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Welcome to\u00a0Foreign Policy<\/em>\u2019s South Asia Brief.<\/p>\n The highlights this week: U.S. President Donald Trump imposes an additional 25 percent tariff on India<\/strong>, Bangladesh marks one year since mass demonstrations<\/strong> led to former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina\u2019s ousting, and supporters of former Pakistani leader Imran Khan<\/strong> protest in Pakistan.<\/p>\n The United States and India are embroiled in an ugly confrontation over trade and tariffs\u2014and there\u2019s no end in sight. On Wednesday, U.S. President Donald Trump followed through on his earlier threat<\/a> and announced<\/a> an additional 25 percent tariff on India, citing its continued purchase of Russian oil. The new levy comes on top of an existing 25 percent tariff that Trump announced last week. The total tariffs on India are notably higher than those imposed<\/a> on India\u2019s neighbors, including Pakistan (19 percent) and Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (20 percent each).<\/p>\n Indian officials have signaled<\/a> that they currently have no plans<\/a> to stop buying energy from Russia. New Delhi has argued<\/a> that its targeting by Washington and Brussels is \u201cunjustified and unreasonable.\u201d After all, China purchases more Russian crude than India, but it has not been specifically targeted. In addition, New Delhi believes it has already done more than enough to address U.S. concerns and has argued that it was buying Russian oil under a G-7 approved price cap<\/a> that also helped stabilize global energy prices\u2014a position that was loosely endorsed <\/a>by the Biden administration.<\/p>\n Since then, New Delhi has tried to appease Washington on other fronts. It has reduced<\/a> its share of arms imports from Russia and increased imports<\/a> of U.S. oil, while also dramatically reducing imports from Iran<\/a> and Venezuela<\/a>. And, as New Delhi likes to point out<\/a>, this is all while both the European Union and United States continue to import Russian goods. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi\u2019s government has also made other concessions to the Trump administration, including preemptively reducing<\/a> some tariffs and taking back<\/a> dozens of undocumented Indian workers.<\/p>\n Russia is one of India\u2019s oldest and most trusted partners<\/a>, as well as a crucial supplier of economic and military assistance\u2014even with India strengthening ties with Washington and European capitals in recent years. New Delhi likes to say it doesn\u2019t turn against its friends. Russia will be no exception.<\/p>\n And then there\u2019s the economic factor. Cheap Russian crude makes up roughly 35 percent<\/a> of the India\u2019s oil imports. Energy experts say that turning to non-Russian sources could add<\/a> as much as $11 billion to New Delhi\u2019s import bill.<\/p>\n But with Trump upping the ante to a whopping total of 50 percent tariffs on India, the walls are closing in on Indian policymakers: If they decline to divest from Russia, they could face considerable economic pain.<\/p>\n This leaves New Delhi with difficult choices. It can expand ongoing efforts<\/a> to ink new trade deals with other countries to secure greater market access and reduce U.S. tariff damage. India is currently in talks with the European Union\u2014another top export market\u2014to complete a free trade agreement. But these negotiations are complex and can take time.<\/p>\n New Delhi can renew earlier efforts<\/a> to prod Russia to stop fighting in Ukraine. Trump would likely pressure India less on Russian oil if Moscow were no longer waging a war that Trump badly wants to end. However, earlier calls for peace by India didn\u2019t succeed. And Trump may not like India taking on a mediation role that he wants his administration to lead on, suggesting the risk of further tensions.<\/p>\n India can also continue to pursue a deal with Washington. But this could be risky politically for New Delhi, given broader tensions in U.S.-India relations, and it would be uncomfortable making more concessions. Modi has already urged<\/a> Indians to buy local amid an \u201catmosphere of instability.\u201d<\/p>\n In the early days of the second Trump administration, Indian officials professed confidence<\/a> in their ability to work with the mercurial and unpredictable Trump. But with tariffs having become a severe bilateral flashpoint, the U.S.-India relationship now arguably faces its biggest test over the last two decades. New Delhi must navigate the tariff crisis and keep the relationship afloat\u2014all while managing the whims of the U.S. president.<\/p>\n One year since Hasina\u2019s fall<\/strong>. On Tuesday, Bangladesh marked one year<\/a> since mass protests prompted longtime Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to resign and flee to India. Hasina\u2019s departure came after weeks of student-led demonstrations against her authoritarian rule, which prompted the country\u2019s security forces to brutally crack down on protesters, resulting in the death of more than 1,400 people<\/a>. Hasina\u2019s ouster has had massive political implications in a country that was ruled by her Awami League party for more than 15 consecutive years.<\/p>\n Today, Bangladeshis are generally happier and freer<\/a> than they were during the Hasina era, but the post-revolution honeymoon is a distant memory. The country\u2019s interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, has struggled to stabilize the economy and strengthen law and order. Meanwhile, as Salil Tripathi writes<\/a> in Foreign Policy <\/em>this week, the country\u2019s cycle of retributive politics has continued to persist.<\/p>\n Indeed, many protest leaders\u2014some of whom served in the interim government before leaving<\/a> earlier this year to form a new political party\u2014have insisted on following through on ambitious structural reforms promised immediately after Hasina\u2019s fall. But progress has lagged, leaving many Bangladeshis frustrated. On Tuesday, Yunus announced <\/a>that the country will hold elections next February. Bangladesh hasn\u2019t experienced free and fair elections for a long time, and next year\u2019s polls will mark a major test for a post-Hasina Bangladesh.<\/p>\n Protests in Pakistan. <\/strong>On Tuesday, Pakistani police arrested<\/a> more than 200 people as thousands<\/a> of former Prime Minister Imran Khan\u2019s supporters took to the streets to protest against his imprisonment. After losing power in a parliamentary no-confidence vote in 2022, Khan turned on his former benefactors within Pakistan\u2019s powerful military, resulting in a massive crackdown on himself, his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, and his large support base. He was eventually jailed in 2023 on corruption charges, an accusation that his supporters reject as politically motivated.<\/p>\n Tuesday\u2019s turnout, while relatively modest, is impressive given the scale of the crackdown on Khan\u2019s backers. With Khan in jail, PTI\u2019s remaining leadership has struggled to adjust, and street mobilizations are difficult to muster. Most of the party\u2019s noise has been made abroad<\/a>, where expatriate PTI supporters have protested in large numbers\u2014but without any ability to change the calculus back in Islamabad.<\/p>\n The Pakistani Army, which regained<\/a> some public goodwill following the latest military clash with India in May, continues to hold all the cards. The governing coalition is helmed by leaders, including Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who are happy to defer to the military. Meanwhile, Pakistan\u2019s generals have bolstered ties with key allies, including<\/a> Washington.<\/p>\n Kashmir, six years on. <\/strong>Tuesday marked six years since the Indian government revoked<\/a> Article 370, which granted special autonomous status to Jammu and Kashmir. The decision resulted in the region becoming a union territory of India, bringing Indian-administered Kashmir under the full control of Prime Minister Narendra Modi\u2019s government.<\/p>\n New Delhi has defended the change as a purely administrative one that would help bring more stability and prosperity to the contested region. But many residents of Kashmir, especially in the Kashmir Valley, as well as Islamabad in nearby Pakistan\u2014which rejects India\u2019s administration of the region\u2014have denounced it. On Tuesday, hundreds marked the anniversary by organizing protests in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Meanwhile, in Srinagar, a city in Indian-administered Kashmir, opposition members urged the central government to restore the region\u2019s statehood.<\/p>\n Even though the region remained heavily militarized, the first few years after Article 370\u2019s revocation did bring some relative calm and \u201cnormalcy\u201d to Kashmir, as New Delhi has argued<\/a>. However, this narrative was undermined when a terrorist attack<\/a> in April, which New Delhi blamed on militants linked to Pakistan, killed 26 tourists in the Pahalgam area of Kashmir.<\/p>\n Senior Indian officials, including Modi, have recently signaled<\/a> their willingness to restore Kashmir\u2019s statehood, albeit with no indication of a timeframe. India\u2019s Supreme Court is scheduled <\/a>to weigh in on the issue on Aug. 8.<\/p>\n Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. is in India on a five-day state visit this week. On Tuesday, he met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and the two countries agreed<\/a> to upgrade their bilateral ties and announced a strategic partnership. This isn\u2019t a surprise; in recent years, New Delhi\u2019s relationship with Manila has quietly blossomed into one of its strongest in Southeast Asia\u2014and in ways that can also be beneficial to U.S.-India relations. In April, New Delhi sent<\/a> supersonic cruise missiles to Manila to help the Philippines counter Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.<\/p>\n This represents a case of India acting as a net security provider in the Indo Pacific and helping advance U.S. strategic interests, which is an example of the burden-sharing that the Trump administration expects of its allies and partners. In that sense, Marcos\u2019s visit to India is important not just for the latter\u2019s foreign policy, but also for the United States. But with Washington so heavily focused on tariffs and India\u2019s ties to Russia, the visit might not get the attention it deserves.<\/p>\n A Daily Mirror<\/em> editorial<\/strong> offers<\/a> advice to Colombo on how Sri Lanka should respond to U.S. tariffs: \u201cOur own country needs to look for markets within our own region and with BRICS. Asia is in fact the biggest market \u2026 Africa is a new market which is\u00a0opening up and we need to look to these two sources for mutual help and development.\u201d<\/p>\n In Prothom Alo<\/em>, economist Selim Raihan<\/strong> discusses<\/a> the implications of Bangladesh receiving a 15 percent reduction in the reciprocal tariff rate from Washington. While the reduction is \u201cencouraging, it does not raise any option for self-complacency,\u201d Raihan argues. \u201cBangladesh must act decisively now to establish a diversified, competitive, and resilient trade strategy.\u201d<\/p>\n For The Print<\/em>, journalist Vir Sanghvi<\/strong> asks<\/a> why India feels a \u201csense of betrayal\u201d about U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s embrace of Islamabad, given all the U.S.-Pakistan dalliances of the past. India\u2019s leaders had \u201cacted as though Trump was one of them,\u201d Sanghvi writes, referring to \u00a0the U.S. president\u2019s embrace of anti-Muslim rhetoric. \u201cIn truth, Trump and his Indian fan club had nothing in common.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\nTrump Ups the Ante on New Delhi<\/b><\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
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