential peace deal with Russia, but now it is playing mysterious. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly\u00a0told<\/a>\u00a0Europeans that U.S. security guarantees would be discussed only after a deal has been agreed on.<\/p>\n However, in hushed voices in Brussels\u2014the seat of the European\u00a0Union\u2014 officials have long been whispering about whether Trump\u2019s fondness for Putin and his transactional approach to negotiations have already crushed the deterrent effect they were meant to offer to Ukraine and even other NATO members. And, while a different U.S. government may lend different credibility to the same guarantees, a returning MAGA candidate may not.<\/p>\n Europeans are livid, sidelined and desperate to find a way to influence Trump. But they\u00a0 have also engaged half-heartedly to support Ukraine\u2014sending some weapons, blocking more\u2014since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in 2022. They have not worded the end game, which is likely to avoid being cornered into matching that ambition with action.<\/p>\n France and the U.K. have been taking a lead on deciding future guarantees for Ukraine through what\u2019s called a coalition of the willing\u2014a total of31 nations. Each country is expected to deliver in a specific way to aid Ukraine\u2019s future defense. French President Emmanuel Macron said soldiers from France, the U.K., and Turkey\u2014which has friendlier ties this with Russia\u2014could be sent to Ukraine as part of a so-called reassurance force that\u2019s expected to monitor the peace deal once an agreement\u00a0is reached.<\/p>\n Unlike the United States, France and the U.K. are ready to deploy troops to Ukraine, but they have been equally unclear about their military response if Russia invaded again or attacked one of their own.\u00a0The deterrent effect of a European non combat force on the ground is equally\u00a0suspect.<\/p>\n \u201cEuropeans have no idea what to do if such a force is deployed and a European contingent is attacked by Russia,\u201d said an EU official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.<\/p>\n A source in the French president\u2019s office\u00a0emphasized Ukraine\u2019s role when asked about how the conversation around security guarantees was shaping up. The first security guarantee for Ukraine will be the strength of its army, the second will be European support, and the third, hopefully, will be an American commitment, they said.<\/p>\n A militarily strong Ukraine and a strong and large Ukrainian army, however, is also a buffer for Europe.<\/p>\n Europeans are increasingly earnest about arranging funding to pay salaries, pensions, and benefits for Ukrainian soldiers, as well as developing mechanisms to jointly produce and procure key equipment such as ammunition, drones, and air defense systems.<\/p>\n The EU has decided to raise 150 billion euros\u2014primarily for EU member states via Security\u00a0Action for Europe, also known as the SAFE instrument.\u00a0That\u00a0money will allow EU members to plug the capability gaps in their own defense, send existing equipment to Ukraine, and replenish their own supplies.<\/p>\n But experts said that Europeans have been far too slow, and while they are finally moving in the right direction, it will take years before this expansive plan starts to have any effect. In an op-ed for the New York Times<\/em>, former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba\u00a0wrote<\/a>\u00a0that stopping Russia on the front line \u201cwould require Europe to stop treating defense production as a bureaucratic necessity and start treating it as a continental emergency.\u201d<\/p>\n Moreover,\u00a0Europeans are still\u00a0arguing over whether to use, or not to use, frozen Russian assets\u2014worth more than $300 billion, the largest share of which lies in European countries\u2014to help Ukraine rebuild its cities and strengthen its defense sector. According to a Ukrainian assessment shared with Europe, the cost of country\u2019s defense needs will range anywhere from $70 to $100 billion for next year.<\/p>\n Ukrainians have been in the trenches for nearly four years. War fatigue and\u00a0other domestic constraints make it difficult for them to turn into a military giant.<\/p>\n