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In October 2024, the United Nations\u2019 top gender equality body, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, published<\/a> a report urging Japan to amend its imperial succession law. The 1947 Imperial House Law<\/a> stipulates that only men can become emperor\u2014a principle that was first enshrined<\/a> in the 1889 Meiji Constitution.<\/p>\n The committee, which monitors<\/a> states\u2019 compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), regularly issues observation reports following periodic reviews of member states. These reports typically offer recommendations to bring national laws into alignment with CEDAW\u2019s principles of gender equality.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n In October 2024, the United Nations\u2019 top gender equality body, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, published<\/a> a report urging Japan to amend its imperial succession law. The 1947 Imperial House Law<\/a> stipulates that only men can become emperor\u2014a principle that was first enshrined<\/a> in the 1889 Meiji Constitution.<\/p>\n The committee, which monitors<\/a> states\u2019 compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), regularly issues observation reports following periodic reviews of member states. These reports typically offer recommendations to bring national laws into alignment with CEDAW\u2019s principles of gender equality.<\/p>\n The current, male-only system has caused concerns<\/a> about the imperial family\u2019s future stability, which have in turn revived discussions within Japan\u2014however tentative\u2014about revising the succession law.\u00a0As Emperor Naruhito turns 65 this year, the Japanese imperial family has only three heirs: Naruhito\u2019s uncle Prince Hitachi<\/a>, 89; Crown Prince Fumihito<\/a>, 59; and his only son, Prince Hisahito, who at 18 is the first male member of the imperial family to reach adulthood in nearly four decades.<\/p>\n In 2024, public opinion polls revealed that 90 percent of respondents<\/a> supported allowing female emperors. In early 2025, House Speaker Fukushiro Nukaga expressed<\/a> his wish to finalize measures to address the issue of the shrinking imperial family during the current parliamentary session ending in June. However, conservative factions within Japan\u2019s political establishment remain firmly opposed to giving women the right to rule, citing a so-called \u201ceternal and unbroken<\/a>\u201d imperial lineage that has existed for thousands of years. Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Toshihiro Kitamura<\/a> said imperial throne eligibility is not considered a basic human right, so male-only succession does not violate women\u2019s fundamental rights. Some nationalist and conservative newspapers even lashed out at the CEDAW committee, calling it \u201cignorant<\/a>\u201d and accusing it of meddling in Japan\u2019s affairs.<\/p>\n The committee\u2019s recommendation on inclusive succession is neither legally binding nor, as the committee itself acknowledges<\/a>, within the scope of its formal mandate. A similar CEDAW proposal was considered in 2016 but later removed under pressure from Japan. But this time, the government\u2019s reaction was more antagonistic. On Jan. 27, Japan announced that it would freeze voluntary funding<\/a> to the committee, a move interpreted as a rebuke to its perceived interference<\/a>. Japan subsequently canceled the committee\u2019s planned visit to Japan.<\/p>\n According to Japan\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan has been making annual contributions<\/a> of approximately 20 million to 30 million yen (about $140,000 to $200,000) to the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which manages administrative affairs for CEDAW. While the ministry confirmed that none of these contributions have been used for CEDAW activities since 2005, the funding cut entailed a formal notification to OHCHR that Japan\u2019s contributions must not be allocated to the CEDAW committee. As Kitamura stated<\/a>, \u201cEnsuring that not even a portion of Japan\u2019s contributions is used for the committee will clarify the government\u2019s position.\u201d<\/p>\n Japan remains the only country in the world that forces married couples<\/a> to share the same surname, despite public pushback<\/a>. Likewise, the government has failed to fully criminalize all forms of discrimination and harassment. Reflecting this dismissive attitude, then-Finance Minister Taro Aso, who appeared to defend Junichi Fukuda, a Japanese vice finance minister accused of sexually harassing a female reporter, stated<\/a> in 2018 that there is \u201cno such thing [crime] as a sexual harassment charge.\u201d In this broader context, the CEDAW committee made a recommendation<\/a> in 2016 urging Japan to \u201cadopt legal provisions that prohibit and provide for appropriate sanctions to deter sexual harassment at the workplace.\u201d The funding cut reflects broader patterns and contradictions within Japan\u2019s conservative political establishment: While Japan strategically engages with international gender equality agendas to enhance its global soft power, it avoids meaningful domestic reform.<\/p>\n In 2013, then-Prime Minister<\/span> Shinzo Abe adopted the term \u201cWomenomics\u201d\u2014originally coined by Goldman Sachs strategist Kathy Matsui<\/a> in 1999\u2014not only as a core pillar of his economic revitalization strategy, \u201cAbenomics,\u201d but also as a rhetorical tool to promote women\u2019s empowerment and enhance Japan\u2019s image. The policy aimed to boost women\u2019s participation in the workforce in response to demographic decline and an aging population. Specifically, it set<\/a> targets to increase employment rates for women ages 25-44 from 68 percent in 2012 to 73 percent in 2020 while increasing the share of women in leadership roles to 30 percent. It ultimately fell far short<\/a> of these goals.<\/p>\n However, more than a domestic economic measure, Womenomics became a diplomatic tool and part of Japan\u2019s broader \u201cWomen Shine<\/a>\u201d foreign-policy strategy, itself shortened from the slogan \u201cA society in which women shine.\u201d His effort was in part to counter criticisms, from the European Union<\/a> to the United States<\/a>, over Japan\u2019s handling of wartime sexual slavery<\/a>, as well as Japan\u2019s chronically low rankings on international gender equality indexes.<\/p>\n This international posture was underscored in Abe\u2019s address<\/a> to the U.N. General Assembly in September 2013, in which he said<\/a> that \u201cJapan respects the activities of U.N. Women and intends to become one of its leading contributors and thus an exemplary country in the area.\u201d His speech framed gender equality as a domestic priority and a shared international responsibility.<\/p>\n Internationally, this gender equality discourse gained traction<\/a>. In addition to the money allocated to OHCHR, Japan pledged more than $3 billion in official development assistance for global initiatives supporting women\u2019s education and leadership. It further aligned itself with U.N. Women\u2019s core commitment to gender equality through donations<\/a> and support for a range of programs such as the World Assembly for Women and\u00a0Empowered Women, Peaceful Communities and endorsed the women, peace, and security<\/a> agenda.<\/p>\n Despite its global advocacy, Japan\u2019s domestic policies on gender equality have continued to lag. Japan<\/a> ranked 118 out of 146 countries in the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI), primarily due to ongoing barriers to women\u2019s participation in the political and economic spheres. Outdated views that favor men in politics and the workplace contributed to it placing at the bottom among the G-7 nations. It also lagged behind several Asian countries, with China at 106 and South Korea at 94. While the female employment rate has risen, structural barriers continue to stymie women from attaining management roles<\/a>. These include a reliance on part-time positions, inadequate corporate support for women\u2019s career development, limited government influence on corporate practices, and a lack of diversity in executive and governance structures. Japan ranks 27 out of 29 among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries in the Economist<\/em>\u2019s 2025 glass-ceiling index<\/a>, having moved up only one place since 2016. In politics, although there are a few high-profile female figures, a systemic glass ceiling blocks women from reaching the highest levels of political leadership.<\/p>\n In 2016, while still in office, the Abe administration revised<\/a> its ambitious national target of filling 30 percent of senior positions with women by 2020, lowering the goals to 7 percent for senior government roles and 15 percent in the corporate sector. This shift marked a decline in the prioritization of Abe\u2019s \u201cWomen Shine\u201d foreign policy.<\/p>\n The CEDAW funding halt reveals the limit to Japan\u2019s gender equality advocacy. While the nation has been eager to promote women\u2019s empowerment on the global stage through verbal and monetary support, it remains resistant to international scrutiny and recommendations that challenge its domestic status quo and reluctant to adopt binding international accountability mechanisms. There were earlier signs that Japan\u2019s gender equality policy was largely lip service, as well.<\/p>\n Japan ratified CEDAW in 1985, thereby committing to promote gender equality and eliminate discrimination against women. However, it has yet to ratify the Optional Protocol<\/a> adopted in 1999, which enables individuals to file complaints with the CEDAW committee and allows inquiries into serious or systemic violations. This remains the case despite more than half a million petition signatures and support from hundreds of local assemblies<\/a>. Given that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party\u2014with its socially conservative agenda\u2014has governed Japan almost without interruption for seven decades, it\u2019s unsurprising that this leadership continues to resist ratifying the Optional Protocol.<\/p>\n In contrast, a majority of countries\u2014115 out of the 189<\/a> parties to CEDAW\u2014have either signed and ratified or acceded to the Optional Protocol, including Morocco<\/a>, which acceded most recently in 2022 despite ranking in the bottom 10 of the 2024 GGGI. This places Japan among the minority of states, such as Iraq, that have nominally committed to CEDAW without adopting its more robust monitoring mechanisms.<\/p>\n Japan\u2019s funding withdrawal<\/span> may embolden domestic conservative groups<\/a> that resist progressive gender reforms and international scrutiny. Some are even saying that the committee\u2019s recommendations justify withdrawing from CEDAW<\/a> altogether. One of the most influential among these is Nippon Kaigi<\/a>, a powerful, ultra-right<\/a> nationalist lobby group closely tied to the political elite, including a third<\/a> of Japan\u2019s parliament and more than half of the Abe\u2019s 2015 cabinet. With a revisionist<\/a> agenda\u2014glorifying Japan\u2019s wartime past as the \u201cliberation\u201d of East Asia from Western colonialism, rebuilding the military, and restoring prewar reverence for the emperor\u2014such groups view progressive reforms as external impositions on national sovereignty. More concerning is the deployment of financial pressure<\/a> to influence an international body, raising serious questions about Japan\u2019s credibility on global gender justice and human rights standards. And Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba\u2019s administration has been criticized<\/a> for attaching \u201ca low priority to gender-equality policies,\u201d as reflected in its overwhelmingly male cabinet.<\/p>\n As the Chrysanthemum Throne\u2019s future rests on Hisahito, Japan must reconcile its deeply conservative politics with the liberal gender norms it claims to uphold. To meet that challenge, Japan must adopt a more consistent and comprehensive approach to gender equality\u2014one that bridges the gap between its international rhetoric and domestic realities. This includes dismantling structural barriers to women\u2019s advancement, confronting historical injustices such as the sexual violence committed against women by the imperial Japanese army, and challenging cultural norms that continue to entrench gendered hierarchies. Reengaging constructively with international bodies such as the CEDAW committee, rather than retreating from them, would demonstrate commitment and reaffirm Japan\u2019s aspiration to become an \u201cexemplary country<\/a>\u201d in gender equality and diplomacy. Without such resolve, Japan\u2019s international standing on gender justice risks being irretrievably undermined.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n
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