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As the second round of nuclear talks between the United States and Iran get underway this weekend, suspicion and distrust between the two sides remain high. U.S. President Donald Trump continues to make threats against the country I served for years as a policymaker and a diplomat. Understandably, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains cautious. “We are very pessimistic about the other side, but we are optimistic about our own capabilities,\u201d he said recently<\/a>.<\/p>\n As such, many analysts believe the chances of a deal are slim. In fact, the American side doesn\u2019t seem entirely sure what outcome it wants from the negotiations. U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff has emphasized that any agreement must be \u201cTrump\u2019s deal\u201d\u2014distinguishing it from the 2015 nuclear agreement<\/a> reached under then-U.S. President Barack Obama. Earlier this week, Witkoff said that Iran could maintain a program enriching uranium up to 3.67 percent. He then reversed<\/a> course, saying the president\u2019s position was to eliminate Iran\u2019s ability to enrich uranium altogether.<\/p>\n<\/p><\/div>\n As the second round of nuclear talks between the United States and Iran get underway this weekend, suspicion and distrust between the two sides remain high. U.S. President Donald Trump continues to make threats against the country I served for years as a policymaker and a diplomat. Understandably, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains cautious. \u201cWe are very pessimistic about the other side, but we are optimistic about our own capabilities,\u201d he said recently<\/a>.<\/p>\n As such, many analysts believe the chances of a deal are slim. In fact, the American side doesn\u2019t seem entirely sure what outcome it wants from the negotiations. U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff has emphasized that any agreement must be \u201cTrump\u2019s deal\u201d\u2014distinguishing it from the 2015 nuclear agreement<\/a> reached under then-U.S. President Barack Obama. Earlier this week, Witkoff said that Iran could maintain a program enriching uranium up to 3.67 percent. He then reversed<\/a> course, saying the president\u2019s position was to eliminate Iran\u2019s ability to enrich uranium altogether.<\/p>\n Still, I believe there\u2019s a way forward. These negotiations, which could shape not only the future of Iran\u2019s nuclear program but the broader trajectory of the Middle East, are too important to squander. A deal that eschews war, tackles a comprehensive set of issues\u2014not just nukes\u2014and offers Iran a realistic compromise regarding its nuclear program can work.<\/p>\n Having been directly or indirectly involved in U.S.-Iran nuclear dynamics over the past four decades, I believe America\u2019s historical policies have played a pivotal role in fueling today\u2019s nuclear crisis. In the 1950s, under the Eisenhower administration\u2019s \u201cAtoms for Peace\u201d initiative, the United States laid the foundation<\/a> for a nuclear Iran, viewing the Shah as a regional ally and guarantor of Western interests. In 1967, the U.S. constructed Iran\u2019s first reactor in Tehran. In 1974, the CIA reported<\/a> to President Gerald Ford that the Shah could potentially acquire a nuclear weapon by 1984.<\/p>\n But Washington changed its position after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. From that point on, it sought to block<\/a> Iran from obtaining even peaceful nuclear technology\u2014despite Iran\u2019s rights under Article IV<\/a> of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which guarantees the right to develop and use peaceful nuclear energy for all signatories. During my tenure in the Iranian Foreign Ministry in the late 1980s and early 1990s, our stance was clear: Iran had abandoned the Shah\u2019s large-scale nuclear ambitions and would refrain from enrichment and heavy water production if the United States provided fuel for the Tehran reactor and European countries honored their pre-revolution contracts to provide reactors and fuel. These negotiations failed mainly because of unwavering U.S. opposition. Had Washington agreed, Iran would likely not have pursued enrichment.<\/p>\n Western resistance spurred Iran to strive for nuclear self-sufficiency\u2014which it \u00a0achieved in 2002<\/a>. Soon Iran\u2019s program became the focus of the International Atomic Energy Agency, prompting negotiations with Germany, France, and Britain. As a member of Iran\u2019s negotiating team, I witnessed Tehran\u2019s unprecedented transparency\u2014including a suspension of enrichment and acceptance of maximum verification measures. We offered Europe a deal: Respect Iran\u2019s peaceful nuclear rights under the NPT, and Iran would offer comprehensive guarantees against weaponization. Yet talks broke down as the United States refused<\/a> to recognize any form of Iranian enrichment\u2014even within the treaty\u2019s bounds. Hassan Rouhani, Iran\u2019s top nuclear negotiator at the time, told me that Khamenei would never accept a ban on enrichment. \u201cIf Iran is to abandon its right to enrich, it will either have to happen after my death, or I will have to resign from leadership,\u201d Rouhani quoted Khamenei as saying in a private meeting.<\/p>\n President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad resumed<\/a> enrichment in 2006, the same year<\/a> the United States and the European Union to refer Iran\u2019s file to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC). Over the next several years, six UNSC resolutions sanctioned Iran, which responded by expanding its enrichment capacity. By 2013, Iran was two months<\/a> from breakout capability. The cycle of escalating sanctions and nuclear advances left both sides at a strategic impasse.<\/p>\n Recognizing the futility of coercion, Obama pivoted. In 2013, the U.S. redefined its red line: preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, not enrichment itself. The resulting Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, imposed the most intrusive<\/a> inspections on Iran while recognizing its right to peaceful enrichment. U.S.-Iran tensions eased dramatically. Under the JCPOA, the breakout timeline extended<\/a> to at least one year, where it was supposed to remain for a duration of at least 10 years.<\/p>\n Despite Iran\u2019s compliance, Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, triggering a \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d campaign. In response, Iran increased the level and the capacity of its enrichment, bringing<\/a> its breakout time down from one year to two months. Former President Joe Biden\u2019s policy of \u201cno deal, no crisis<\/a>\u201d retained Trump-era sanctions while adding hundreds more\u2014further eroding trust. Iran\u2019s current breakout window stands<\/a> at one week.<\/p>\n Trump\u2019s threats are only making the situation worse. \u201cThere are two ways Iran can be handled, militarily or you make a deal,\u201d he said<\/a> last month on Fox News. Some have suggested Europe could invoke the JCPOA\u2019s \u201csnapback\u201d mechanism, reinstating U.N. sanctions. If that happens, Iran has threatened to exit<\/a> both the JCPOA and the NPT and to pursue nuclear weaponization if attacked<\/a>. This is the worst-case scenario\u2014one that could plunge the Middle East into chaos and turn Iran into a second North Korea. But I believe the Trump team can succeed in diplomacy with Iran\u2014if it adopts five foundational principles:<\/p>\n America\u2019s legacy of failed wars\u2014from Iraq to Afghanistan\u2014has cost trillions and devastated millions of lives. War with Iran would be exponentially<\/a> more catastrophic. Trump must abandon the binary of \u201cdeal or war\u201d and commit to diplomacy as the only viable path.<\/p>\n\n