Hegseth Shangri-La Remarks Fall Flat With Asian Audience

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Southeast Asia Brief.

It’s been a very busy week in the region. We’re covering the highlights from the Shangri-La Dialogue, Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing’s first overseas trip, and the arrest of a Philippines senator (not the one you’re thinking of).

It’s always interesting when a compliment misses the mark. At last week’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s attempted flattery of Asia prompted snorts in sections of the audience, the Straits Times reported.

“Our partners in Asia have long understood that the bedrock of a durable partnership is not based on idealistic values, but on the concrete alignment of national interests,” Hegseth declared at the massive international security establishment gathering. “When our interests align, we act together with focused resolve. When our interests diverge, we adjust pragmatically without the drama or the moralizing. I think Western Europe might take note.”

Alongside the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a bastion of believers in endless multilateral summitry and international law.

Hegseth saying, “We don’t need more conferences. We need more combat power,” is not reassuring for the region’s many small- and medium-sized states.

Shangri-La’s keynote speech by Vietnamese President To Lam (see next section) stood in near-direct contradiction to Hegseth’s. The latter’s contention was also dubious.

The U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, which Hegseth boasted about at the start of his speech, prompted near-universal condemnation and invocations of international law across Southeast Asia. The U.S. strikes on Iran also sparked public consternation, which has only grown as the war takes a cruel toll on local economies.

Meanwhile, key European NATO allies were often much more equivocal about U.S. actions in Venezuela and Iran.

Hegseth singling out various countries as good allies and partners (the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam) also likely discomfited, rather than reassured, many.

His definition of a good partner entails moving toward spending 3.5 percent of GDP on defense and/or doing more on regional security. Spending 3.5 percent is a high bar that few will want to meet, except maybe Singapore. And in a region where great-power interference is viewed warily, few will be keen on a deeper entanglement with U.S. security. (Note the trepidation that greeted Indonesia’s proposed concessions to the United States on airspace overflight access.)

The Philippines has spent under 2 percent of GDP on defense for nearly 30 years. In 2024, its spending was 1.3% percent. This is consistently less than France and, until recently, about on par with Germany—until the latter committed to massive new defense spending. Most other Southeast Asian nations have similar track records.

Some now worry that failing to meet these benchmarks could mean worse treatment from the United States on the trade front.

And as Hunter Marston pointed out, Hegseth’s softer line on China at the summit stands in tension with his call on countries in the region to step up on security: “Washington is fuelling an arms race at a time when doubts about its commitment to the region continue to grow.”

One final note: It was odd to see Thailand, a treaty ally like the Philippines, bracketed into the “partners” section of the speech.

China’s Japan warning. Turns out the United States isn’t the only superpower failing to convince others at Shangri-La. China had its own its own solipsistic message at the dialogue: Beware of “militarism” from Japan.

“Can it earn the trust of the international community, especially the Asian countries that once suffered under its aggression? I have serious doubts,” Gen. Meng Xiangqing, head of China’s delegation, said about Japan.

As Japan ups its security role in the region, China hopes invoking the shared suffering of occupation by Japan during World War II will deter Southeast Asia. Reporting on Chinese President Xi Jinping’s outburst on the matter when he met with U.S. President Donald Trump in May suggests China really means it.

Yet official historical memories, which are important as those who actually lived through the war die, are different in China and Southeast Asia. For China, the struggle against Japanese invasion has been promoted as the birth of the modern nation. In Southeast Asia, the significance of the Japanese invasion is often much more ambiguous: especially cruel for overseas Chinese communities but also heralding independence.

Key nationalist figures like Sukarno in Indonesia and Aung San in Myanmar collaborated, looking to snatch independence as European colonial empires fell. The state-defining struggles were often postwar—against the Netherlands in Indonesia, France and then the United States in Vietnam, and Chinese communists in Malaysia.

Two countries—the Philippines and Singapore—focus heavily on the occupation as a period of nation-creating suffering. But both now have strong relationships with Japan, with the former embracing Japan as a key security partner.

Resentment of Japan did linger in some quarters in the 20th century, but Japan has worked hard to smooth them over. Polls in Southeast Asia show that Japan is now the region’s most trusted partner.

So, when Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi pushed back, he had a strong hand. He offered Japan as a security partner for the region, an important development that I will discuss in later iterations of Southeast Asia Brief. While few will probably go as far as the Philippines in embracing Japan, not many will be alarmed by China’s warning.

To Lam’s diplomatic push. Vietnam’s president gave the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue. This was a highlight of two weeks of diplomatic travel that took him to Bangkok, Manila, and Singapore.

The speech, in which To Lam diagnosed three crises, stood in sharp contrast to Hegseth’s vision where power, not values, matter.

Lam first identified “the crisis of the international order,” where “fundamental principles of international law are interpreted selectively, applied inconsistently, or subordinated to the logic where might makes right.” His second, “the crisis of development models,” was also interesting for anyone curious about his economic plans for Vietnam.

The third was “the crisis of strategic trust.” The solution he identified was “managing differences within a rules-based framework.” Lam said that disruptive new technologies like artificial intelligence risk intensifying the crisis.

To Lam’s visit to Singapore was also accompanied by the announcement of further cooperation on manufacturing and technology. His visits to Bangkok and Manila saw upgrades to diplomatic relationships and agreements on various issues, including tech and security.

Yadnya Kasada is a ceremony practiced by the Tenggerese people who live in Indonesia’s East Java province. Local legend holds that, long ago, a childless king and queen were granted 24 children by mountain gods on the condition that they threw the 25th into the mountain’s crater as a sacrifice. Today, people chuck in goats, chickens, and vegetables—as some stand with nets to try and catch the offerings.

Junta leader in India. Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing visited India, his first trip abroad since being “elected” as president, from May 30 to June 3.

Many had expected Min Aung Hlaing’s first trip to be to China, which has emerged as a key backer of the junta. But India offers opportunities to try to balance the former and has taken a pragmatic view of engagement with the junta.

Min Aung Hlaing’s first stop was in Bodh Gaya, where it is believed that the Buddha reached enlightenment. This was followed by meetings with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, President Droupadi Murmu, and Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri.

A joint statement after the visit included a few interesting nuggets.

The first was an agreement on “the importance of preventing the misuse of sovereign territory for activities inimical to their security interests.” In short, India wants Myanmar to crack down on Indian insurgent groups operating on Myanmar’s side of the border and vice versa.

The second was discussion of the Kaladan project—a highway that is supposed to connect India’s northeast to Myanmar and Thailand. The project has been stalled since Myanmar’s coup in 2021 and the subsequent civil war.

The third was talk of deepening economic ties, including establishing a rupee-kyat settlement mechanism.

Not everything is rosy, though. Even as the trip proceeded, Indian security forces and Myanmar’s military exchanged fire in a low-level border skirmish.

Senator arrested for corruption. On Monday, Sen. Jinggoy Estrada surrendered himself to police and was arrested on charges of plunder. He is now the highest-ranking elected official in the Philippines to be arrested in connection to last year’s flood infrastructure scandal.

This connects to the increasingly heated wrangling between pro- and anti-Duterte factions for control of the Senate ahead of Vice President Sara Duterte’s impeachment trial.

In theory, the pro-Duterte faction has 13 votes to its opponent’s 11. But, of the former camp, Estrada is now under arrest and Sen. Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa is on the run from the International Criminal Court after a shootout in the Senate. Plus, Sen. Robinhood Padilla is under investigation for allegedly helping Bato escape.

The anti-Duterte camp is also trying to block measures that would let senators attend and vote remotely. So, no casting your vote from a secret safe house or a jail cell for now.

All this is not enough to ensure Duterte is impeached. For that, 16 votes are needed.

Thai opposition leader acquitted. Leading Thai political figure Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit was acquitted of charges of lèse majesté and cybercrimes last week.

The businessman-turned-politician founded the liberal Future Forward Party in 2018 to challenge Thailand’s conservative establishment. Juangroongruangkit was subsequently dogged by repeated legal issues, which many saw as politically motivated.

In 2019, when his party came in third, he was disqualified from sitting as an MP on the grounds that he held shares in a media company when he registered to run.

In 2021, he was accused of lèse majesté ⁠and cybercrimes over statements in a livestream, where he said that the government had unfairly favored a company owned by the Thai king in the procurement of COVID-19 vaccines.

Accusations of insulting the monarchy are a common charge against opposition figures and can carry heavy sentences.

Despite a ban on the Future Forward Party and its successor, the movement continues today in the People’s Party, which leads the opposition.