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After three years of intense fighting that has now touched every corner of Africa\u2019s third-largest country, Sudan\u2019s civil war has settled into a deadly stalemate. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and their Rapid Support Forces (RSF) adversaries are locked in a battle that seems more aimed at incremental advantage than outright victory. The war has become an end to itself\u2014a self-perpetuating folly that neither side is capable of winning, nor can they afford to lose.<\/p>\n
Among the carnage, there is honor among thieves, with both sides cynically playing by the same rules. Neither side is seriously targeting the other\u2019s leadership, nor their respective gold-mining profit centers<\/a>. Doing so could risk the ire of the war\u2019s Emirati and Egyptian backers<\/a>, who observers allege have helped launder<\/a> the RSF\u2019s and SAF\u2019s profits, respectively.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n After three years of intense fighting that has now touched every corner of Africa\u2019s third-largest country, Sudan\u2019s civil war has settled into a deadly stalemate. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and their Rapid Support Forces (RSF) adversaries are locked in a battle that seems more aimed at incremental advantage than outright victory. The war has become an end to itself\u2014a self-perpetuating folly that neither side is capable of winning, nor can they afford to lose.<\/p>\n Among the carnage, there is honor among thieves, with both sides cynically playing by the same rules. Neither side is seriously targeting the other\u2019s leadership, nor their respective gold-mining profit centers<\/a>. Doing so could risk the ire of the war\u2019s Emirati and Egyptian backers<\/a>, who observers allege have helped launder<\/a> the RSF\u2019s and SAF\u2019s profits, respectively.<\/p>\n As a result, the war has become more political theater than territorial conquest, with Sudan\u2019s 50 million civilians cast as the unwitting extras. Each side is playing the part that it has been scripted to play by its benefactors. They are merely the actors in a larger contest of strategic influence between wealthier regional states intent on gaining a strategic foothold on the western shores of the Red Sea and ensuring Sudan\u2019s status as a long-term economic client state.<\/p>\n Now, as this fight grinds on and the humanitarian toll<\/a> mounts, Sudan faces scenarios ranging from bad to worse. There still exists a small opportunity for constructive U.S. engagement to help chart a course out of hell, but it will require a level of attention and nuance that has so far been absent from Washington\u2019s diplomacy.<\/p>\n The most likely scenario is that the status quo will endure while becoming increasingly deadly. Absent any dramatic changes, it appears that neither side can achieve a significant upper hand or deliver a knockout blow. Instead, the warring militias will likely continue to engage in cat and mouse battles across the country, leaving in their wake devastated communities and decimated infrastructure that are unlikely to be rebuilt any time soon. Fighting could continue for years, as long as both sides maintain a fresh pipeline of recruits and willing financial backers.<\/p>\n But while the belligerents may keep up the fight, the civilians\u2019 ability to survive erodes by the day. Instead of talking about this conflict as the worst displacement and humanitarian crisis in the world today, we will soon have to talk about it as one of the worst in human history. Already, local estimates<\/a> suggest than more than 500,000 children have died from malnutrition, while another 8 million people are on the verge<\/a> of famine. And with resiliencies stretched beyond the breaking point, and an influx of international humanitarian assistance nowhere on the horizon, the world could be faced with civilian casualties akin to the country\u2019s last civil war, in which more than 2 million people<\/a> are thought to have died.<\/p>\n As if this outcome weren\u2019t bad enough, things could still get worse. Either belligerent\u2014or their backers\u2014could feel compelled to finally push for total victory. For the Sudanese Armed Forces, this would almost certainly involve a greater and more explicit reliance upon the Islamist militias associated with the previous regime, as well as rogue state actors such as Russia and what\u2019s left of Iran, to achieve a definitive tactical advantage. For the RSF, this would involve the acquisition of even more advanced weaponry, including next-generation strategic drones that can travel further and linger longer over targets. It would also likely involve redoubled support from the United Arab Emirates<\/a>, which has the political and financial network to facilitate more materiel flowing in from neighboring states such as Libya, Chad, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Ethiopia.<\/p>\n Any increase in operational tempo and lethality would almost assuredly worsen the humanitarian crisis, exacerbating casualties. In a matter of months, Sudan could see a breakdown of remaining state institutions and a rapid descent into a kind of Libya-like failed state status that would threaten Red Sea navigation and send masses of refugees<\/a> toward relatively safer lands.<\/p>\n The best scenario for unwinding Sudan\u2019s spiraling conflict is both the most fraught and the most unlikely. But it is also the most urgent if the world hopes to prevent this catastrophe. Neither the SAF nor the RSF will voluntarily seek to lay down their arms to reach a political accommodation. Nor will they willingly relinquish their control over the country\u2019s economic resources to any civilian authorities, even if a civilian coalition could be identified and organized to assume power. Instead, the regional and international backers of this war, along with the neighboring beneficiaries, must be brought together to agree on a way forward that acknowledges each party\u2019s respective interest in Sudan.<\/p>\n Here, Washington seems to recognize that it has a role to play. During his White House meeting<\/a> with African leaders on July 9, U.S. President Donald Trump announced<\/a>, with unironic understatement, \u201cWe\u2019re going to be facilitating peace \u2026 in places like Sudan, where they have a lot of problems.\u201d And Secretary of State Marco Rubio\u2019s senior advisor for Africa, Massad Boulos\u2014fresh off his efforts to forge a cease-fire<\/a> between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda in their ongoing territorial dispute<\/a>\u2014recently indicated<\/a> that seeking an end to the \u201cpower struggle\u201d in Sudan would be his next priority.<\/p>\n The challenge for Boulos will be to simultaneously address the regional and internal dimensions of this conflict, all while managing a sometimes-disengaged White House that has eroded U.S. expertise and influence in the region. Already, the Trump administration has gutted much of Washington\u2019s institutional knowledge on Sudan, including decades of personal relations, with the closure of agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and offices including<\/a> the State Department\u2019s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations.<\/p>\n Boulos benefits from the perception that he has access to Rubio and Trump\u2014he is the father-in-law of Trump\u2019s daughter Tiffany\u2014which has helped open<\/a> doors for him across Africa. Still, reconstituting the U.S. government\u2019s knowledge base on Sudan will be essential if he hopes to succeed in making progress with the belligerents, who\u2014in more than 30 years of U.S. diplomacy\u2014have dealt with 10 U.S. special envoys to the country.<\/p>\n On the regional level, the administration appears to be staking out a more pragmatic position than we have seen. Boulos has described<\/a> Sudan\u2019s war as \u201cpredominantly an internal conflict.\u201d While this isn\u2019t entirely accurate, it does suggest that the Trump administration is keen not to single out or antagonize its partners, such the UAE, for their role, as former President Joe Biden\u2019s team<\/a> did.<\/p>\n This is a wise tactic. Countries such as the UAE have been steadfast in their denial<\/a> that they have played anything but a salutary role in Sudan, and publicly confronting them with allegations to the contrary is likely to only further entrench their position. Instead, Washington is reportedly<\/a> organizing a meeting of foreign ministers of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt to work toward a regional solution. Recognizing the leverage that these countries have over the belligerents and their respective interests in the war\u2019s outcome is a necessary starting point. But any long-term peace will also require a shared understanding of how Sudan is governed and, most importantly, who governs it.<\/p>\n Washington is likely to have greater success in forging a regional consensus than it is in directly cajoling the warring parties in Sudan to make peace. But that doesn\u2019t mean that it shouldn\u2019t try to pursue both tracks at once. To date, the Trump administration has made no public outreach to either side of the conflict, nor has it sought to preview its diplomatic initiative with Sudanese officials. A set of recently announced U.S. sanctions<\/a>, initiated under the Biden administration in response to the SAF\u2019s alleged use of chemical weapons, has been Trump\u2019s only engagement to date. These come on top of a host of Biden-era sanctions against the leaders of both the SAF and RSF, along with the companies that they use to support the war effort. Yet such efforts have not prevented ongoing civilian atrocities, suggesting that further punitive measures are unlikely to unlock a path toward peace.<\/p>\n Instead, a dual-track diplomatic approach will be required to disarm both internal and external spoilers who continue to benefit from the war\u2019s status quo. That means contending equally with Sudan\u2019s messy internal politics and the deep-seated drivers of the conflict as much as managing the competing ambitions of Washington\u2019s regional partners.<\/p>\n As fraught as this endeavor will be, the alternative of a failed state and humanitarian catastrophe pose far greater risks to Washington regional interests.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n