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On April 12, 2025, the world watched as Gabonese citizens cast their ballots in the first presidential election<\/a> since the fall of the Bongo dynasty, which had ruled the country for nearly six decades.<\/p>\n But rather than marking a clean democratic break from the past, the election signaled the consolidation of power by Gen. Brice Oligui Nguema\u2014the military officer who deposed President Ali Bongo Ondimba in the 2023 coup and has since served as transitional president. Despite earlier promises of a swift return to civilian rule, Oligui Nguema\u2019s reported 94.9 percent landslide victory points to a deepening pattern of post-coup entrenchment seen across the region.<\/p>\n Military leaders have increasingly abandoned<\/a> an earlier tendency of swiftly transferring power back to civilian authorities in the aftermath of coups. In some cases, transitional periods have been generously extended and elections have been postponed indefinitely, as in Burkina Faso and Mali. In others, such as Chad and now Gabon, coup leaders have used elections to legitimize their continued grip on power.<\/p>\n But the implications of these maneuvers extend far beyond the domestic politics of any single country. As coup leaders across the region observe each other, successful efforts to entrench power\u2014whether through delayed transitions, manipulated elections, or the repression of key opposition forces\u2014serve as a blueprint for others to emulate.<\/p>\n Coup contagion refers<\/a> to the idea that military takeovers don\u2019t just happen in isolation\u2014they can spread across borders. When one country falls to a coup, it may increase the chances that others nearby will follow. It isn\u2019t just the seizure of power that spreads, though, but also the playbook for staying in power, refined and reinforced across borders.<\/p>\n West and Central<\/span> Africa have experienced a surge of coups since 2020<\/a>. From Mali and Chad to Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger, and Gabon, military takeovers have swept across the region in rapid succession. Some analysts point to shared vulnerabilities\u2014such as weak institutions, poor governance, and widespread discontent\u2014as the root causes of this wave. But the timing and proximity of these events suggest something more: that coups can influence each other.<\/p>\n The logic is straightforward. When military officers in one country watch a coup unfold elsewhere, they\u2019re not just observing\u2014they\u2019re learning. They pay close attention to what succeeds, what fails, and how both citizens and the international community respond. These events send powerful signals. If a coup fails or is met with harsh consequences\u2014such as swift international sanctions or domestic backlash\u2014then it may serve as a warning. But if a coup succeeds with minimal resistance or even public support, then it can embolden officers in neighboring states to follow suit.<\/p>\n Capturing power in dramatic fashion usually grabs the headlines, but for coup leaders, it\u2019s only the beginning. The immediate aftermath of a coup\u2014the period of consolidation\u2014is critical as leaders navigate domestic unrest, political rivals, and international pressures.<\/p>\n Researchers have shown that authoritarian regimes often learn<\/a> from one another\u2014borrowing tools of repression, propaganda, and political control to entrench power. But much of that focus has been on entrenched dictatorships. What\u2019s often overlooked is how coup leaders, particularly those emerging within the same regional wave, adopt similar tactics in the critical period shortly after<\/em> seizing power, such as in Africa\u2019s recent string of coups. While standard measures such as restricting the press and sidelining rivals remain common, alternative approaches increasingly reflect lessons drawn from neighboring juntas.<\/p>\n One such example has been the systematic delays of promised transitions back to civilian rule. Mali, the first domino to fall within the recent cascade of coups, set an important precedent. The country\u2019s August 2020 coup ousted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and brought Col. Assimi Go\u00efta to power, first as the vice president of the transitional government alongside President Bah Ndaw. Less than a year later, Go\u00efta assumed full leadership for himself after he orchestrated another coup to remove Ndaw.<\/p>\n Since then, Go\u00efta\u2019s government has repeatedly postponed elections. Transitional authorities have offered up a range of justifications\u2014including \u201ctechnical reasons\u201d; the creation of a new constitution; and disputes with Idemia, the French biometric firm that manages the electoral registry\u2014to support the rescheduling. The indefinite delay<\/a> of the most recent presidential election, originally scheduled for February 2024, represented yet another broken promise. More than that, it sent a clear signal: Go\u00efta has little intention of relinquishing power on any fixed timeline.<\/p>\n That signal wasn\u2019t lost on Go\u00efta\u2019s peers.<\/p>\n In Guinea, Col. Mamady Doumbouya\u2019s junta adopted a similar script after he toppled President Alpha Cond\u00e9 in September 2021. Justifying<\/a> his power grab as a patriotic duty \u201cto save the country,\u201d Doumbouya initially promised a two-year transition back to civilian administration and elections by the end of December 2024. The junta would later echo Mali\u2019s rationale, citing the need to draft a new constitution as justification for extending the transition. This was accompanied by the dissolution of numerous political parties and the forced retirement<\/a> of nearly 1,000 military personnel\u2014clear signs of a broader effort to dismantle the old order and consolidate power.<\/p>\n After missing its promised deadline, the junta\u2019s broken commitments sparked protests, resulting in yet another extension for elections to December 2025. Doumbouya\u2019s pledge to hold a constitutional referendum has offered little reassurance, as the absence of a concrete timeline underscored his reluctance to cede control.<\/p>\n In Burkina Faso, Lt.-Col. Paul-Henri Damiba seized power in January 2022, ousting President Roch Kabor\u00e9 and promising a return to democratic rule through a new Basic Law affirming civil liberties. But just eight months later, Capt. Ibrahim Traor\u00e9 overthrew him, citing<\/a> Damiba\u2019s failure to contain the country\u2019s Islamist insurgency. Traor\u00e9 dissolved the government, suspended the constitution, and centralized authority under his junta.<\/p>\n Though Traor\u00e9 initially pledged to restore civilian rule by July 2024, he reversed course<\/a> in May of that year, extending military rule by five years and declaring himself eligible to run for president\u2014just days after Chad\u2019s junta leader, Mahamat D\u00e9by, secured a contested election victory. D\u00e9by, who assumed power after his father\u2019s death in 2021, had likewise promised a transition before using the vote to cement his rule. Now Gabon follows suit, with Oligui Nguema using an election to legitimize his post-coup presidency.<\/p>\n These moves reveal a broader lesson among coup leaders: Even when transitions end in elections, the goal is not to exit power but rather to entrench it. And the trend is measurable. Since 2020, the median time in power<\/a> for armed forces in Africa has exceeded 1,000 days\u2014up dramatically from an average of just 22 days between 2002 and 2020.<\/p>\n The strategic realignment of foreign policy\u2014and the accompanying anti-colonial rhetoric\u2014has become a crucial tool for post-coup consolidation. Junta leaders have increasingly distanced themselves from traditional Western partners, especially France<\/a>, turning instead to alternatives such as Russia, whose support comes with fewer demands for democratic governance. Yet beyond copying each other\u2019s moves, these shifts now reflect a deeper evolution: a transition from simple imitation toward coordinated, active cooperation.<\/p>\n Once again, Mali set the tone. After Go\u00efta seized power, regional blocs such as ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States<\/a>) and the African Union issued condemnations<\/a>, and France suspended joint military operations. Rather than backtrack, Go\u00efta pivoted\u2014deepening ties with Russia and expelling French forces\u2014all while employing the language of national sovereignty and a rejection of Western neocolonialism. At the center of this new partnership was the Russian Wagner Group, whose mercenaries arrived in 2021<\/a> to support Mali\u2019s counterterrorism efforts.<\/p>\n Though never officially acknowledged, Wagner\u2019s presence offered Go\u00efta more than just battlefield support. The group provided a loyal, extralegal security partner that helped suppress internal dissent. Wagner faced credible accusations<\/a> of human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings, particularly at former U.N. bases jointly operated with the Malian army. Despite these abuses, the partnership helped solidify Go\u00efta\u2019s control, a trend that will likely continue with the replacement of Wagner with its successor, Russia\u2019s state-controlled Africa Corps<\/a>.<\/p>\n Burkina Faso and Niger followed in the years that followed, severing ties with France, embracing Russia, and adopting similar anti-colonial narratives to justify their realignment. By late 2023, these three countries formalized their cooperation with the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States<\/a>\u2014a bloc explicitly designed to protect military sovereignty and resist foreign interference.<\/p>\n What began as isolated post-coup tactics in Mali have matured into a coordinated regional strategy. The contagion of military rule extended beyond imitation, evolving into institutionalized collaboration among juntas seeking to secure their hold on power.<\/p>\n Like in the first stage of contagion, the strategies used to consolidate power after a coup are shaped by how well other military regimes in the region have managed to entrench themselves. Each extension of a transitional period, each landslide victory in a tightly controlled election, and each successful pivot away from Western partners serves as a proof of concept.<\/p>\n So, what\u2019s the<\/span> takeaway for actors in the international community observing this second phase of the coup wave? Fundamentally, a two-pronged shift is needed in how the politics of military coups are understood and addressed.<\/p>\n First, international actors must abandon the habit of treating each coup as an isolated event. That approach not only misses the cross-border learning that is underway\u2014it also allows the success of one junta to encourage the ambitions of others. Moreover, inconsistency in responses has become a feature, not a bug: While juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso have faced sanctions and vocal condemnation, others, such as those in Chad and Gabon, have encountered far less<\/a> resistance. This is in part due to the fragmented nature of the international response, where geopolitical interests and security partnerships often outweigh a principled and unified stance on civilian rule.<\/p>\n Second, international engagement must focus on the realities of post-coup governance, not just the formal benchmarks that juntas promise. These promises\u2014such as election dates or constitutional referendums\u2014are often used strategically to create the appearance of progress while delaying genuine transitions. An overreliance on such timelines risks rewarding superficial gestures, which not only legitimize regimes domestically but also send powerful signals across the region.<\/p>\n These shifts in approach would not only improve responses to individual cases, but more importantly, they would also help disrupt the incentive structure driving the spread of consolidation strategies.<\/p>\n The first stage of Africa\u2019s coup contagion captured global attention. But it is this quieter second stage\u2014the slow entrenchment of military regimes\u2014that will determine whether these regimes will become permanent fixtures. Stopping the spread now depends not only on deterring the next coup, but also on undermining the playbook that keeps coup leaders in power long after the headlines fade.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n
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