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Commenting on U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s successful brokering of a cease-fire between Israel and Iran on June 24, a Ukrainian pundit observed<\/a>: \u201cDonald Trump has demonstrated to Donald Trump how to negotiate an end to a conflict from a position of strength.\u201d But does Trump\u2019s Middle East success suggest a more fundamental new approach\u2014perhaps an emerging doctrine\u2014for his conduct of foreign and security policy going forward?<\/p>\n Given that Trump\u2019s foreign-policy views are often instinctive, situational, transactional, and unpredictable, the idea of his administration pursuing a consistent doctrine may seem far-fetched. Yet above all, Trump values success, and his experience intervening in the Middle East could give momentum to a more muscular foreign policy in the coming months.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n Commenting on U.S. President Donald Trump\u2019s successful brokering of a cease-fire between Israel and Iran on June 24, a Ukrainian pundit observed<\/a>: \u201cDonald Trump has demonstrated to Donald Trump how to negotiate an end to a conflict from a position of strength.\u201d But does Trump\u2019s Middle East success suggest a more fundamental new approach\u2014perhaps an emerging doctrine\u2014for his conduct of foreign and security policy going forward?<\/p>\n Given that Trump\u2019s foreign-policy views are often instinctive, situational, transactional, and unpredictable, the idea of his administration pursuing a consistent doctrine may seem far-fetched. Yet above all, Trump values success, and his experience intervening in the Middle East could give momentum to a more muscular foreign policy in the coming months.<\/p>\n In three successive presidential campaigns, Trump tried to straddle the wide gulf in his electoral coalition between traditional national security conservatives and MAGA isolationists by supporting significant increases in defense spending while emphasizing<\/a> his reluctance to use force that might entangle Washington in \u201cforever wars.\u201d The Reagan-era slogan<\/a> \u201cpeace through strength\u201d was Trump\u2019s means of keeping both parts of his coalition contented.\u00a0In the Middle East, geopolitical realities may have led him to conclude that peace does not always come from strength alone, but from the strategic application of that strength.<\/p>\n Indeed, Trump\u2019s recent actions in Iran and support for NATO at the bloc\u2019s recent summit in The Hague dispel the notion that the United States has entered an isolationist phase. Instead, they point to the contours of a new foreign and security policy with ramifications that go far beyond the Middle East.<\/p>\n Addressing a Republican audience on June 25 in Lima, Ohio, Vice President J.D. Vance took a stab at defining what might be called the Trump doctrine<\/a>: \u201cNumber one, you articulate a clear American interest, and that\u2019s, in this case, that Iran can\u2019t have a nuclear weapon. Number two, you try to aggressively diplomatically solve that problem. And number three, when you can\u2019t solve it diplomatically, you use overwhelming military power to solve it, and then you get the hell out of there before it ever becomes a protracted conflict.\u201d<\/p>\n Vance\u2019s narrow description of Trump\u2019s actions in Iran deserves a broader interpretation. Indeed, the administration\u2019s approach to Iran may be a harbinger of an evolving doctrine for the limited use of U.S. power to assist vulnerable allies at a crucial tipping point of a strategically important conflict. This doctrine also underscores the United States\u2019 readiness to help those countries that, like Israel, are seriously committed carrying the main burden of their own\u00a0defense.<\/p>\n This approach was on full display at the NATO summit in The Hague last week. There, an upbeat Trump, basking in the success of the Iran mission, signaled robust support for NATO<\/a> in the context of its members\u2019 commitment to major increases in defense spending. Against all expectations, Washington endorsed an alliance statement<\/a> recognizing the looming Russian security threat to Europe and confirming NATO members\u2019 ongoing commitment to assist Ukraine in its effort to resist Russian aggression.<\/p>\n There are four reasons to believe that Trump\u2019s intervention in the Middle East could lead the administration toward a new approach to the Russia-Ukraine war.<\/p>\n First, nothing succeeds like demonstrable success. And the initial success\u2014in creating space for a cease-fire agreement\u2014of Trump\u2019s decision to attack Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities convincingly demonstrates that conflicts involving an aggressive and brutal tyranny cannot be resolved solely by an appeal to reason, comity, or commercial interests, but require the exertion of intense U.S. pressure and power.<\/p>\n Second, Trump\u2019s attack on Iran has deflated the arguments of semi-isolationist voices inside the administration, including Vance, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard. These are now shifting to Trump\u2019s embrace of a more activist U.S. posture. He has also sidelined isolationists in the MAGA sphere, such as U.S. Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, media personality Tucker Carlson, far-right ideologue Steve Bannon, and U.S. Sen. Rand Paul (who has pushed back against the label but nonetheless opposed<\/a> aid to Ukraine). Most of these have either outright opposed NATO and Ukraine or been lukewarm in their support.<\/p>\n Third, as recent polling<\/a> by the Ronald Reagan Institute clearly shows, the emerging Trump doctrine aligns with the views of his base. Most Republican voters do not reject U.S. engagement in the world. They understand the threats posed by China, Iran, and Russia. Moreover, many Republican voters deeply respect martial courage and admire Ukrainians and Israelis for their commitment to their own self-defense. What Trump voters don\u2019t want is a direct engagement in the conflict by U.S. forces. They expect major burden-sharing by U.S. allies.<\/p>\n Fourth, the glad-handing diplomacy<\/a> practiced by U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff\u2014who has praised Russian President Vladimir Putin as a \u201cgreat leader\u201d and offered him a slew of unilateral U.S. concessions\u2014has reached a dead end<\/a>. Indeed, Witkoff\u2019s approach has frustrated Trump\u2019s peacemaking ambitions and contributed to an upsurge<\/a> in Russian attacks on Ukraine\u2019s main cities<\/a>, with hundreds of civilians deliberately killed and wounded far from the front line. And much of this has occurred with the use of Shahed drones provided by Russia\u2019s strategic ally, Iran. While Trump continues to hold open the possibility of a peace \u201cdeal\u201d with Moscow, as underscored by the U.S. decision on July 1 to halt some weapons shipments to Ukraine,<\/a> Putin\u2019s indifference to Trump\u2019s peacemaking ambitions is likely to revive tensions with the Kremlin in the near term.<\/p>\n As his conflict with Elon Musk demonstrates<\/a>, Trump is capable of rapidly turning on his allies and counterparts. Consequently, the glaring contrast between the failed concessions and inducements to Putin on the one hand and the successful, tough-minded measures against Iran on the other could open the door to a muscular new approach to Russia. This, of course, does not mean direct U.S. military engagement. But it should mean the application of hard-hitting economic sanctions on Russia and the enhancement of Ukraine\u2019s defensive and offensive capabilities, a two-pronged approach that gained momentum at the recent NATO summit.<\/p>\n Europe has greatly raised its financial obligations<\/a> for self-defense and significantly increased its support for Ukraine, compensating Trump\u2019s deep reductions<\/a> in U.S. support. But if Putin is to be stopped in his tracks, then Europe will also need Trump\u2019s consent to purchase U.S. arms for Ukraine, and Washington will need to continue sharing intelligence with Kyiv. Indications from the NATO summit point to U.S. willingness to do just this.<\/p>\n The best way to deter Putin is to show that the alliance is committed to supporting Ukraine\u2019s defense over the long haul. And the best way to do this in a way that meets the self-help requirement of the emerging Trump doctrine also rests with Europe. Its banks hold the bulk of $300 billion in frozen Russian hard currency reserves<\/a>, whose confiscation is advocated by various European leaders and parliaments as well as U.S. experts<\/a> such as former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, former State Department counselor Philip Zelikow, and former World Bank President Robert Zoellick.<\/p>\n These Russian reserves represent the equivalent of many years of U.S. funding for Ukraine and would allow Ukraine to defend itself from Putin\u2019s massive recent attacks on civilian targets.\u00a0A bit of Trump-induced pressure could be decisive in driving Europe to stop prevaricating and finally make use of these assets, which in turn would relieve the United States of any major financial burden for the war. Using Russian assets to fund Ukraine\u2019s defense\u2014including for buying U.S.-made weapons\u2014is, in its essence, a very Trumpian idea: the geopolitical equivalent of getting Mexico to pay for a border wall.<\/p>\n On the heels of his success in achieving an Israel-Iran cease-fire\u2014and with isolationist sentiment waning within his MAGA base\u2014Trump has the political capital at home and the diplomatic heft abroad to implement this new approach. Its application to the Russia-Ukraine war could dramatically reverse the dire trends of recent weeks by ratcheting up pressure on the Kremlin. If the administration pursues this path, then Putin will be far more likely to settle a peace and provide a second major foreign-policy success for the U.S. president.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n